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Figure 1: The Boyer–Moore Waterfall
Note that a formula falls back to the center pool after each successful application
of one of the stages in the circle.
1 A Snapshot of a Decisive Moment in History
The automation of mathematical theorem proving for deductive first-order logic started in
the 1950s, and it took about half a century to develop software systems that are sufficiently
strong and general to be successfully applied outside the community of automated theorem
proving.1 For more restricted logic languages, such as propositional logic and the purely
equational fragment, such strong systems were not achieved much earlier.2 Moreover,
automation of theorem proving for higher-order logic has started becoming generally useful
only during the last ten years.3
In this context, it is surprising that for the field of quantifier-free first-order inductive
theorem proving based on recursive functions, most of the progress toward general useful-
ness took place within the 1970s and that usefulness was clearly demonstrated by 1986.4
1The currently (i.e. in 2012) most successful first-order automated theorem prover is Vampire, cf. e.g.
[Riazanov & Voronkov, 2001].
2A breakthrough toward industrial strength in deciding propositional validity (i.e. sentential validity)
(or its dual: propositional satisfiability) (which are decidable, butNP-complete) was the SAT solver Chaff,
cf. e.g. [Moskewicz &al., 2001]. The most successful automated theorem prover for purely equational
logic is WaldMeister, cf. e.g. [Buch & Hillenbrand, 1996], [Hillenbrand & Löchner, 2002].
3Driving forces in the automation of higher-order theorem proving are the TPTP-competition-winning
systems Leo-II (cf. e.g. [Benzmüller &al., 2008]) and Satallax (cf. e.g. [Brown, 2012]).
4See the last paragraph of § 6.4.
4Figure 2: Robert S. Boyer (1971) (l.) and J Strother Moore (1972?) (r.)
In this article we describe how this leap took place, and sketch the further development
of automated inductive theorem proving.
The work on this breakthrough in the automation of inductive theorem proving was
started in September 1972, by Robert S. Boyer and J Strother Moore, in Edin-
burgh, Scotland. Unlike earlier work on theorem proving, Boyer and Moore chose to
make induction the focus of their work. Most of the crucial steps and their synergetic
combination in the “waterfall”5 of their now famous theorem provers were developed in
the span of a single year and implemented in their “Pure LISP Theorem Prover”,
presented at IJCAI in Stanford (CA) in August 1973,6 and documented in Moore’s PhD
thesis [1973], defended in November 1973.
5See Figure 1 for the Boyer–Moore waterfall. See [Bell & Thayer, 1976] for the probably first
occurrence of “waterfall” as a term in software engineering. Boyer and Moore, however, were inspired
not by this metaphor from software engineering, but again by a real waterfall, as can be clearly seen from
[Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 89]:
“A good metaphor for the organization of these heuristics is an initially dry waterfall. One
pours out a clause at the top. It trickles down and is split into pieces. Some pieces evaporate
as they are proved. Others are further split up and simplified. Eventually at the bottom a
pool of clauses forms whose conjunction suffices to prove the original formula.”
6Cf. [Boyer & Moore, 1973].
5Readers who take a narrow view on the automation of inductive theorem proving might
be surprised that we discuss the waterfall. It is impossible, however, to build a good in-
ductive theorem prover without considering how to transform the induction conclusion into
the hypothesis (or, alternatively, how to recognize that a legitimate induction hypothesis
can dispatch a subgoal). So we take the expansive view and discuss not just the induction
principle and its heuristic control, but also the waterfall architecture that is effectively an
integral part of the success.
Boyer and Moore had met in August 1971, a year before the induction work started,
when Boyer took up the position of a post-doctoral research fellow at the Metamathe-
matics Unit of the University of Edinburgh. Moore was at that time starting the second
year of his PhD studies in “the Unit”. Ironically, they were both from Texas and they had
both come to Edinburgh from MIT. Boyer’s PhD supervisor, W.W. Bledsoe, from
The University of Texas at Austin, spent 1970–71 on sabbatical at MIT, and Boyer ac-
companied him and completed his PhD work there. Moore got his bachelor’s degree at
MIT (1966–70) before going to Edinburgh for his PhD.
Being “warm blooded Texans”, they shared an office in the Metamathematics Unit at
9 Hope Park Square, Meadow Lane. The 18th century buildings at Hope Park Square were
the center of Artificial Intelligence research in Britain at a time when the promises of AI
were seemingly just on the horizon.7 In addition to mainline work on mechanized reason-
ing by Rod M. Burstall, Robert A. Kowalski, Pat Hayes, Gordon Plotkin,
J Strother Moore, Mike J. C. Gordon, Robert S. Boyer, Alan Bundy, and
(by 1973) Robin Milner, there was work on new programming paradigms, program trans-
7The Metamathematics Unit of the University of Edinburgh was renamed into “Dept. of Computational
Logic” in late 1971, and was absorbed into the new “Dept. of Artificial Intelligence” in Oct. 1974. It was
founded and headed by Bernard Meltzer. In the early 1970s, the University of Edinburgh hosted most
remarkable scientists, of which the following are relevant in our context:
Univ. Edinburgh PhD life time
(time, Dept.) (year, advisor) (birth–death)
Donald Michie (1965–1984, MI) (1953, unknown) (1923–2007)
Bernard Meltzer (1965–1978, CL) (1953, Fürth) (1916?–2008)
Robin J. Popplestone (1965–1984, MI) (no PhD) (1938–2004)
Rod M. Burstall (1965–2000, MI & Dept.AI) (1966, Dudley) (*1934)
Robert A. Kowalski (1967–1974, CL) (1970, Meltzer) (*1941)
Pat Hayes (1967–1973, CL) (1973, Meltzer) (*1944)
Gordon Plotkin (1968–today, CL & LFCS) (1972, Burstall) (*1946)
J Strother Moore (1970–1973, CL) (1973, Burstall) (*1947)
Mike J. C. Gordon (1970–1978, MI) (1973, Burstall) (*1948)
Robert S. Boyer (1971–1973, CL) (1971, Bledsoe) (*1946)
Alan Bundy (1971–today, CL) (1971, Goodstein) (*1947)
Robin Milner (1973–1979, LFCS) (no PhD) (1934–2010)
CL = Metamathematics Unit (founded and headed by Bernard Meltzer)
(new name from late 1971 to Oct. 1974: Dept. of Computational Logic)
(new name from Oct. 1974: Dept. of Artificial Intelligence)
MI = Experimental Programming Unit (founded and headed by Donald Michie)
(new name from 1966 to Oct. 1974: Dept. for Machine Intelligence and Perception)
(new name from Oct. 1974: Machine Intelligence Unit)
LFCS = Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science
(Sources: [Meltzer, 1975], [Kowalski, 1988], etc.)
6formation and synthesis, natural language, machine vision, robotics, and cognitive model-
ing. Hope Park Square received a steady stream of distinguished visitors from around
the world, including J. Alan Robinson, John McCarthy, W.W. Bledsoe, Dana
S. Scott, and Marvin Minsky. An eclectic series of seminars were on offer weekly
to complement the daily tea times, where all researchers gathered around a table and
talked about their current problems.
Boyer andMoore initially worked together on structure sharing in resolution theorem
proving. The inventor of resolution, J. Alan Robinson (*1930?), created and awarded
them the “1971ProgrammingPrize” on December 17, 1971 — half jokingly, half seriously.
The document, handwritten by Robinson, actually says in part:
“In 1971, the prize is awarded, by unanimous agreement of the Board, to Ro-
bert S. Boyer and J Strother Moore for their idea, explained in [Boyer
& Moore, 1971], of representing clauses as their own genesis. The Board
declared, on making the announcement of the award, that this idea is ‘. . . bloody
marvelous’.”
Their structure-sharing representation of derived clauses in a linear resolution system is just
a stack of resolution steps. This suggests the idea of resolution being a kind of “procedure
call.”8 Exploiting structure sharing, Boyer andMoore implemented a declarative LISP-
like programming language called “Baroque” [Moore, 1973], a precursor to Prolog.9
They then implemented a LISP interpreter in Baroque and began to use their resolution
engine to prove simple theorems about programs in LISP. Resolution was sufficient to
prove such theorems as “there is a list whose length is 3”, whereas the absence of a rule
for induction prevented the proofs of more interesting theorems like the associativity of list
concatenation.
So, in the summer of 1972, they turned their attention to a theorem prover designed
explicitly to do mathematical induction — this at a time when uniform first-order proof
procedures were all the rage. The fall of 1972 found them taking turns at the blackboard
proving theorems about recursive LISP functions and articulating their reasons for each
proof step. Only after several months of such proofs did they sit down together to write
the code for the Pure LISP Theorem Prover.
Today’s readers might have difficulty imagining the computing infrastructure in Scot-
land in the early 1970s. Boyer and Moore developed their software on an ICL–4130,
with 64 kByte (128 kByte in 1972) core memory (RAM). Paper tape was used for archival
storage. The machine was physically located in the Forrest Hill building of the University
of Edinburgh, about 1 km from Hope Park Square. A rudimentary time-sharing system
allowed several users at once to run lightweight applications from teletype machines at Hope
Park Square. The only high-level programming language supported was POP–2, a simple
stack-based list-processing language with an Algol-like syntax.10
8Cf. [Moore, 1973, Part I, § 6.1, pp. 68–69].
9For Baroque see [Moore, 1973, Part I, §§ 6.2 and 6.3, pp. 70–75]. For logic programming and
Prolog see [Moore, 1973, Part I, Chapter 6, pp. 68–75], [Kowalski, 1974; 1988], and [Clocksin &
Mellish, 2003].
10Cf. [Burstall &al., 1971].
7Programs were prepared with a primitive text editor modeled on a paper tape editor:
A disk file could be copied through a one byte buffer to an output file. By halting the
copying and typing characters into or deleting characters from the buffer one could edit
a file — a process that usually took several passes. Memory limitations of the ICL–4130
prohibited storing large files in memory for editing. In their very early collaboration,
Boyer andMoore solved this problem by inventing what has come to be called the “piece
table”, whereby an edited document is represented by a linked list of “pieces” referring to
the original file which remains on disk. Their “77-editor” [Boyer &al., 1973] (written in
1971 and named for the disk track on which it resided) provided an interface like MIT’s
Teco, but with POP–2 as the command language.11 It was thus with their own editor
that Boyer and Moore wrote the code for the Pure LISP Theorem Prover.
During the day Boyer and Moore worked at Hope Park Square, with frequent trips
by foot or bicycle through The Meadows to Forrest Hill to make archival paper tapes or to
pick up line-printer output. During the night — when they could often have the ICL–4130
to themselves — they often worked at Boyer’s home where another teletype was available.
2 Method of Procedure and Presentation
The excellent survey articles [Walther, 1994a] and [Bundy, 1999] cover the engineering
and research problems and current standards of the field of explicit induction. To cover
the history of the automation of mathematical induction, we need a wider scope in mathe-
matics and more historical detail. To keep this article within reasonable limits, we have
to focus more narrowly on those developments and systems which are the respectively first
successful and historically most important ones.
It is always hard to see the past because we look through the lens of the present.
Achieving the necessary detachment from the present is especially hard for the historian
of recent history because the “lens of the present” is shaped so immediately by the events
being studied.
We try to mitigate this problem by avoiding the standpoint of a disciple of the leading
school of explicit induction. Instead, we put the historic achievements into a broad mathe-
matical context and a space of time from the ancient Greeks to a possible future, based on a
most general approach to recursive definition (cf. § 5), and on descente infinie as a general,
implementation-neutral approach to mathematical induction (cf. § 4.7). Then we can see
the achievements in the field with the surprise they historically deserve — after all, until
1973 mathematical induction was considered too creative an activity to be automated.
11The 77-editor was widely used by researchers at Hope Park Square until the ICL–4130 was decom-
missioned. When Moore went to Xerox PARC in Palo Alto (CA) (Dec. 1973), the Boyer–Moore
representation [Moore, 1981] was adopted by Charles Simonyi (*1948) for the Bravo editor on the Alto
and subsequently found its way into Microsoft Word, cf. [Verma, 2005?].
8As a historiographical text, this article should be accessible to an audience that goes
beyond the technical experts and programmers of the day, should use common mathematical
language and representation, focus on the global and eternal ideas and their developments,
and paradigmatically display the historically most significant achievements.
Because these achievements in the automation of inductive theorem proving manifest
themselves for the first time mainly in the line of the Boyer–Moore theorem provers,
we cannot avoid the confrontation of the reader with some more ephemeral forms of repre-
sentation found in these software systems. In particular, we cannot avoid some small
expressions in the list programming language LISP,12 simply because the Boyer–Moore
theorem provers we discuss in this article, namely the Pure LISP Theorem Prover,
Thm, Nqthm, and ACL2, all have logics based on a subset of LISP.
Note that we do not necessarily refer to the implementation language of these soft-
ware systems, but to the logic language used both for representation of formulas and for
communication with the user.
For the first system in this line of development, Boyer and Moore had a free choice,
but wrote:
“We use a subset of LISP as our language because recursive list processing
functions are easy to write in LISP and because theorems can be naturally
stated in LISP; furthermore, LISP has a simple syntax and is universal in
Artificial Intelligence. We employ a LISP interpreter to ‘run’ our theorems and
a heuristic which produces induction formulas from information about how the
interpreter fails. We combine with the induction heuristic a set of simple rewrite
rules of LISP and a heuristic for generalizing the theorem being proved.”13
Note that the choice of LISP was influenced by the rôle of the LISP interpreter in induction.
LISPwas important for another reason: Boyer andMoore were building a computational-
logic theorem prover:
“The structure of the program is remarkably simple by artificial intelligence stan-
dards. This is primarily because the control structure is embedded in the syntax
of the theorem. This means that the system does not contain two languages,
the ‘object language’, LISP, and the ‘meta-language’, predicate calculus. They
are identified. This mix of computation and deduction was largely inspired by
the view that the two processes are actually identical. Bob Kowalski, Pat
Hayes, and the nature of LISP deserve the credit for this unified view.”14
This view was prevalent in the Metamathematics Unit by 1972. Indeed, “the Unit” was by
then officially renamed the Department of Computational Logic.7
12Cf. [McCarthy &al., 1965]. Note that we use the historically correct capitalized “LISP” for general
reference, but not for more recent, special dialects such as Common Lisp.
13Cf. [Boyer & Moore, 1973, p. 486, left column].
14Cf. [Moore, 1973, p. 207f.].
9In general, inductive theorem proving with recursively defined functions requires a logic
in which
a method of symbolic evaluation can be obtained from an interpretation pro-
cedure by generalizing the ground terms of computation to terms with free
variables that are implicitly universally quantified.
So candidates to be considered today (besides a subset of LISP or of λ-calculus) are the
typed functional programming languages ml and Haskell,15 which, however, were not
available in 1972. LISP and ml are to be preferred to Haskell as the logic of an inductive
theorem prover because of their innermost evaluation strategy, which gives preference to the
constructor terms that represent the constructor-based data types, which again establish
the most interesting domains in hard- and software verification and the major elements of
mathematical induction.
Yet another candidate today would be the rewrite systems of [Wirth & Gramlich,
1994a] and [Wirth, 1991; 2009] with constructor variables16 and positive/negative-condi-
tional equations, designed and developed for the specification, interpretation, and symbolic
evaluation of recursive functions in the context of inductive theorem proving in the domain
of constructor-based data types. Neither this tailor-made theory, nor even the general
theory of rewrite systems in which its development is rooted,17 were available in 1972.
And still today, the applicative subset of Common Lisp that provides the logic language
for ACL2 (= (ACL)2 = A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp) is again to
be preferred to these positive/negative-conditional rewrite systems for reasons of efficiency:
The applications of ACL2 in hardware verification and testing require a performance that
is still at the very limits of today’s computing technology. This challenging efficiency
demand requires, among other aspects, that the logic of the theorem prover is so close to
its own programming language that — after certain side conditions have been checked — the
theorem prover can defer the interpretation of ground terms to the analogous interpretation
in its own programming language.
For most of our illustrative examples in this article, however, we will use the higher
flexibility and conceptual adequacy of positive/negative-conditional rewrite systems. They
are so close to standard logic that we can dispense their semantics to the reader’s intuition,18
and they can immediately serve as an intuitively clear replacement of the Boyer–Moore
machines.19
15Cf. [Hudlak &al., 1999] forHaskell, [Paulson, 1996] for ml, which started as the meta-language for
implementations of LCF (the Logic of Computable Functions with a single undefined element ⊥, invented
by Scott [1993]) with structural induction over ⊥, 0, and s, but without original contributions to the
automation of induction, cf. [Milner, 1972, p. 8], [Gordon, 2000].
16See § 5.4 of this article.
17See [Dershowitz & Jouannaud, 1990] for the theory in which the rewrite systems of [Wirth &
Gramlich, 1994a], [Wirth, 1991; 2009] are rooted. One may try to argue that the paper that launched
the whole field of rewrite systems, [Knuth & Bendix, 1970], was already out in 1972, but the relevant
parts of rewrite theory for unconditional equations were developed only in the late 1970s and the 1980s.
Especially relevant in the given context are [Huet, 1980] and [Toyama, 1988]. The rewrite theory of posi-
tive/negative-conditional equations, however, started to become an intensive area of research only with the
burst of creativity at 1st Int. Workshop on Conditional Term Rewriting Systems (CTRS), Orsay (France),
1987; cf. [Kaplan & Jouannaud, 1988].
10
Moreover, the typed (many-sorted) approach of the positive/negative-conditional equa-
tions allows the presentation of formulas in a form that is much easier to grasp for human
readers than the corresponding sugar-free LISP notation with its overhead of explicit type
restrictions.
Another reason for avoiding LISP notation is that we want to make it most obvious
that the achievements of the Boyer–Moore theorem provers are not limited to their LISP
logic.
For the same reason, we also prefer examples from arithmetic to examples from list
theory, which might be considered to be especially supported by the LISP logic. The
reader can find the famous examples from list theory in almost any other publication on
the subject.20
In general, we tend to present the challenges and their historical solutions with the
help of small intuitive examples and refer the readers interested in the very details of the
implementations of the theorem provers to the published and easily accessible documents
on which our description is mostly based.
Nevertheless, small LISP expression cannot completely be avoided because we have
to describe the crucial parts of the historically most significant implementations and ought
to show some of the advantages of LISP’s untypedness.21 The readers, however, do not have
to know more about LISP than the following: A LISP term is either a variable symbol,
or a function call of the form (f t1 · · · tn), where f is a function symbol, t1, . . . , tn are
LISP terms, and n is one of the natural numbers, which we assume to include 0.
3 Organization of this Article
This article is further organized as follows.
§§ 4 and 5 offer a self-contained reference for the readers who are not familiar with
the field of mathematical induction and its automation. In § 4 we introduce the essen-
tials of mathematical induction. In § 5 we have to become more formal regarding recursive
function definitions, their consistency, termination, and induction templates and schemes.
The main part is § 6, where we present the historically most important systems in auto-
mated induction, and discuss the details of software systems for explicit induction, with a
focus on the 1970s. After describing the application context in § 6.1, we present the follow-
ing Boyer–Moore theorem provers: the Pure LISP Theorem Prover (§ 6.2), Thm
(§ 6.3), Nqthm (§ 6.4), and ACL2 (§ 6.5). The historically most important remaining
explicit-induction systems are sketched in § 6.6. Alternative approaches to the automation
of induction that do not follow the paradigm of explicit induction are discussed in § 7. After
summarizing the lessons learned in § 8, we conclude with § 9.
18The readers interested into the precise details are referred to [Wirth, 2009].
19Cf. [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 165f.].
20Cf. e.g. [Moore, 1973], [Boyer & Moore, 1979; 1988b; 1998], [Walther, 1994a], [Bundy, 1999],
[Kaufmann &al., 2000a; 2000b].
21See the advantages of the untyped, type-restriction-free declaration of the shell CONS in § 6.3.
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4 Mathematical Induction
In this section, we introduce mathematical induction and clarify the difference between
descente infinie and Noetherian, structural, and explicit induction.
According to Aristotle, induction means to go from the special to the general, and
to realize the general from the memorized perception of particular cases. Induction plays
a major rôle in the generation of conjectures in mathematics and the natural sciences.
Modern scientists design experiments to falsify a conjectured law of nature, and they accept
the law as a scientific fact only after many trials have all failed to falsify it. In the tradition
of Euclid, mathematicians accept a mathematical conjecture as a theorem only after a
rigorous proof has been provided. According to Kant, induction is synthetic in the sense
that it properly extends what we think to know — in opposition to deduction, which is
analytic in the sense that it cannot provide us with any information not implicitly contained
in the initial judgments, though we can hardly be aware of all deducible consequences.
Surprisingly, in this well-established and time-honored terminology, mathematical in-
duction is not induction, but a special form of deduction for which — in the 19th century —
the term “induction” was introduced and became standard in German and English mathe-
matics.22
In spite of this misnomer, for the sake of brevity, the term “induction” will always refer
to mathematical induction in what follows.
Although it received its current name only in the 19th century, mathematical induction
has been a standard method of every working mathematician at all times. It has been con-
jectured23 that Hippasus of Metapontum (ca. 550b.c.) applied a form of mathematical
induction, later named descente infinie (ou indéfinie) by Fermat. We find another form
of induction, nowadays called structural induction, in a text of Plato (427–347b.c.).24
In Euclid’s famous “Elements” [ca. 300b.c.], we find several applications of descente
infinie and in a way also of structural induction.25 Structural induction was known to
the Muslim mathematicians around the year 1000, and occurs in a Hebrew book of Levi
ben Gerson (Orange and Avignon) (1288–1344).26 Furthermore, structural induction was
used by Francesco Maurolico (Messina) (1494–1575),27 and by Blaise Pascal (1623–
1662).28 After an absence of more than one millennium (besides copying ancient proofs),
descente infinie was reinvented by Pierre Fermat (160?–1665).29 30
22First in German (cf. Note 39), soon later in English (cf. [Cajori, 1918]).
23It is conjectured in [Fritz, 1945] that Hippasus has proved that there is no pair of natural numbers
that can describe the ratio of the lengths of the sides of a pentagram and its enclosing pentagon. Note that
this ratio, seen as an irrational number, is equal to the golden number, which, however, was conceptualized
in entirely different terms in ancient Greek mathematics.
24Cf. [Acerbi, 2000].
25An example for descente infinie is Proposition 31 of Vol. VII of the Elements. Moreover, the proof in
the Elements of Proposition 8 of Vol. IX seems to be sound according to mathematical standards; and so
we can see it only as a proof by structural induction in a very poor linguistic and logical form. This is in
accordance with [Freudenthal, 1953], but not with [Unguru, 1991] and [Acerbi, 2000]. See [Fowler,
1994] and [Wirth, 2010b, § 2.4] for further discussion.
26Cf. [Rabinovitch, 1970]. Also summarized in [Katz, 1998].
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4.1 Well-Foundedness and Termination
A relation < is well-founded if, for each proposition Q(w) that is not constantly false, there
is a <-minimal m among the objects for which Q holds, i.e. there is an m with Q(m), for
which there is no u < m with Q(u).
Writing “Wellf(<)” for “< is well-founded”, we can formalize this definition as follows:
(Wellf(<)) ∀Q.
(
∃w. Q(w) ⇒ ∃m. (Q(m) ∧ ¬∃u<m. Q(u)) )
Let <+ denote the transitive closure of <, and <∗ the reflexive closure of <+.
< is an (irreflexive) ordering if it is an irreflexive and transitive relation.
There is not much difference between a well-founded relation and a well-founded
ordering : 31
Lemma 4.1 < is well-founded if and only if <+ is a well-founded ordering.
Closely related to the well-foundedness of a relation < is the termination of its reverse
relation written as <−1 or >, and defined as { (u, v) | (v, u)∈< }.
A relation > is terminating if it has no non-terminating sequences, i.e. if there is no
infinite sequence of the form x0 > x1 > x2 > x3 . . . .
If > has a non-terminating sequence, then this sequence, taken as a set, is a witness for
the non-well-foundedness of <. The converse implication, however, is a weak form of the
Axiom of Choice;32 indeed, it allows us to pick a non-terminating sequence for > from the
set witnessing the non-well-foundedness of <.
So well-foundedness is slightly stronger than termination of the reverse relation, and
the difference is relevant here because we cannot take the Axiom of Choice for granted in
a discussion of the foundations of induction, as will be explained in § 4.3.
27Cf. [Bussey, 1917].
28Cf. [Pascal, 1954, p. 103].
29There is no consensus on Fermat’s year of birth. Candidates are 1601, 1607 ([Barner, 2007]), and
1608. Thus, we write “160?”, following [Goldstein, 2008].
30The best-documented example of Fermat’s applications of descente infinie is the proof of the theorem:
The area of a rectangular triangle with positive integer side lengths is not the square of an integer ; cf. e.g.
[Wirth, 2010b].
31Cf. Lemma 2.1 of [Wirth, 2004, § 2.1.1].
32See [Wirth, 2004, § 2.1.2, p. 18] for the equivalence to the Principle of Dependent Choice, found in
[Rubin & Rubin, 1985, p.19], analyzed in [Howard & Rubin, 1998, p. 30, Form43].
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4.2 The Theorem of Noetherian Induction
In its modern standard meaning, the method of mathematical induction is easily seen to be
a form of deduction, simply because it can be formalized as the application of the Theorem
of Noetherian Induction:
A proposition P (w) can be shown to hold (for all w) by Noetherian induction
over a well-founded relation < as follows: Show (for every v) that P (v) follows
from the assumption that P (u) holds for all u < v.
Again writing “Wellf(<)” for “< is well-founded”, we can formalize the Theorem of
Noetherian Induction as follows:33
(N) ∀P.
(
∀w. P (w) ⇐ ∃<.
( ∀v.(P (v) ⇐ ∀u<v. P (u))
∧ Wellf(<)
))
The today commonly used term “Noetherian induction” is a tribute to the famous female
German mathematician Emmy Noether (1882–1935). It occurs as the “Generalized
principle of induction (Noetherian induction)” in [Cohn, 1965, p. 20]. Moreover, it occurs
as Proposition 7 (“Principle of Noetherian Induction”) in [Bourbaki, 1968a, Chapter III,
§ 6.5, p. 190] — a translation of the French original in its second edition [Bourbaki, 1967,
§ 6.5], where it occurs as Proposition 7 (“principe de récurrence nœthérienne”).34 We do not
know whether “Noetherian” was used as a name of an induction principle before 1965;35
in particular, it does not occur in the first French edition [Bourbaki, 1956] of [Bourbaki,
1967].36
33When we write an implication A⇒B in the reverse form of B⇐A, we do this to indicate that a proof
attempt will typically start from B and try to reduce it to A.
34The peculiar French spelling “nœthérienne” imitates the German pronunciation of “Noether”, where
the “oe” is to be pronounced neither as a long “o” (the default, as in “Itzehoe”), nor as two separate vowels as
indicated by the diaeresis in “oë”, but as an umlaut, typically written in German as the ligature “ö”. Neither
Emmy nor her fatherMax Noether (1844–1921) (mathematics professor as well) used this ligature, found
however in some of their official German documents.
35In 1967, “Noetherian Induction” was not generally used as a name for the Theorem of Noether-
ian Induction yet: For instance, this theorem — instantiated with the ordering of the natural num-
bers — is called the principle of complete induction in [Schoenfield, 1967, p. 205], but more often
called course-of-values induction, cf. e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction#
Complete_induction. “Complete induction”, however, is a most confusing name hardly used in English.
Indeed, “complete induction” is the literal translation of the German technical term “vollständige Induc-
tion”, which traditionally means structural induction (cf. Note 39) — and these two kinds of mathematical
induction are different from each other.
36Indeed, the main text of § 6.5 in the 1st edition [Bourbaki, 1956] ends (on Page 98) three lines before
the text of Proposition 7 begins in the 2nd edition [Bourbaki, 1967] (on Page 76 of § 6.5).
14
4.3 An Induction Principle Stronger than Noetherian Induction?
Let us try to find a weaker replacement for the precondition of well-foundedness inNoether-
ian induction, in the sense that we try to replace “Wellf(<)” in the Theorem of Noetherian
Induction (N) in § 4.2 with some weaker property, which we will designate with “Weak(<,P )”
(such that ∀P. Weak(<,P ) ⇐ Wellf(<)). This would result in the formula
(N′) ∀P.
(
∀w. P (w) ⇐ ∃<.
( ∀v.(P (v) ⇐ ∀u<v. P (u))
∧ Weak(<,P )
))
.
If we assume (N′), however, we get the converse ∀P. Weak(<,P ) ⇒ Wellf(<). 37 This
means that a proper weakening is possible only w.r.t. certain P, and the Theorem of
Noetherian Induction is the strongest among those induction principles of the form (N′)
where Weak(<,P ) does not depend on P.
C is a <-chain if <+ is a total ordering on C. Let us write “u<C” for ∀c∈C. u<c,
and “∀u<C. F ” as usual for ∀u.(u<C ⇒ F ). In [Geser, 1995], we find applications of an
induction principle that roughly has the form (N′) where Weak(<,P ) is:
For every non-empty <-chain C [without a <-minimal element]:
∃v∈C. P (v) ⇐ ∀u<C. P (u).
The resulting induction principle can be given an elegant form: If we drop the part of
Weak(<,P ) given in optional brackets [. . .], then we can drop the conjunction in (N′)
together with its first element, because {v} is a non-empty <-chain.
Then the following equivalent is obtained by switching from proposition P to its class of
counterexamples Q: “If, for every non-empty <-chain C ⊆ Q, there is a u ∈ Q with u<C,
then Q= ∅.” Under the assumption that Q is a set, this is an equivalent of the Axiom of
Choice (cf. [Geser, 1995], [Rubin & Rubin, 1985]).
This means that the axiomatic status of induction principles ranges from the Theorem
of Noetherian Induction up to the Axiom of Choice. If we took the Axiom of Choice
for granted, this difference in status between a theorem and an axiom would collapse and
our discussion of the axiomatic status of mathematical induction would degenerate. So the
care with which we distinguished termination of the reverse relation from well-foundedness
in § 4.1 is justified.
37Proof. Let <↾A denote the range restriction of < toA (i.e. u<↾Av if and only if u<v ∈A).
Let us take P (w) to be Wellf(<↾A(w)) for A(w) := { w′ | w′<∗ w }. Then the reverse implication
follows from (N′) because P (v) ⇐ ∀u<v. P (u) holds for any v,38 and ∀w. P (w) implies Wellf(<).
38Proof. To show P (v), it suffices to find, for an arbitrary, not constantly false proposition Q, an m
with Q(m), for which, in case of m∈A(v), there is no m′<m with Q(m′).
If we have Q(m) for some m with m 6∈A(v), then we are done.
If we have Q(u′) for some u < v and some u′ ∈ A(u), then, for Q′(u′′) being the conjunction of Q(u′′)
and u′′ ∈A(u), there is (because of the assumed P (u)) an m with Q′(m), for which there is no m′<m
with Q′(m′). Then we have Q(m). If there were an m′<m with Q(m′), then we would have Q′(m′).
Thus, there cannot be such an m′, and so m satisfies our requirements.
Otherwise, if none of these two cases is given, Q can only hold for v. As Q is not constantly false, we
get Q(v) and then v≮ v (because otherwise the second case is given for u := v and u′ := v). Then m := v
satisfies our requirements.
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4.4 The Natural Numbers
The field of application of mathematical induction most familiar in mathematics is the
domain of the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . . Let us formalize the natural numbers with the
help of two constructor function symbols, namely one for the constant zero and one for the
direct successor of a natural number:
0 : nat
s : nat→ nat
Moreover, let us assume in this article that the variables x, y always range over the natural
numbers, and that free variables in formulas are implicitly universally quantified (as is
standard in mathematics), such that, for example, a formula with the free variable x can
be seen as having the implicit outermost quantifier ∀x : nat.
After the definition (Wellf(<)) and the theorem (N), let us now consider some standard
axioms for specifying the natural numbers, namely that a natural number is either zero
or a direct successor of another natural number (nat1), that zero is not a successor (nat2),
that the successor function is injective (nat3), and that the so-called Axiom of Structural
Induction over 0 and s holds; formally:
(nat1) x= 0 ∨ ∃y. ( x= s(y) )
(nat2) s(x) 6= 0
(nat3) s(x) = s(y) ⇒ x= y
(S) ∀P.
(
∀x. P (x) ⇐ P (0) ∧ ∀y. ( P (s(y)) ⇐ P (y) ) )
Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) proved the Axiom of Structural Induction (S) for his
model of the natural numbers in [Dedekind, 1888], where he states that the proof method
resulting from the application of this axiom is known under the name “vollständige Induc-
tion”.39
Now we can go on by defining — in two equivalent40 ways — the destructor function
p : nat→ nat, returning the predecessor of a positive natural number:
(p1) p(s(x)) = x
(p1′) p(x′) = x ⇐ x′= s(x)
The definition via (p1) is in constructor style, where constructor terms may occur on the
left-hand side of the positive/negative-conditional equation as arguments of the function
being defined. The alternative definition via (p1′) is in destructor style, where only variables
may occur as arguments on the left-hand side.
39In the tradition of Aristotelian logic, the technical term “vollständige Induction” (in Latin: “inductio
completa”, cf. e.g. [Wolff, 1740, Part I, § 478, p. 369]) denotes a complete case analysis, cf. e.g. [Lambert,
1764, Dianoiologie, § 287; Alethiologie, § 190]. Its misuse as a designation of structural induction originates
in [Fries, 1822, p. 46f.], and was perpetuated by Dedekind. Its literal translation “complete induction”
is misleading, cf. Note 35. By the 1920s, “vollständige Induction” had become a very vague notion that is
best translated as “mathematical induction”, as done in [Heijenoort, 1971, p.130] and as it is standard
today, cf. e.g. [Hilbert & Bernays, 2013a, Note 23.4].
40For the equivalence transformation between constructor and destructor style see Example 6.5 in § 6.3.2.
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For both definition styles, the term on the left-hand side must be linear (i.e. all its
variable occurrences must be distinct variables) and have the function symbol to be defined
as the top symbol.
Let us define some recursive functions over the natural numbers, such as addition
and multiplication +, ∗ : nat, nat→ nat, the irreflexive ordering of the natural numbers
lessp : nat, nat→ bool (see § 4.5.1 for the data type bool of Boolean values), and the
Ackermann function ack : nat, nat→ nat : 41
(+1) 0+ y = y (∗1) 0 ∗ y = 0
(+2) s(x) + y = s(x+ y) (∗2) s(x) ∗ y = y+ (x ∗ y)
(lessp1) lessp(x, 0) = false
(lessp2) lessp(0, s(y)) = true
(lessp3) lessp(s(x), s(y)) = lessp(x, y)
(ack1) ack(0, y) = s(y)
(ack2) ack(s(x), 0) = ack(x, s(0))
(ack3) ack(s(x), s(y)) = ack(x, ack(s(x), y))
The relation from a natural number to its direct successor can be formalized by the binary
relation λx, y. (s(x) = y). Then Wellf(λx, y. (s(x) = y)) states the well-foundedness of
this relation, which means according to Lemma4.1 that its transitive closure — i.e. the
irreflexive ordering of the natural numbers — is a well-founded ordering; so, in particular,
we have Wellf(λx, y. (lessp(x, y)= true)).
Now the natural numbers can be specified up to isomorphism either by42
• (nat2), (nat3), and (S) — following Guiseppe Peano (1858–1932),
or else by
• (nat1) and Wellf(λx, y. (s(x) = y)) — following Mario Pieri (1860–1913).43
41Rósza Péter (1905–1977) (a woman in the fertile community of Budapest mathematicians and, like
most of them, of Jewish parentage) published a simplified version [1951] of the first recursive, but not
primitive recursive function developed by Wilhelm Ackermann (1896–1962) [Ackermann, 1928]. It is
actually Péter’s version that is simply called “the Ackermann function” today.
42Cf. [Wirth, 2004, § 1.1.2].
43Pieri [1908] stated these axioms informally and showed their equivalence to the version of the
Peano axioms [Peano, 1889] given in [Padoa, 1913]. For a discussion and an English translation see
[Marchisotto & Smith, 2007]. Pieri [1908] has also a version where, instead of the symbol 0, there is
only the statement that there is a natural number, and where (nat1) is replaced with the weaker statement
that there is at most one s-minimal element:
¬∃y0. (x0 = s(y0)) ∧ ¬∃y1. (x1 = s(y1)) ⇒ x0 =x1.
That non-standard natural numbers cannot exist in Pieri’s specification is easily shown as follows: For
every natural number x we can form the set of all elements that can be reached from x by the reverse of
the successor relation; by well-foundedness of s, this set contains the unique s-minimal element (0); thus,
we have x= sn(0) for some standard meta-level natural number n.
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Immediate consequences of the axiom (nat1) and the definition (p1) are the lemma (s1)
and its flattened44 version (s1′):
(s1) s(p(x′)) = x′ ⇐ x′ 6= 0
(s1′) s(x) = x′ ⇐ x′ 6= 0 ∧ x= p(x′)
Moreover, on the basis of the given axioms we can most easily show
(lessp4) lessp(x, s(x)) = true
(lessp5) lessp(x, s(x+ y)) = true
by structural induction on x, i.e. by taking the predicate variable P in the Axiom of
Structural Induction (S) to be λx. (lessp(x, s(x))= true) in case of (lessp4), and λx. ∀y.
(lessp(x, s(x+ y))= true) in case of (lessp5).
Furthermore — to see the necessity of doing induction on several variables in parallel —
we will present45 the more complicated proof of the strengthened transitivity of the irreflexive
ordering of the natural numbers, i.e. of
(lessp7) lessp(s(x), z) = true ⇐ lessp(x, y)= true ∧ lessp(y, z) = true
We will also prove the commutativity lemma (+3)46 and the simple lemma (ack4) about
the Ackermann function:47
(+3) x+ y = y+ x,
(ack4) lessp(y, ack(x, y)) = true
4.5 Standard Data Types
As we are interested in the verification of hardware and software, more important for us
than natural numbers are the standard data types of higher-level programming languages,
such as lists, arrays, and records.
To clarify the inductive character of data types defined by constructors, and to show the
additional complications arising from constructors with no or more than one argument,
let us present the data types bool (of Boolean values) and list(nat) (of lists over natural
numbers), which we also need for our further examples.
44Flattening is a logical equivalence transformation that replaces a subterm (here: p(x′)) with a fresh
variable (here: x) and adds a condition that equates the variable with the subterm.
45We will prove (lessp7) twice: once in Example 4.3 in § 4.7, and again in Example 6.2 in § 6.2.6.
46We will prove (+3) twice: once in Example 4.2 in § 4.7, and again in Example 4.4 in § 4.8.1.
47We will prove (ack4) in Example 4.5 in § 4.9.
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4.5.1 Boolean Values
A special case is the data type bool of the Boolean values given by the two constructors
true, false : bool without any arguments, for which we get only the following two axioms by
analogy to the axioms for the natural numbers. We globally declare the variable b : bool;
so b will always range over the Boolean values.
(bool1) b= true ∨ b= false
(bool2) true 6= false
Note that the analogy of the axioms of Boolean values to the axioms of the natural
numbers (cf. § 4.4) is not perfect: An axiom (bool3) analogous to (nat3) cannot exist because
there are no constructors for bool that take arguments. Moreover, an axiom analogous to (S)
is superfluous because it is implied by (bool1).
Furthermore, let us define the Boolean function and : bool, bool→ bool :
(and1) and(false, b) = false
(and2) and(b, false) = false
(and3) and(true, true) = true
4.5.2 Lists over Natural Numbers
Let us now formalize the data type of the (finite) lists over natural numbers with the help
of the following two constructors: the constant symbol
nil : list(nat)
for the empty list, and the function symbol
cons : nat, list(nat)→ list(nat),
which takes a natural number and a list of natural numbers, and returns the list where the
number has been added to the input list as a new first element. We globally declare the
variables k, l : list(nat).
By analogy to natural numbers, the axioms of this data type are the following:
(list(nat)1) l= nil ∨ ∃y, k. ( l= cons(y, k) )
(list(nat)2) cons(x, l) 6= nil
(list(nat)31) cons(x, l)= cons(y, k) ⇒ x= y
(list(nat)32) cons(x, l)= cons(y, k) ⇒ l= k
(list(nat)S) ∀P. (∀l. P (l) ⇐ (P (nil) ∧ ∀x, k. (P (cons(x, k)) ⇐ P (k))))
Moreover, let us define the recursive functions length, count : list(nat)→ nat, returning
the length and the size of a list:
(length1) length(nil) = 0
(length2) length(cons(x, l)) = s(length(l))
(count1) count(nil) = 0
(count2) count(cons(x, l)) = s(x+ count(l))
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Note that the analogy of the axioms of lists to the axioms of the natural numbers is
again not perfect:
1. There is an additional axiom (list(nat)31), which has no analog among the axioms of
the natural numbers.
2. Neither of the axioms (list(nat)31) and (list(nat)32) is implied by the axiom (list(nat)1)
together with the axiom
Wellf(λl, k. ∃x. (cons(x, l) = k)),
which is the analog to Pieri’s second axiom for the natural numbers.48
3. The latter axiom is weaker than each of the two axioms
Wellf(λl, k. (lessp(length(l), length(k)) = true)),
Wellf(λl, k. (lessp(count(l), count(k)) = true)),
which state the well-foundedness of bigger49 relations. In spite of their relative
strength, the well-foundedness of these relations is already implied by the well-founded-
ness that Pieri used for his specification of the natural numbers.
Therefore, the lists of natural numbers can be specified up to isomorphism by a specification
of the natural numbers up to isomorphism (see § 4.4), plus the axioms (list(nat)31) and
(list(nat)32), plus one of the following sets of axioms:
• (list(nat)2), (list(nat)S) — in the style of Peano,
• (list(nat)1), Wellf(λl, k. ∃x. (cons(x, l)= k)) — in the style of Pieri,50
• (list(nat)1), (length1–2) — refining the style of Pieri.51
Today it is standard to avoid higher-order axioms in the way exemplified in the last of these
three items,52 and to get along with one second-order axiom for the natural numbers, or
even with the first-order instances of that axiom.
48See § 4.4 for Pieri’s specification of the natural numbers. The axioms (list(nat)31) and (list(nat)32) are
not implied because all axioms besides (list(nat)31) or (list(nat)32) are satisfied in the structure where both
natural numbers and lists are isomorphic to the standard model of the natural numbers, and where lists
differ only in their sizes.
49Indeed, in case of cons(x, l) = k, we have lessp(length(l), length(k)) =
= lessp(length(l), length(cons(x, l))) = lessp(length(l), s(length(l))) = true because of (lessp4), and we also
have lessp(count(l), count(k)) = lessp(count(l), count(cons(x, l))) =
lessp(count(l), s(x+ count(l))) = true because of (+3) and (lessp5).
50This option is essentially the choice of the “shell principle” of [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p.37ff.]: The
one but last axiom of item (1) of the shell principle means (list(nat)2) in our formalization, and guarantees
that item (6) implies Wellf(λl, k. ∃x. (cons(x, l)= k)).
51Although (list(nat)2) follows from (length1–2) and (nat2), it should be included in this standard
specification because of its frequent applications.
52For this avoidance, however, we have to admit the additional function length. The same can be achieved
with count instead of length, which is only possible, however, for lists over element types that have a mapping
into the natural numbers.
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Moreover, as some of the most natural functions on lists, let us define the destructors
car : list(nat)→ nat and cdr : list(nat)→ list(nat), both in constructor and destructor style.
Furthermore, let us define the recursive member predicate mbp : nat, list(nat)→ bool, and
delfirst : list(nat)→ list(nat), a recursive function that deletes the first occurrence of a natu-
ral number in a list:
(car1) car(cons(x, l)) = x
(cdr1) cdr(cons(x, l)) = l
(car1′) car(l′) = x ⇐ l′= cons(x, l)
(cdr1′) cdr(l′) = l ⇐ l′= cons(x, l)
(mbp1) mbp(x, nil) = false
(mbp2) mbp(x, cons(y, l)) = true ⇐ x= y
(mbp3) mbp(x, cons(y, l)) = mbp(x, l) ⇐ x 6= y
(delfirst1) delfirst(x, cons(y, l)) = l ⇐ x= y
(delfirst2) delfirst(x, cons(y, l)) = cons(y,delfirst(x, l)) ⇐ x 6= y
Immediate consequences of the axiom (list(nat)1) and the definitions (car1) and (cdr1)
are the lemma (cons1) and its flattened version (cons1′):
(cons1) cons(car(l′), cdr(l′)) = l′ ⇐ l′ 6= nil
(cons1′) cons(x, l) = l′ ⇐ l′ 6= nil ∧ x= car(l′) ∧ l= cdr(l′)
Furthermore, let us define theBoolean function lexless : list(nat), list(nat)→ bool, which
lexicographically compares lists according to the ordering of the natural numbers, and
lexlimless : list(nat), list(nat), nat→ bool, which further restricts the length of the first argu-
ment to be less than the number given as third argument:
(lexless1) lexless(l, nil) = false
(lexless2) lexless(nil, cons(y, k)) = true
(lexless3) lexless(cons(x, l), cons(y, k)) = lexless(l, k) ⇐ x= y
(lexless4) lexless(cons(x, l), cons(y, k)) = lessp(x, y) ⇐ x 6= y
(lexlimless1) lexlimless(l, k, x) = and(lexless(l, k), lessp(length(l), x))
Such lexicographic combinations play an important rôle in well-foundedness arguments
of induction proofs, because they combine given well-founded orderings into new well-
founded orderings, provided there is an upper bound for the length of the list:53
(lexlimless2) Wellf(λl, k. (lexlimless(l, k, x) = true))
Finally note that analogous axioms can be used to specify any other data type generated
by constructors, such as pairs of natural numbers or binary trees over such pairs.
53The length limit is required because otherwise we have the following counterexample to termination:
(s(0)), (0, s(0)), (0, 0, s(0)), (0, 0, 0, s(0)), . . . . Note that the need to compare lists of different lengths
typically arises in mutual induction proofs where the induction hypotheses have a different number of free
variables at measured positions. See [Wirth, 2004, § 3.2.2] for a nice example.
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4.6 The Standard High-Level Method of Mathematical Induction
In general, the intuitive and procedural aspects of a mathematical proof method are not
completely captured by its logic formalization. For actually finding and automating proofs
by induction, we also need effective heuristics.
In the everyday mathematical practice of an advanced theoretical journal, the common
inductive arguments are hardly ever carried out explicitly. Instead, the proof reads some-
thing like “by structural induction on n, q.e.d.” or “by (Noetherian) induction on (x, y)
over <, q.e.d.”, expecting that the mathematically educated reader could easily expand the
proof if in doubt. In contrast, difficult inductive arguments, sometimes covering several
pages,54 require considerable ingenuity and have to be carried out in the journal explicitly.
In case of a proof on natural numbers, the experienced mathematician might engineer
his proof roughly according to the following pattern:
He starts with the conjecture and simplifies it by case analysis, typically based
on the axiom (nat1). When he realizes that the current goal is similar to an
instance of the conjecture, he applies the instantiated conjecture just like a
lemma, but keeps in mind that he has actually applied an induction hypothesis.
Finally, using the free variables of the conjecture, he constructs some ordering
whose well-foundedness follows from the axiom Wellf(λx, y. (s(x) = y)) and in
which all instances of the conjecture applied as induction hypotheses are smaller
than the original conjecture.
The hard tasks of a proof by mathematical induction are thus:
(Induction-Hypotheses Task)
to find the numerous induction hypotheses,55 and
(Induction-Ordering Task)
to construct an induction ordering for the proof, i.e. a well-founded ordering that
satisfies the ordering constraints of all these induction hypotheses in parallel.56
The above induction method can be formalized as an application of the Theorem of
Noetherian Induction. For non-trivial proofs, mathematicians indeed prefer the axioms
of Pieri’s specification in combination with the Theorem of Noetherian Induction (N)
to Peano’s alternative with the Axiom of Structural Induction (S), because the instances
for P and < in (N) are often easier to find than the instances for P in (S) are.
54Such difficult inductive arguments are the proofs of Hilbert’s first ε-theorem [Hilbert & Bernays,
1970], Gentzen’s Hauptsatz [Gentzen, 1935], and confluence theorems such as the ones in [Gramlich
& Wirth, 1996], [Wirth, 2009].
55As, e.g., in the proof of Gentzen’s Hauptsatz on Cut-elimination.
56For instance, this was the hard part in the elimination of the ε-formulas in the proof of the 1st ε-theorem
in [Hilbert & Bernays, 1970], and in the proof of the consistency of arithmetic by the ε-substitution
method in [Ackermann, 1940].
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4.7 Descente Infinie
The soundness of the induction method of § 4.6 is most easily seen when the argument is
structured as a proof by contradiction, assuming a counterexample. For Fermat’s historic
reinvention of the method, it is thus just natural that he developed the method in terms
of assumed counterexamples.57 Here is Fermat’s Method of Descente Infinie in modern
language, very roughly speaking:
A proposition P (w) can be proved by descente infinie as follows: Show that for
each assumed counterexample v of P there is a smaller counterexample u of P
w.r.t. a well-founded relation <, which does not depend on the counterexamples.
If this method is executed successfully, we have proved ∀w. P (w) because no counter-
example can be a <-minimal one, and so the well-foundedness of < implies that there are
no counterexamples at all.
It was very hard for Fermat to obtain a positive version of his counterexample method.58
Nowadays every logician immediately realizes that a formalization of the method of des-
cente infinie is obtained from the Theorem of Noetherian Induction (N) (cf. § 4.2) simply
by replacing
P (v) ⇐ ∀u<v. P (u)
with its contrapositive
¬P (v) ⇒ ∃u<v. ¬P (u).
For the history of the automation of induction, however, that difference between an
implication and its contrapositive is not crucial. Indeed, for this endeavor, the relevant
mathematical logic was formalized during the 19th and the 20th centuries and we may confine
ourselves to classical (i.e. two-valued) logics. What actually matters here is the heuristic
task of finding proofs. Therefore — overlooking that difference — we will take descente
infinie in the remainder of this article59 simply as a synonym for the modern standard
high-level method of mathematical induction described in § 4.6.
Let us now prove the lemmas (+3) and (lessp7) of § 4.4 (in the axiomatic context of
§ 4.4) by descente infinie, seen as the standard high-level method of mathematical induction
described in § 4.6.
57Cf. [Fermat, 1891ff.], [Mahoney, 1994], [Bussotti, 2006], [Wirth, 2010b].
58Fermat reported in his letter for Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) that he had had problems
applying the Method of Descente Infinie to positive mathematical statements. See [Wirth, 2010b, p. 11]
and the references there, in particular [Fermat, 1891ff., Vol. II, p. 432].
Moreover, a natural-language presentation via descente infinie (such as Fermat’s representation in
Latin) is often simpler than a presentation via the Theorem of Noetherian Induction, because it is
easier to speak of one counterexample v and to find one smaller counterexample u, than to manage the
dependences of universally quantified variables.
59In general, in the tradition of [Wirth, 2004], descente infinie is nowadays taken as a synonym for
the standard high-level method of mathematical induction as described in § 4.6. This way of using the
term “descente infinie” is found in [Brotherston & Simpson, 2007; 2011], [Voicu & Li, 2009], [Wirth,
2005a; 2010a; 2013; 2012c].
If, however, the historical perspective before the 19th century is taken, then this identification is not
appropriate because a more fine-grained differentiation is required, such as found in [Bussotti, 2006],
[Wirth, 2010b].
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Example 4.2 (Proof of (+3) by descente infinie)
By application of the Theorem of Noetherian Induction (N) (cf. § 4.2) with P set to
λx, y. (x+ y = y+x), and the variables v, u renamed to (x, y), (x′′, y′′), respectively, the
conjectured lemma (+3) reduces to
∃<.
( ∀(x, y). ((x+ y= y+x) ⇐ ∀(x′′, y′′)< (x, y). (x′′+ y′′= y′′+x′′))
∧ Wellf(<)
)
.
Let us focus on the sub-formula x+ y = y+ x. Based on axiom (nat1) we can reduce this
task to the two cases x= 0 and x= s(x′) with the two goals
0+ y = y+ 0; s(x′)+ y = y+ s(x′);
respectively. They simplify by (+1) and (+2) to
y = y+ 0; s(x′+ y) = y+ s(x′);
respectively. Based on axiom (nat1) we can reduce each of these goals to the two cases
y= 0 and y= s(y′), which leaves us with the four open goals
0 = 0+ 0; s(x′+ 0) = 0+ s(x′);
s(y′) = s(y′)+ 0; s(x′+ s(y′)) = s(y′)+ s(x′).
They simplify by (+1) and (+2) to
0 = 0; s(x′+ 0) = s(x′);
s(y′) = s(y′+ 0); s(x′+ s(y′)) = s(y′+ s(x′));
respectively. Now we instantiate the induction hypothesis that is available in the context60
given by our above formula in four different forms, namely we instantiate (x′′, y′′) with
(x′, 0), (0, y′), (x′, s(y′)), and (s(x′), y′), respectively. Rewriting with these instances, the
four goals become:
0 = 0; s(0+x′) = s(x′);
s(y′) = s(0+ y′); s(s(y′)+ x′) = s(s(x′) + y′);
which simplify by (+1) and (+2) to
0 = 0; s(x′) = s(x′);
s(y′) = s(y′); s(s(y′+x′)) = s(s(x′+ y′)).
Now the first three goals follow directly from the reflexivity of equality, whereas the last
goal also needs an application of our induction hypothesis: This time we have to instantiate
(x′′, y′′) with (x′, y′).
Finally, we instantiate our induction ordering < to the lexicographic combination of
length less than 3 of the ordering of the natural numbers. If we read our pairs as two-
element lists, i.e. (x′′, y′′) as cons(x′′, cons(y′′, nil)), then we can set < to
λl, k. (lexlimless(l, k, s(s(s(0)))) = true),
which is well-founded according to (lexlimless2) (cf. § 4.5). Then it is trivial to show that
(s(x′), s(y′)) is greater than each of (x′, 0), (0, y′), (x′, s(y′)), (s(x′), y′), (x′, y′).
This completes the proof of our conjecture by descente infinie. 
60On how this availability can be understood formally, see [Autexier, 2005].
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Example 4.3 (Proof of (lessp7) by descente infinie)
In the previous proof in Example 4.2 we made the application of the Theorem of Noether-
ian Induction most explicit, and so its presentation was rather formal w.r.t. the underlying
logic. Contrary to this, let us now proceed more in the vernacular of a working mathema-
tician. Moreover, instead of p= true, let us just write p.
To prove the strengthened transitivity of lessp as expressed in lemma (lessp7) in the
axiomatic context of § 4.4, we have to show
lessp(s(x), z) ⇐ lessp(x, y) ∧ lessp(y, z).
Let us reduce the last literal. To this end, we apply the axiom (nat1) once to y and once
to z. Then, after reduction with (lessp1), the two base cases have an atom false in their
conditions, abbreviating false= true, which is false according to (bool2), and so the base
cases are true (ex falso quodlibet ). The remaining case, where we have both y= s(y′) and
z= s(z′), reduces with (lessp3) to
lessp(x, z′) ⇐ lessp(x, s(y′))∧lessp(y′, z′)
If we apply the induction hypothesis instantiated via {y 7→y′, z 7→z′} to match the last
literal, then we obtain the two goals
lessp(x, z′) ⇐ lessp(x, s(y′))∧lessp(y′, z′)∧lessp(s(x), z′)
lessp(x, y′)∨lessp(s(x), z′)∨lessp(x, z′) ⇐ lessp(x, s(y′))∧lessp(y′, z′)
By elimination of irrelevant literals, the first goal can be reduced to the valid conjecture
lessp(x, z′) ⇐ lessp(s(x), z′), but we cannot obtain a lemma simpler than our initial
conjecture (lessp7) by generalization and elimination of irrelevant literals from the second
goal. This means that the application of the given instantiation of the induction hypothesis
is useless.
Thus, instead of induction-hypothesis application, we had better apply the axiom (nat1)
also to x, obtaining the cases x= 0 and x= s(x′) with the two goals — after reduction
with (lessp2) and (lessp3) —
lessp(0, z′) ⇐ lessp(y′, z′)
lessp(s(x′), z′) ⇐ lessp(x′, y′) ∧ lessp(y′, z′),
respectively. The first is trivial by (lessp1), (lessp2) after another application of the
axiom (nat1) to z′. The second is just an instance of the induction hypothesis via
{x7→x′, y 7→y′, z 7→z′}. As the induction ordering we can select any of the variables
of the original conjecture w.r.t. the irreflexive ordering on the natural numbers or w.r.t. the
successor relation.
This completes the proof of the conjecture by descente infinie.
Note that we also have made clear that the given proof can only be successful with an
induction hypotheses where all variables are instantiated with predecessors. It is actually
possible to show that this simple example — ceteris paribus — requires an induction hypo-
thesis resulting from an instance {x7→x′′, y 7→y′′, z 7→z′′} where, for some meta-level natural
number n, we have x= sn+1(x′′) ∧ y= sn+1(y′′) ∧ z= sn+1(z′′). 
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4.8 Explicit Induction
4.8.1 From the Theorem of Noetherian Induction to Explicit Induction
To admit the realization of the standard high-level method of mathematical induction as
described in § 4.6, a proof calculus should have an explicit concept of an induction hypo-
thesis. Moreover, it would have to cope in some form with the second-order variables P
and < in the Theorem of Noetherian Induction (N) (cf. § 4.2), and with the second-order
variable Q in the definition of well-foundedness (Wellf(<)) (cf. § 4.1).
Such an implementation needs special care regarding the calculus and its heuristics.
For example, the theorem provers for higher-order logic with the strongest automation
today3 are yet not able to prove standard inductive theorems by just adding the Theorem
of Noetherian Induction, which immediately effects an explosion of the search space. It is
a main obstacle to practical usefulness of higher-order theorem provers that they are still
poor in the automation of induction.
Therefore, it is probable that — on the basis of the logic calculi and the computer tech-
nology of the 1970s — Boyer and Moore would also have failed to implement induction
via these human-oriented and higher-order features. Instead, they confined the concept of
an induction hypothesis to the internals of single reductive inference steps — namely the
applications of the so-called induction rule — and restricted all other inference steps to
quantifier-free first-order deductive reasoning. These decisions were crucial to their success.
Described in terms of the Theorem of Noetherian Induction, this induction rule im-
mediately instantiates the higher-order variables P and < with first-order predicates. This
is rather straightforward for the predicate variable P, which simply becomes the (properly
simplified and generalized) quantifier-free first-order conjecture that is to be proved by in-
duction, and the tuple of the free first-order variables of this conjecture takes the place of
the single argument of P ; cf. Example 4.4 below.
The instantiation of the higher-order variable < is more difficult: Instead of a simple
instantiation, the whole context of its two occurrences is transformed. For the first occur-
rence, namely the one in the sub-formula ∀u<v. P (u), the whole sub-formula is replaced
with a conjunction of instances of P (u), for which u is known to be smaller than v in some
lexicographic combination of given orderings that are already known to be well-founded.
As a consequence, the second occurrence of <, i.e. the one in Wellf(<), simplifies to true,
and so we can drop the conjunction that contains it.
At a first glance, it seems highly unlikely that there could be any framework of proof-
search heuristics in which such an induction rule could succeed in implementing all appli-
cations of the Theorem of Noetherian Induction, simply because this rule has to solve
the two hard tasks of an induction proof, namely the Induction-Hypotheses Task and the
Induction-Ordering Task (cf. § 4.6), right at the beginning of the proof attempt, before the
proof has been sufficiently developed to exhibit its structural difficulties.
Most surprisingly, but as a matter of fact, the induction rule has proved to be most
successful in realizing all applications of the Theorem of Noetherian Induction required
within the proof-search heuristics of the Boyer–Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1). Essential
for this success is the relatively weak quantifier-free first-order logic:
• No new symbols have to be introduced during the proof, such as the ones of quantifier
elimination. Therefore, the required instances of the induction hypothesis can already
be denoted when the induction rule is applied.61
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• A general peculiarity of induction,62 namely that the formulation of lemmas often
requires the definition of new recursive functions, is aggravated by the weakness of the
logic; and the user is actually required to provide further guidance for the induction
rule via these new function definitions.63
Moreover, this success crucially depends on the possibility to generate additional lemmas
that are proved by subsequent inductions, which is best shown by an example.
Example 4.4 (Proof of (+3) by Explicit Induction)
Let us prove (+3) in the context of § 4.4, just as we have done already in Example 4.2
(cf. § 4.7), but now with the induction rule as the only way to apply the Theorem of
Noetherian Induction.
As the conjecture is already properly simplified and concise, we instantiate P (w) in
the Theorem of Noetherian Induction again to the whole conjecture and reduce this
conjecture by application of the Theorem of Noetherian Induction again to
∃<.
( ∀(x, y). ((x+ y= y+ x) ⇐ ∀(x′′, y′′)< (x, y). (x′′+ y′′= y′′+ x′′))
∧ Wellf(<)
)
.
Based, roughly speaking, on a termination analysis for the function +, the heuristic of the
induction rule of explicit induction suggests to instantiate < to λ(x′′, y′′), (x, y). (s(x′′)= x).
As this relation is known to be well-founded, the induction rule reduces the task based on
axiom (nat1) to two goals, namely the base case
0+ y = y+ 0;
and the step case
(s(x′) + y = y+ s(x′)) ⇐ (x′+ y = y+ x′).
This completes the application of the induction rule. Thus, instances of the induction
hypothesis can no longer be applied in the further proof (except the ones that have already
been added explicitly as conditions of step cases by the induction rule).
The induction rules of the Boyer–Moore theorem provers are not able to find the
many instances we applied in the proof of Example 4.2. This is different for a theoretically
more powerful induction rule suggested by Christoph Walther (*1950), which actually
finds the proof of Example 4.2.64 In general, however, for harder conjectures, a simulation
of descente infinie by the induction rule of explicit induction would require an arbitrary
look-ahead into the proofs, depending on the size of the structure of these proofs; thus,
because the induction rule is understood to have a limited look-ahead into the proofs, such
a simulation would not fall under the paradigm of explicit induction any more. Indeed, the
look-ahead of induction rules into the proofs is typically not more than a single unfolding of a
single occurrence of a recursive function symbol, for each such occurrence in the conjecture.
Note that the two above goals of the base and the step case can also be obtained by
reducing the input conjecture with an instance of axiom (S) (cf. § 4.4), i.e. with the Axiom
61Cf. Note 65.
62See item2 of § 4.10.
63Cf. § 9.
64See [Walther, 1993, p. 99f.]. On Page 100, the most interesting step case computed by Walther’s
induction rule is (rewritten to constructor-style):
s(x) + s(y) = s(y)+ s(x) ⇐ ( x+ s(y) = s(y)+x ∧ ∀z. (z+ y = y+ z) ).
In practice, however, Walther’s induction rule has turned out to be overall less successful when applied
within a heuristic framework similar to the Boyer–Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1).
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of Structural Induction over 0 and s. Nevertheless, the induction rule of the Boyer–
Moore theorem provers is, in general, able to produce much more complicated base and
step cases than those that can be obtained by reduction with the axiom (S).
Now the first goal is simplified again to y = y+ 0, and then another application of the
induction rule results in two goals that can be proved without further induction.
The second goal is simplified to
(s(x′+ y) = y+ s(x′)) ⇐ (x′+ y = y+ x′).
Now we use the condition from left to right for rewriting only the left-hand side of the
conclusion and then we throw away the condition completely, with the intention to obtain
a stronger induction hypothesis in a subsequent induction proof. This is the famous “cross-
fertilization” of the Boyer–Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1). By this, the simplified second
goal reduces to
s(y+x′) = y+ s(x′).
Now the induction rule triggers a structural induction on y, which is successful without
further induction.
All in all, although the induction rule of the Boyer–Moore theorem provers does not
find the more complicated induction hypotheses of the descente infinie proof of Example 4.2
in § 4.7, it is well able prove our original conjecture with the help of the additional lemmas
y = y+ 0 and s(y+ x′) = y+ s(x′).
It is crucial here that the heuristics of the Boyer–Moore waterfall discover these
lemmas automatically, and that this is also typically the case in general.
From a logical viewpoint, these lemmas are redundant because they follow from the
original conjecture and the definition of +. From a heuristic viewpoint, however, they are
more useful than the original conjecture, because — oriented for rewriting from right to
left — their application tends to terminate in the context of the overall simplification by
symbolic evaluation, which constitutes the first stage of the waterfall. 
Although the two proofs of the very simple conjecture (+3) given in Examples 4.2 and 4.4
can only give a very rough idea on the advantage of descente infinie for hard induction
proofs,65 these two proofs nicely demonstrate how the induction rule of explicit induction
manages to prove simple theorems very efficiently and with additional benefits for the
further performance of the simplification procedure.
Moreover, for proving very hard theorems for which the overall waterfall heuristic fails,
the user can state hints and additional lemmas with additional notions in any Boyer–
Moore theorem prover, except thePure LISP Theorem Prover.
65For some of the advantages of descente infinie, see Example 6.2 in § 6.2.6, and especially the more
difficult, complete formal proof of Max H. A. Newman’s famous lemma in [Wirth, 2004, § 3.4], where
the reverse of a well-founded relation is shown to be confluent in case of local confluence — by induction
w.r.t. this well-founded relation itself. The induction rule of explicit induction cannot be applied here
because an eager induction hypothesis generation is not possible: The required instances of the induction
hypothesis contain δ-variables that can only be generated later during the proof by quantifier elimination.
Though confluence is the Church–Rosser property, the Newman Lemma has nothing to do with the
Church–Rosser Theorem stating the confluence of the rewrite relation of αβ-reduction in untyped λ-
calculus, which has actually been verified with a Boyer–Moore theorem prover in the first half of the
1980s by Shankar [1988] (see the last paragraph of § 6.4 and Note 178) following the short Tait/Martin-
Löf proof found e.g. in [Barendregt, 2012, p. 59ff.]. Unlike the Newman Lemma, Shankar’s proof
proceeds by structural induction on the λ-terms, not by Noetherian induction w.r.t. the reverse of the
rewrite relation; indeed, untyped λ-calculus is not terminating.
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4.8.2 Theoretical Viewpoint on Explicit Induction
From a theoretical viewpoint, we have to be aware of the possibility that the intended models
of specifications in explicit-induction systems may also include non-standard models.
For the natural numbers, for instance, there may be Z-chains in addition to the natural
numbers N, whereas the higher-order specifications of Peano and Pieri specify exactly
the natural numbers N up to isomorphism.66 This is indeed the case for the case of the
Boyer–Moore theorem provers as explained in Note 140. These Z-chains cannot be
excluded because the inference rules realize only first-order deductive reasoning, except
for the induction rule to which all applications of the Theorem of Noetherian Induction
are confined and which does not use any higher-order properties, but only well-founded
orderings that are defined in the first-order logic of the explicit-induction system.
4.8.3 Practical Viewpoint on Explicit Induction
Note that the application of the induction rule of explicit induction is not implemented via
a reference to the Theorem of Noetherian Induction, but directly handles the following
practical tasks and their heuristic decisions.
In general, the induction stage of the Boyer–Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1) applies the
induction rule once to its input formula, which results in a conjunction — or conjunctive
set — of base and step cases to which the input conjecture reduces, i.e. whose validity
implies the validity of the input conjecture.
Therefore, a working mathematician would expect that the induction rule of explicit
induction solves the following two tasks:
1. Choose some of the variables in the conjecture as induction variables, and split the
conjecture into several base and step cases, based on the induction variables’ demand
on which governing conditions and constructor substitutions67 have to be added to
be able to unfold — without further case analysis — some of the recursive function
calls that contain the induction variables as direct arguments.
2. Eagerly generate the induction hypotheses for the step cases.
The actual realization of these tasks in the induction rule, however, is quite different from
these expectations: Except the very early days of explicit induction in the Pure LISP
Theorem Prover (cf. Example 6.1), induction variables play only a very minor rôle to-
ward the end of the procedure (in the deletion of flawed induction schemes, cf. § 6.3.8). The
focus, however, is on complete step cases including eagerly generated induction hypotheses,
and the complementing bases case are generated only at the very end.68
66Contrary to the Z-chains (which are structures similar to the integers Z, injectively generated from
an arbitrary element via s and its inverse, where every element is greater than every standard natural
number), “s-circles” cannot exist because it is possible to show by structural induction on x the two
lemmas lessp(x, x)= false and lessp(x, sn+1(x))= true for each standard meta-level natural number n.
67This adding of constructor substitutions refers to the application of axioms like (nat1) (cf. § 4.4), and
is required whenever constructor style either is found in the recursive function definitions or is to be used
for the step cases. In the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, only the latter is the case. In Thm, none is the
case.
68See, e.g., Example 5.5 of § 5.8.
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4.9 Generalization
Contrary to merely deductive, analytic theorem proving, an input conjecture for a proof
by induction is not only a task (as induction conclusion) but also a tool (as induction
hypothesis) in the proof attempt. Therefore, a stronger conjecture is often easier to prove
because it supplies us with a stronger induction hypothesis during the proof attempt.
Such a step from a weaker to a stronger input conjecture is called generalization.
Generalization is to be handled with great care because it is a sound, but unsafe reduc-
tion step in the sense that it may reduce valid goal to an invalid goal, causing the proof
attempt to fail; such a reduction is called over-generalization.
Generalization of input conjectures directly supplied by humans is rarely helpful be-
cause stating sufficiently general theorems is part of the standard mathematical training in
induction. As we have seen in Example 4.4 of § 4.8.1, however, explicit induction often has
to start another induction during the proof, and then the secondary, machine-generated
input conjecture often requires generalization.
The two most simple syntactical generalizations are the replacement of terms with fresh
universal variables and the removal of irrelevant side conditions.
In the vernacular of Boyer–Moore theorem provers, the first is simply called “gen-
eralization” and the second is called “elimination of irrelevance”. They are dealt with in
two consecutive stages of these names in the Boyer–Moore waterfall, which come right
before the induction stage.
The removal of irrelevant side conditions is intuitively clear. For formulas in clausal
form, it simply means to remove irrelevant literals. More interesting are the heuristics of
its realization, which we discuss in § 6.3.5.
The less clear process of generalization typically proceeds by the replacement of all
occurrences of a non-variable69 term with a fresh variable.
This is especially promising for a subsequent induction if the same non-variable term
has multiple occurrences in the conjecture, and becomes even more promising if these
occurrences are found on both sides of the same positive equation or in literals of different
polarity, say in a conclusion and a condition of an implication.
To avoid over-generalization, subterms are to be preferred to their super-terms,70 and
one should never generalize a term of any of the following forms: a constructor term, a top
level term, a term with a logical operator (such as implication or equality) as top symbol,
a direct argument of a logical operator, or the first argument of a conditional (IF). Indeed,
for any of these forms, the information loss by generalization is typically so high that the
generalization results in an invalid conjecture.
How powerful generalization can be is best seen by the multitude of its successful auto-
matic applications, which often surprise humans. Here is one of these:
69Besides the replacement of (typically all) the occurrences of a non-variable term, there is also the
possibility of replacing some — but not all — occurrences of a variable with a fresh variable. This is a very
delicate process, but heuristics for it were discussed very early, namely in [Aubin, 1976, § 3.3].
70This results in a weaker conjecture and the stronger one remains available by a further generalization.
30
Example 4.5 (Proof of (ack4) by Explicit Induction and Generalization)
Let us prove (ack4) in the context of § 4.4 by explicit induction. It is obvious that such a
proof has to follow the definition of ack in the three cases (ack1), (ack2), (ack3), using the
termination ordering of ack, which is just the lexicographic combination of its arguments.
So the induction rule of explicit induction reduces the input formula (ack4) to the following
goals:71
lessp(y, ack(0, y)) = true;
lessp(0, ack(s(x′), 0))= true ⇐ lessp(s(0), ack(x′, s(0)))= true;
lessp(s(y′), ack(s(x′), s(y′))) = true
⇐
(
lessp(y′, ack(s(x′), y′)) = true
∧ lessp(ack(s(x′), y′), ack(x′, ack(s(x′), y′)))= true
)
.
After simplifying with (ack1), (ack2), (ack3), respectively, we obtain:
lessp(y, s(y)) = true;
lessp(0, ack(x′, s(0)))= true ⇐ lessp(s(0), ack(x′, s(0)))= true;
lessp(s(y′), ack(x′, ack(s(x′), y′)))= true
⇐
(
lessp(y′, ack(s(x′), y′)) = true
∧ lessp(ack(s(x′), y′), ack(x′, ack(s(x′), y′)))= true
)
.
Now the base case is simply an instance of our lemma (lessp4). Let us simplify the two step
cases by introducing variables for their common subterms:
lessp(0, z) = true ⇐ ( lessp(s(0), z) = true ∧ z= ack(x′, s(0)) );
lessp(s(y′), z2) = true ⇐
(
lessp(y′, z1) = true ∧ lessp(z1, z2)= true
∧ z1 = ack(s(x′), y′) ∧ z2 = ack(x′, z1)
)
.
Now the first follows from applying (nat1) to z. Before we can prove the second by another
induction, however, we have to generalize it to the lemma (lessp7) of § 4.4 by deleting the
last two literals from the condition. 
In combination with explicit induction, generalization becomes especially powerful in the
invention of new lemmas of general interest, because the step cases of explicit induction
tend to have common occurrences of the same term in their conclusion and their condition.
Indeed, the lemma (lessp7), which we have just discovered in Example 4.5, is one of the
most useful lemmas in the theory of natural numbers.
It should be noted that all Boyer–Moore theorem provers except the Pure LISP
Theorem Prover are able to do this whole proof completely automatically and invent
the lemma (lessp7) by generalization of the second step case; and they do this even when
they work with an arithmetic theory that was redefined, so that no decision procedures
or other special knowledge on the natural numbers can be used by the system. Moreover,
as shown in § 3.3 of [Wirth, 2004], in a slightly richer logic, these heuristics can actually
synthesize the lower bound in the first argument of lessp from the weaker input conjecture
∃z. (lessp(z, ack(x, y)) = true), simply because lessp does not contribute to the choice of the
base and step cases.
71See Example 5.5 of § 5.8 on how these step cases are actually found in explicit induction.
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4.10 Proof-Theoretical Peculiarities of Mathematical Induction
The following two proof-theoretical peculiarities of induction compared to first-order de-
duction may be considered noteworthy:72
1. A calculus for arithmetic cannot be complete, simply because the theory of the arith-
metic of natural numbers is not enumerable.73
2. According to Gentzen’s Hauptsatz,74 a proof of a first-order theorem can always be
restricted to the “sub”-formulas of this theorem. In contrast to lemma application in
a deductive proof tree, however, the application of induction hypotheses and lemmas
inside an inductive reasoning cycle cannot generally be eliminated in the sense that the
“sub”-formula property could be obtained.75 As a consequence, in first-order inductive
theorem proving, “creativity” cannot be restricted to finding just the proper instances,
but may require the invention of new lemmas and notions.76
4.11 Conclusion
In this section, after briefly presenting the induction method in its rich historical context,
we have offered a formalization and a first practical description. Moreover, we have
explained why we can take Fermat’s term “descente infinie” in our modern context as a
synonym for the standard high-level method of mathematical induction. Finally, we have
introduced explicit induction and generalization.
Noetherian induction requires domains for its well-founded orderings; and these do-
mains are typically built-up by constructors. Therefore, the discussion of the method of
induction required the introduction of some paradigmatic data types, such as natural num-
bers and lists.
To express the relevant notions on these data types, we need recursion, a method of
definition, which we have often used in this section intuitively. We did not discuss its formal
admissibility requirements yet. We will do so in § 5, with a focus on modes of recursion
that admit an effective consistency test, including termination aspects such as induction
templates and schemes.
72Note, however, that these peculiarities of induction do not make a difference to first-order deductive
theorem proving in practice. See Notes 73 and 76.
73This theoretical result is given by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem [1931]. In practice, however,
it does not matter whether our proof attempt fails because our theorem will not be enumerated ever, or
will not be enumerated before doomsday.
74Cf. [Gentzen, 1935].
75Cf. [Kreisel, 1965].
76In practice, however, proof search for harder theorems often requires the introduction of lemmas,
functions, and relations, and it is only a matter of degree whether we have to do this for principled reasons
(as in induction) or for tractability (as required in first-order deductive theorem proving, cf. [Baaz &
Leitsch, 1995]).
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5 Recursion, Termination, and Induction
5.1 Recursion and the Rewrite Relation on Ground Terms
Recursion is a form of programming or definition where a newly defined notion may even
occur in its definientia. Contrary to explicit definitions, where we can always get rid of the
new notions by reduction (i.e. by rewriting the definienda (left-hand sides of the defining
equations) to the definientia (right-hand sides)), reduction with recursive definitions may
run forever.
We have already seen some recursive function definitions in §§ 4.4 and 4.5, such as
the ones of +, lessp, length, and count, where these function symbols occurred in some of
the right-hand sides of the equations of their own definitions; for instance, the function
symbol + occurs in the right-hand side of (+2) in § 4.4.
The steps of rewriting with recursive definitions can be formalized as a binary relation
on terms, namely as the rewrite relation that results from reading the defining equations as
reduction rules, in the sense that they allow us to replace occurrences of left-hand sides of
instantiated equations with their respective right-hand sides, provided that their conditions
are fulfilled.77
A ground term is a term without variables. We can restrict our considerations here to
rewrite relations on ground terms.
5.2 Confluence
The restriction that is to be required for every recursive function definition is the conflu-
ence78 of this rewrite relation on ground terms.
The confluence restriction guarantees that no distinct objects of the data types can be
equated by the recursive function definitions.79
This is essential for consistency if we assume axioms such as (nat2–3) (cf. § 4.4) or
(list(nat)2–3) (cf. § 4.5).
Indeed, without confluence, a definition of a recursive function could destroy the data
type in the sense that the specification has no model anymore; for example, if we added
p(x) = 0 as a further defining equation to (p1), then we would get s(0) = p(s(s(0))) = 0,
in contradiction to the axiom (nat2) of § 4.4.
77For the technical meaning of fulfilledness in the recursive definition of the rewrite relation see [Wirth,
2009], where it is also explained why the rewrite relation respects the straightforward purely logical, model-
theoretic semantics of positive/negative-conditional equation equations, provided that the given admissi-
bility conditions are satisfied (as is the case for all our examples).
78A relation−→ is confluent (or has the “Church–Rosser property”) if two sequences of steps with −→,
starting from the same element, can always be joined by an arbitrary number of further steps on each side;
formally:
+←−◦ +−→ ⊆ ∗−→◦ ∗←−. Here ◦ denotes the concatenation of binary relations; for the further
notation see § 4.1.
79As constructor terms are irreducible w.r.t. this rewrite relation, if the application of a defined function
symbol rewrites to two constructor terms, they must be identical in case of confluence.
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For the recursive function definitions admissible in the Boyer–Moore theorem provers,
confluence results from the restrictions that there is only one (unconditional) defining equa-
tion for each new function symbol,80 and that all variables occurring on the right-hand side
of the definition also occur on the left-hand side of the defining equation.81
These two restrictions are an immediate consequence of the general definition style of
the list-programming language LISP. More precisely, recursive functions are to be defined
in all Boyer–Moore theorem provers in the more restrictive style of applicative LISP.82
Example 5.1 (A Recursive Function Definition in Applicative LISP)
Instead of our two equations (+1), (+2) for +, we find the following single equation on
Page 53 of the standard reference for the Boyer–Moore heuristics [Boyer & Moore,
1979]:
(PLUS X Y) = (IF (ZEROP X)
(FIX Y)
(ADD1 (PLUS (SUB1 X) Y)))
Note that (IF x y z) is nothing but the conditional “IF z then y else z”, that ZEROP
is a Boolean function checking for being zero, that (FIX Y) returns Y if Y is a natural
number, and that ADD1 is the successor function s.
The primary difference to (+1), (+2) is that PLUS is defined in destructor style instead of
the constructor style of our equations (+1), (+2) in § 4.4. As a constructor-style definition
can always be transformed into an equivalent destructor-style definition, let us do so for
our definition of + via (+1), (+2).
In place of the untyped destructor SUB1, let us use the typed destructor p defined by
either by (p1) or by (p1′) of § 4.4, which — just as SUB1 — returns the predecessor of a
positive natural number. Now our destructor-style definition of + consists of the following
two positive/negative-conditional equations:
(+1′) x+ y = y ⇐ x= 0
(+2′) x+ y = s(p(x) + y) ⇐ x 6= 0
If we compare this definition of + to the one via the equations (+1), (+2), then we find
that the constructors 0 and s have been removed from the left-hand sides of the defining
equations; they are replaced with the destructor p on the right-hand side and with some
conditions.
Now it is easy to see that (+1′), (+2′) represent the above definition of PLUS in posi-
tive/negative-conditional equations, provided that we ignore that Boyer–Moore theorem
provers have no types and no typed variables. 
80Cf. item (a) of the “definition principle” of [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 44f.]. Confluence is also
discussed under the label “uniqueness” on Page 87ff. of [Moore, 1973].
81Cf. item (c) of the “definition principle” of [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 44f.].
82See [McCarthy &al., 1965] for the definition of LISP. The “ ‘applicative” subset of LISP lacks side
effects via global variables and the imperative commands of LISP, such as variants of PROG, SET, GO, and
RETURN, as well as all functions or special forms that depend on the concrete allocation on the system heap,
such as EQ, RPLACA, and RPLACD, which can be used in LISP to realize circular structures or to save space
on the system heap.
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If we considered the recursive equation (+2) together with the alternative recursive equa-
tion (+2′), then we could rewrite s(x) + y on the one hand with (+2) into s(x+ y), and,
on the other hand, with (+2′) into s(p(s(x))+ y). This does not seem to be problematic,
because the latter result can be rewritten to the former one by (p1).
In general, however, confluence is undecidable and criteria sufficient for confluence are
extremely hard to develop. The only known decidable criterion that is sufficient for con-
fluence of conditional equations and applies to all our example specifications, but does not
require termination, is found in [Wirth, 2009].83 It can be more easily tested than the ad-
missibility conditions of the Boyer–Moore theorem provers and avoids divergence even
in case of non-termination; the proof that it indeed guarantees confluence is very involved.
5.3 Termination and Reducibility
There are two restrictions that are additionally required for any function definition in the
Boyer–Moore theorem provers, namely termination of the rewrite relation and reducibi-
lity of all ground terms that contain a defined function symbol w.r.t. the rewrite relation.
The requirement of termination should be intuitively clear; we will further discuss it
in § 5.5.
Let us now discuss the requirement of reducibility.
First of all, note that it is not only so that we can check the soundness of (+1′) and (+2′)
independently from each other, we can even omit one of the equations, resulting in a partial
definition of the function +. Indeed, for the function p we did not specify any value for
p(0); so p(0) is not reducible in the rewrite relation that results from reading the specifying
equations as reduction rules.
A function defined in a Boyer–Moore theorem prover, however, must always be speci-
fied completely, in the sense that every application of such a function to (constructor)
ground terms must be reducible. This reducibility immediately results from the LISP defi-
nition style, which requires all arguments of the function symbol on the left-hand side of
its defining equation to be distinct variables.84
83The effective confluence test of [Wirth, 2009] requires binding-triviality or -complementary of every
critical peak, and effective weak-quasi-normality, i.e. that each equation in the condition must be restricted
to constructor variables (cf. § 5.4), or that one of its top terms either is a constructor term or occurs as the
argument of a definedness literal in the same condition.
84Cf. item (b) of the “definition principle” of [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 44f.].
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5.4 Constructor Variables
These restrictions of reducibility and termination of the rewrite relation are not essen-
tial; neither for the semantics of recursive function definitions with data types given by
constructors,85 nor for confluence and consistency.86
Note that these two restrictions imply that only total recursive functions87 are admissible
in the Boyer–Moore theorem provers.
As a termination restriction is not in the spirit of the LISP logic of the Boyer–Moore
theorem provers, we have to ask why Boyer and Moore brought up this additional
restriction.
When both reducibility and termination are given, then — similar to the classical case
of explicitly defined notions — we can get rid of all recursively defined function symbols by
rewriting, but in general only for ground terms.
A better potential answer is found on Page 87ff. of [Moore, 1973], where confluence
of the rewrite relation is discussed and a reference to Russell’s Paradox serves as an
argument that confluence alone would not be sufficient for consistency. The argumentation
is essentially the following: First, a Boolean function russell is recursively defined by
(russell1) russell(b) = false ⇐ russell(b) = true
(russell2) russell(b) = true ⇐ russell(b) = false
Then it is claimed that this function definition would result in an inconsistent specifi-
cation on the basis of the axioms (bool1–2) of § 4.5.
This inconsistency, however, arises only if the variable b of the axiom (bool1) can be
instantiated with the term russell(b), which is actually not our intention and which we do
not have to permit: If all variables we have introduced so far are constructor variables88
in the sense that they can only be instantiated with terms formed from constructor function
symbols (incl. constructor constants) and constructor variables, then irreducible terms such
as russell(b) can denote junk objects different from true and false, and no inconsistency
arises.89
Note that these constructor variables are implicitly part of the LISP semantics with
its innermost evaluation strategy. For instance, in Example 5.1 of § 5.2, neither the LISP
definition of PLUS nor its representation via the positive/negative-conditional equations
(+1′), (+2′) is intended to be applied to a non-constructor term in the sense that X or x
should be instantiated to a term that is a function call of a (partially) defined function
symbol that may denote a junk object.
85Cf. [Wirth & Gramlich, 1994b].
86Cf. [Wirth, 2009].
87You may follow the explicit reference to [Schoenfield, 1967] as the basis for the logic of the Pure
LISP Theorem Prover on Page 93 of [Moore, 1973].
88Such constructor variables were formally introduced for the first time in [Wirth &al., 1993] and
became an essential part of the frameworks found in [Wirth & Gramlich, 1994a; 1994b], [Kühler &
Wirth, 1996; 1997], [Wirth, 1997; 2009] [Kühler, 2000], [Avenhaus &al., 2003], and [Schmidt-Samoa,
2006a; 2006b; 2006c].
89For the appropriate semantics see [Wirth & Gramlich, 1994b], [Kühler & Wirth, 1997].
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Moreover, there is evidence that Moore considered the variables already in 1973 as
constructor variables: On Page 87 in [Moore, 1973], we find formulas on definedness and
confluence, which make sense only for constructor variables; the one on definedness of the
Boolean function (AND X Y) reads90
∃Z (IF X (IF Y T NIL) NIL) = Z,
which is trivial for a general variable Z and makes sense only if Z is taken to be a constructor
variable.
Finally, the way termination is established via induction templates in Boyer–Moore
theorem provers and as we will describe it in § 5.5, is sound for the rewrite relation of the
defining equations only if we consider the variables of these equations to be constructor
variables (or if we restrict the termination result to an innermost rewriting strategy and
require that all function definitions are total).
5.5 Termination and General Induction Templates
In addition to the restricted style of recursive definition that is found in LISP and that
guarantees reducibility of terms with defined function symbols and confluence as described
in §§ 5.3 and 5.4, the theorem provers for explicit induction require termination of the
rewrite relation that results from reading the specifying equations as reduction rules. More
precisely, in all Boyer–Moore theorem provers except the Pure LISP Theorem Pro-
ver,91 before a new function symbol fk is admitted to the specification, a “valid induction
template” — which immediately implies termination — has to be constructed from the
defining equation of fk.
92
Induction templates were first used in Thm and received their name when they were
first described in [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
Every time a new recursive function fk is defined, a system for explicit induction im-
mediately tries to construct valid induction templates; if it does not find any, then the
new function symbol is rejected w.r.t. the given definition; otherwise the system links the
function name with its definition and its valid induction templates.
The induction templates serve actually two purposes: as witnesses for termination and
as the basic tools of the induction rule of explicit induction for generating the step cases.
90In the logic of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, the special form IF is actually called “COND”. This
is most confusing because COND is a standard special form in LISP, different from IF. Therefore, we will
ignore this peculiarity and tacitly write “IF” here and in what follows for every “COND” of the Pure LISP
Theorem Prover.
91Note that termination is not proved in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover; instead, the soundness
of the induction proofs comes with the proviso that the rewrite relation of all defined function symbols
terminate.
92See also item (d) of the “definition principle” of [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 44f.] for a formulation that
avoids the technical term “induction template”.
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For a finite number of mutually recursive functions fk with arity nk (k ∈K), an induction
template in the most general form consists of the following:
1. A relational description93 of the changes in the argument pattern of these recursive
functions as found in their recursive defining equations:
For each k ∈ K and for each positive/negative-conditional equation with a left-hand
side of the form fk(t1, . . . , tnk), we take the set R of recursive function calls of the fk′
(k′∈K) occurring in the right-hand side or the condition, and some case condition C,
which must be a subset of the conjunctive condition literals of the defining equation.
Typically, C is empty (i.e. always true) in the case of constructor-style definitions, and
just sufficient to guarantee proper destructor applications in the case of destructor-
style definitions.
Together they form the triple (fk(t1, . . . , tnk), R, C), and a set containing such a triple
for each such defining equation forms the relational description.
For our definition of + via (+1), (+2) in § 4.4, there is only one recursive equation
and only one relevant relational description, namely the following one with an empty
case condition: { (
s(x) + y, {x+ y}, ∅ ) }.
Also for our definition of + with (+1′), (+2′) in Example 5.1, there is only one
recursive equation and only one relevant relational description, namely{ (
x+ y, {p(x) + y}, {x 6= 0} ) }.
2. For each k ∈ K, a variable-free weight term wfk in which the position numbers
(1), . . . , (nk)
are used in place of variables. The position numbers actually occurring in the term
are called the measured positions.
For our two relational descriptions, only the weight term (1) (consisting just of a
position number) makes sense as w+, resulting in the set of measured positions {1}.
Indeed, + terminates in both definitions because the argument in the first position
gets smaller.
3. A binary predicate < that is known to represent a well-founded relation.
For our two relational descriptions, the predicate λx, y. (lessp(x, y)= true), is appro-
priate.
Now, an induction template is valid if for each element of the relational description as given
above, and for each fk′(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n
k′
) ∈ R, the following conjecture is valid:
wf
k′
{(1)7→t′1, . . . , (nk′) 7→t′n
k′
} < wfk{(1) 7→t1, . . . , (nk) 7→tnk} ⇐
∧
C.
For our two relational descriptions, this amounts to showing lessp(x, s(x)) = true and
lessp(p(x), x) = true ⇐ x 6= 0, respectively; so their templates are both valid by lemma
(lessp4) and axioms (nat1–2) and (p1).
93The name “relational description” comes from [Walther, 1992; 1993].
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Example 5.2 (Two Induction Templates with different Measured Positions)
For the ordering predicate lessp as defined by (lessp1–3) of § 4.4, we get two appropriate
induction templates with the sets of measured positions {1} and {2}, respectively, both
with the relational description{ (
lessp(s(x), s(y)), {lessp(x, y)}, ∅ ) },
and both with the well-founded ordering λx, y. (lessp(x, y)= true). The first template has
the weight term (1) and the second one has the weight term (2). The validity of both
templates is given by lemma (lessp4) of § 4.4. 
Example 5.3 (One Induction Template with Two Measured Positions)
For the Ackermann function ack as defined by (ack1–3) of § 4.4, we get only one appropri-
ate induction template. The set of its measured positions is {1, 2}, because of the weight
function cons((1), cons((2), nil)), which we will abbreviate in the following with [(1), (2)].
The well-founded relation is the lexicographic ordering λl, k. (lexlimless(l, k, s(s(s(0))))= true).
The relational description has two elements: For the equation (ack2) we get(
ack(s(x), 0), {ack(x, s(0))}, ∅ ),
and for the equation (ack3) we get(
ack(s(x), s(y)), {ack(s(x), y), ack(x, ack(s(x), y))}, ∅ ).
The validity of the template is expressed in the three equations
lexlimless([x, s(0)], [s(x), 0], s(s(s(0)))) = true;
lexlimless([s(x), y], [s(x), s(y)], s(s(s(0)))) = true;
lexlimless([x, ack(s(x), y)], [s(x), s(y)], s(s(s(0)))) = true;
which follow deductively from (lessp4), (lexlimless1), (lexless2–4), (length1–2). 
For induction templates of destructor-style definitions see Examples 6.8 and 6.9 in § 6.3.7.
5.6 Termination of the Rewrite Relation on Ground Terms
Let us prove that the existence of a valid induction template for a new set of recursive
functions fk (k∈K) actually implies termination of the rewrite relation after addition of the
new positive/negative-conditional equations for the fk, assuming any arbitrary model M
of all (positive/negative-conditional) equations with free constructors to be given.94
For an argumentum ad absurdum, suppose that there is an infinite sequence of rewrite
steps on ground terms. Consider each term in this sequence to be replaced with the multiset
that contains, for each occurrence of a function call fk(t1, . . . , tnk) with k ∈K, the value of
its weight term wfk{(1)7→t1, . . . , (nk) 7→tnk} in M.
Then the rewrite steps with instances of the old equations of previous function definitions
(of symbols not among the fk) can change the multiset only by deleting some elements for
the following two reasons: Instances that do not contain any new function symbol have no
effect on the values in M, because M is a model of the old equations. There are no other
instances because the new function symbols do not occur in the old equations, and because
we consider all our variables to be constructor variables as explained in § 5.4.95
94A model with free constructors is a model where two constructor ground terms are equal in M only if
they are syntactically equal. Because the confluence result of [Wirth, 2009] applies in our case without
requiring termination, there is always an initial model with free constructors according to Corollary 7.17
of [Wirth, 1997], namely the factor algebra of the ground term algebra modulo the equivalence closure of
the rewrite relation.
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Moreover, a rewrite step with a new equation reduces only a single innermost occurrence
of a new function symbol, because only a single new function symbol occurs on the left-hand
side of the equation and because we consider all our variables to be constructor variables.
The other occurrences in the multiset are not affected because M is a model of the new
equations. Thus, such a rewrite step reduces the multiset in a well-founded relation, namely
the multiset extension of the well-founded relation of the template in the assumed modelM.
Indeed, this follows from the fulfilledness of the conditions of the equation and the validity
of the template.
Thus, in each rewrite step, the multiset gets smaller in a well-founded ordering or does
not change. Moreover, if we assume that rewriting with the old equations terminates, then
the new equations must be applied infinitely often in this sequence, and so the multiset
gets smaller in infinitely many steps, which is impossible in a well-founded ordering.
5.7 Applicable Induction Templates for Explicit Induction
We restrict the discussion in this section to recursive functions that are not mutually re-
cursive, partly for simplicity and partly because induction templates are hardly helpful for
finding proofs involving non-trivially mutually recursive functions.96
Moreover, in principle, users can always encode mutually recursive functions fk(. . .) by
means of a single recursive function f(k, . . .). Via such an encoding, humans tend to pro-
vide additional heuristic information relevant for induction templates, namely by the way
they standardize the argument list w.r.t. length and position (cf. the “changeable positions”
below).
Thus, all the fk with arity nk of § 5.5 simplify to one symbol f with arity n. More-
over, under this restriction it is easy to partition the measured positions of a template into
“changeable” and “unchangeable” ones.97
Changeable are those measured positions i of the template which sometimes change in
the recursion, i.e. for which there is a triple (f(t1, . . . , tn), R, C) in the relational descrip-
tion of the template, and an f(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) ∈ R such that t′i 6= ti. The remaining measured
positions of the template are called unchangeable. Unchangeable positions typically result
from the inclusion of a global variable into the argument list of a function (to observe an
applicative programming style).
To improve the applicability of the induction hypotheses of the step cases produced
by the induction rule, these induction hypotheses should mirror the recursive calls of the
unfolding of the definition of a function f occurring in the induction rule’s input formula,
say
A[f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n)].
95Among the old equations here, we may even admit projective equations with general variables, such
as for destructors and the conditional function IfThenElsenat : bool, nat, nat→ nat:
p(s(X)) =X car(cons(X,L)) =X
cdr(cons(X,L))=L
IfThenElsenat(true, X, Y ) =X
IfThenElsenat(false,X, Y )= Y
for general variables X,Y : nat, L : list(nat), ranging over general terms (instead of constructor terms
only).
96See, however, [Kapur & Subramaniam, 1996] for explicit-induction heuristics applicable to simple
forms of mutual recursion.
97This partition into changeable and unchangeable positions (actually: variables) originates in [Boyer
& Moore, 1979, p. 185f.].
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An induction template is applicable to the indicated occurrence of its function symbol f
if the terms t′′i at the changeable positions i of the template are distinct variables and
none of these variables occurs in the terms t′′i′ that fill the unchangeable positions i
′ of the
template.98 For templates of constructor-style equations we additionally have to require here
that the first element f(t1, . . . , tn) of each triple of the relational description of the template
matches (f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n))ξ for some constructor substitution ξ that may replace the variables
of f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n) with constructor terms, i.e. terms consisting of constructor symbols and
variables, such that t′′i ξ= t
′′
i for each unchangeable position i of the template.
Example 5.4 (Applicable Induction Templates)
Let us consider the conjecture (ack4) from § 4.4. From the three induction templates of
Examples 5.2 and 5.3, only the one of Example 5.3 is applicable. The two of Example 5.2
are not applicable because lessp(s(x), s(y)) cannot be matched to (lessp(y, ack(x, y)))ξ for
any constructor substitution ξ. 
5.8 Induction Schemes
Let us recall that for every recursive call f(t′j′,1, . . . , t
′
j′,n) in a positive/negative-condi-
tional equation with left-hand side f(t1, . . . , tn), the relational description of an induction
template for f contains a triple(
f(t1, . . . , tn), { f(t′j,1, . . . , t′j,n) | j ∈ J }, C
)
,
such that j′ ∈ J (by definition of an induction template).
Let us assume that the induction template is valid and applicable to the occurrence
indicated in the formula A[f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n)] given as input to the induction rule of explicit in-
duction. Let σ be the substitution whose domain are the variables of f(t1, . . . , tn) and which
matches the first element f(t1, . . . , tn) of the triple to (f(t
′′
1, . . . , t
′′
n))ξ for some constructor
substitution ξ whose domain are the variables of f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n), such that t
′′
i ξ= t
′′
i for each
unchangeable position i of the template. Then we have tiσ = t
′′
i ξ for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Now, for the well-foundedness of the generic step-case formula( (
A[f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n)]
)
ξ ⇐ ∧j∈J (A[f(t′′1, . . . , t′′n)])µj
)
⇐ ∧Cσ
to be implied by the validity of the induction template, it suffices to take substitutions
µj whose domain dom(µj) is the set of variables of f(t
′′
1, . . . , t
′′
n), such that the constraint
t′′i µj = t
′
j,iσ is satisfied for each measured position i of the template and for each j ∈ J
(because of t′′i ξ= tiσ).
If i is an unchangeable position of the template, then we have ti = t
′
j,i and t
′′
i ξ= t
′′
i .
Therefore, we can satisfy the constraint by requiring µj to be the identity on the variables
of t′′i , simply because then we have t
′′
i µj = t
′′
i = t
′′
i ξ= tiσ= t
′
j,iσ.
If i is a changeable position, then we know by the applicability of the template that t′′i
is a variable not occurring in another changeable or unchangeable position in f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n),
and we can satisfy the constraint simply by defining t′′i µj := t
′
j,iσ.
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On the remaining variables of f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n), we define µj in a way that we get t
′′
i µj = t
′
j,iσ
for as many unmeasured positions i as possible, and otherwise as the identity. This is not
required for well-foundedness, but it improves the likeliness of applicability of the induction
hypothesis (A[f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n)])µj after unfolding f(t
′′
1, . . . , t
′′
n)ξ in (A[f(t
′′
1, . . . , t
′′
n)])ξ. Note
that such an eager instantiation is required in explicit induction unless the logic admits one
of the following: existential quantification, existential variables,99 lazy induction-hypothesis
generation.
An induction scheme for the given input formula consists of the following items:
1. The position set contains the position of f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n) in A[f(t
′′
1, . . . , t
′′
n)]. Merging of
induction schemes may lead to non-singleton position sets later.
2. The set of the induction variables, which are defined as the variables at the changeable
positions of the induction template in f(t′′1, . . . , t
′′
n).
3. To obtain a step-case description for all step cases by means of the generic step-case
formula displayed above, each triple in the relational description of the considered
form is replaced with the new triple(
ξ, {µj | j ∈ J }, Cσ
)
.
To make as many induction hypotheses available as possible in each case, we assume
that step-case descriptions are implicitly kept normalized by the following associative
commutative operation: If two triples are identical in their first elements and in their
last elements, we replace them with the single triple that has the same first and last
elements and the union of the middle elements as new middle element.
4. We also add the hitting ratio100 of all substitutions µj with j ∈ J given by
|{ (j, i) ∈ J×{1, . . . , n} | t′′i µj = t′j,iσ }|
|J×{1, . . . , n}| ,
where J actually has to be the disjoint sum over all the J occurring as index sets of
second elements of triples like the one displayed above.
Note that the resulting step-case description is a set describing all step cases of an induction
scheme; these step cases are guaranteed to be well-founded,101 but — for providing a sound
induction formula — they still have to be complemented by base cases, which may be
analogously described by triples (ξ, ∅, C), such that all substitutions in the first elements
of the triples together describe a distinction of cases that is complete for constructor terms
and, for each of these substitutions, its case conditions describe a complete distinction of
cases again.
98This definition of applicability originates in [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 185f.].
99Existential variables are called “free variables” in modern tableau systems (see the 2nd rev. edn. [Fit-
ting, 1996], but not its 1st edn. [Fitting, 1990]) and occur with extended functionality under different
names in the inference systems of [Wirth, 2004; 2012b; 2013].
100We newly introduce this name here in the hope that it helps the readers to remember that this ratio
measures how well the induction hypotheses hit the recursive calls.
101Well-foundedness is indeed guaranteed according to the above discussion. As a consequence, the in-
duction scheme does not need the weight term and the well-founded relation of the induction template
anymore.
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Example 5.5 (Induction Scheme)
The template for ack of Example 5.3 is the only one that is applicable to (ack4) according
to Example 5.4. It yields the following induction scheme.
The position set is {1.1.2}. It describes the occurrence of ack in the second subterm
of the left-hand side of the first literal of the formula (ack4) as input to the induction rule
of explicit induction:
(ack4) / 1.1.2 = ack(x, y).
The set of induction variables is {x, y}, because both positions of the induction template
are changeable.
The relational description of the induction template is replaced with the step-case de-
scription { (
ξ1, {µ1,1}, ∅
)
,
(
ξ2, {µ2,1, µ2,2}, ∅
) }
.
that is given as follows.
The first triple of the relational description, namely(
ack(s(x), 0), {ack(x, s(0))}, ∅ )
(obtained from the equation (ack2)) is replaced with(
ξ1, {µ1,1}, ∅
)
,
where ξ1 = {x7→s(x′), y 7→0} and µ1,1 = {x7→x′, y 7→s(0)}. This can be seen as follows.
The substitution called σ in the above discussion — which has to match the first element of
the triple to ((ack4)/1.1.2)ξ1 — has to satisfy (ack(s(x), 0))σ = (ack(x, y))ξ1. Taking ξ1 as
the minimal constructor substitution given above, this determines σ = {x7→x′}. Moreover,
as both positions of the template are changeable, µ1,1 has to match (ack4)/1.1.2 to the σ-
instance of the single element of the second element of the triple, which determines µ1,1 as
given.
The second triple of the relational description, namely(
ack(s(x), s(y)), {ack(s(x), y), ack(x, ack(s(x), y))}, ∅ )
(obtained from the equation (ack3)) is replaced with
(
ξ2, {µ2,1, µ2,2}, ∅
)
, where ξ2 =
{x7→s(x′), y 7→s(y′)}, µ2,1 = {x7→s(x′), y 7→y′}, and µ2,2 = {x7→x′, y 7→ack(s(x′), y′)}.
This can be seen as follows. The substitution called σ in the above discussion has to
satisfy (ack(s(x), s(y)))σ = (ack(x, y))ξ2. Taking ξ2 as the minimal constructor substitu-
tion given above, this determines σ = {x7→x′, y 7→y′}. Moreover, we get the constraints
(ack(x, y))µ2,1 = (ack(s(x), y))σ and (ack(x, y))µ2,2 = (ack(x, ack(s(x), y)))σ, which de-
termine µ2,1 and µ2,2 as given above.
The hitting ratio for the three constraints on the two arguments of (ack4)/1.1.2 is 6
6
= 1.
This is optimal: the induction hypotheses are 100% identical to the expected recursive calls.
To achieve completeness of the substitutions ξk for constructor terms we have to add
the base case (ξ0, ∅, ∅) with ξ0 = {x7→0, y 7→y} to the step-case description.
The three new triples now describe exactly the three formulas displayed at the beginning
of Example 4.5 in § 4.9. 
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6 Automated Explicit Induction
6.1 The Application Context of Automated Explicit Induction
Since the development of programmable computing machinery in the middle of the 20th cen-
tury, a major problem of hard- and software has been and still is the uncertainty that they
actually always do what they should do.
It is almost never the case that the product of the possible initial states, input threads,
and schedulings of a computing system is a small number. Otherwise, however, even the
most carefully chosen test series cannot cover the often very huge or even infinite number
of possible cases; and then, no matter how many bugs have been found by testing, there
can never be certainty that none remain.
Therefore, the only viable solution to this problem seems to be:
Specify the intended functionality in a language of formal logic, and then supply
a formal mechanically checked proof that the program actually satisfies the
specification!
Such an approach also requires formalizing the platforms on which the system is imple-
mented. This may include the hardware, operating system, programming language, sensory
input, etc. One may additionally formalize and prove that the underlying platforms are
implemented correctly and this may ultimately involve proving, for example, that a net-
work of logical gates and wires implements a given abstract machine. Eventually, however,
one must make an engineering judgment that certain physical objects (e.g. printed circuit
boards, gold plated pins, power supplies, etc.) reliably behave as specified. To be complete,
such an approach would also require a verification that the verification system is sound and
correctly implemented.102
A crucial problem, however, is the cost — in time and money — of doing the many
proofs required, given the huge amounts of application hard- and software in our modern
economies. Thus, we can expect formal verification only in areas where the managers expect
that mere testing does not suffice, that the costs of the verification process are lower than
the costs of bugs in the hard- or software, and that the competitive situation admits the
verification investment. Good candidates are the areas of central processing units (CPUs)
in standard processors and of security protocols.
To reduce the costs of verification, we can hope to automate it with automated theorem-
proving systems. This automation has to include mathematical induction because induction
is essential for the verification of the properties of most data types used in digital design
(such as natural numbers, arrays, lists, and trees), for the repetition in processing (such as
loops), and for parameterized systems (such as a generic n-bit adder).
102See, for example, [Davis, 2009].
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Decision methods (many of them exploiting finiteness, e.g. the use of 32-bit data paths)
allow automatic verification of some modules, but — barring a completely unexpected
breakthrough in the future — the verification of a new hard- or software system will always
require human users who help the theorem-proving systems to explore and develop the
notions and theories that properly match the new system.
Already today, however, ACL2 often achieves complete automation in verifying minor
modifications of previously verified modules — an activity called proof maintenance which
is increasingly important in the microprocessor-design industry.
6.2 The Pure LISP Theorem Prover
Our overall task is to answer — from a historical perspective — the question:
How could Robert S. Boyer and J Strother Moore — starting virtually
from zero103 in the summer of 1972— actually invent their long-lived solutions to
the hard heuristic problems in the automation of induction and implement them
in the sophisticated theorem prover Thm as described in [Boyer & Moore,
1979]?
As already described in § 1, the breakthrough in the heuristics for automated inductive
theorem proving was achieved with the “Pure LISP Theorem Prover”, developed and
implemented by Boyer and Moore. It was presented by Moore at the third IJCAI
[Boyer & Moore, 1973], which took place in Stanford (CA) in August 1973, and it is
best documented in Part II of Moore’s PhD thesis [1973], defended in November 1973.
The Pure LISP Theorem Prover was given no name in the before-mentioned pub-
lications. The only occurrence of the name in publication seems to be in [Moore, 1975a,
p. 1], where it is actually called “the Boyer–Moore Pure LISP Theorem Prover”.
103No heuristics at all were explicitly described, for instance, in Burstall’s 1968 work on program
verification by induction over recursive functions in [Burstall, 1969], where the proofs were not even
formal, and an implementation seemed to be more or less utopian:
“The proofs presented will be mathematically rigorous but not formalised to the point where
each inference is presented as a mechanical application of elementary rules of symbol manipula-
tion. This is deliberate since I feel that our first aim should be to devise methods of proof which
will prove the validity of non-trivial programs in a natural and intelligible manner. Obviously
we will wish at some stage to formalise the reasoning to a point where it can be performed by
a computer to give a mechanised debugging service.” [Burstall, 1969, p. 41]
As far as we are aware, besides interactively invoked induction in resolution theorem proving (e.g.
by starting a resolution proof for the two clauses resulting from Skolemization of (P(0) ∧ ¬P(x)) ⇒
∃y. (P(y) ∧ ¬P(s(y))) [Darlington, 1968]), the only implementation of an automatically invoked
mathematical-induction heuristic prior to 1972 is in a set-theory prover by Bledsoe [1971], which uses
structural induction over 0 and s (cf. § 4.4) on a randomly picked, universally quantified variable of type nat.
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To make a long story short, the fundamental insights were
• to exploit the duality of recursion and induction to formulate explicit induction hypo-
theses,
• to abandon “random” search and focus on simplifying the goal by rewriting and nor-
malization techniques to lead to opportunities to use the induction hypotheses, and
• to support generalization to prepare subgoals for subsequent inductions.
Thus, it is not enough for us to focus here just on the induction heuristics per se, but it is
necessary to place them in the context of the development of the Boyer–Moore waterfall
(cf. Figure 1).
To understand the achievements a bit better, let us now discuss the material of Part II
ofMoore’s PhD thesis in some detail, because it provides some explanation of how Boyer
and Moore could be so surprisingly successful. Especially helpful for understanding the
process of creation are those procedures of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover that are
provisional w.r.t. their refinement in later Boyer–Moore theorem provers. Indeed, these
provisional procedures help to decompose the leap from nothing toThm, which was achieved
by two men in less than eight years of work.
As W.W. Bledsoe (1921–1995) was Boyer’s PhD advisor, it is no surprise that the
Pure LISP Theorem Prover shares many design features with Bledsoe’s provers. In
[Moore, 1973, p.172] we read on the Pure LISP Theorem Prover:
“The design of the program, especially the straightforward approach of ‘hitting’
the theorem over and over again with rewrite rules until it can no longer be
changed, is largely due to the influence of W.W. Bledsoe.”
Boyer and Moore report104 that in late 1972 and early 1973 they were doing proofs
about list data structures on the blackboard and verbalizing to each other the heuristics
behind their choices on how to proceed with the proof. This means that, although explicit
induction is not the approach humans would choose for non-trivial induction tasks, the
heuristics of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover are learned from human heuristics after
all.
Note that Boyer’s and Moore’s method of learning computer heuristics from their
own human behavior in mathematical logic was a step of two young men against the spirit of
the time: the use of vast amounts of computational power to search an even more enormous
space of possibilities. Boyer’s and Moore’s goal, however, was in a sense more modest:
“The program was designed to behave properly on simple functions. The over-
riding consideration was that it should be automatically able to prove theorems
about simple LISP functions in the straightforward way we prove them.”
[Moore, 1973, p. 205]
104Cf. [Wirth, 2012d].
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It may be that the orientation toward human-like or “intelligible” methods and heuris-
tics in the automation of theorem proving had also some tradition in Edinburgh at the
time,105 but, also in this aspect, the major influence on Boyer and Moore is again
W.W. Bledsoe.106
The source code of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover was written in the programming
language POP–2.107 Boyer and Moore were the only programmers involved in the
implementation. The average time in the central processing unit (CPU) of the ICL–4130
for the proof of a theorem is reported to be about ten seconds.108 This was considered
fast at the time, compared to the search-dominated proofs by resolution systems. Moore
explains the speed:
“Finally, it should be pointed out that the program uses no search. At no time
does it ‘undo’ a decision or back up. This is both the primary reason it is a fast
theorem prover, and strong evidence that its methods allow the theorem to be
proved in the way a programmer might ‘observe’ it. The program is designed
to make the right guess the first time, and then pursue one goal with power and
perseverance.” [Moore, 1973, p. 208]
One remarkable omission in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover is lemma application.
As a consequence, the success of proving a set of theorems cannot depend on the order
of their presentation to the theorem prover. Indeed, just as the resolution theorem provers
of the time, the Pure LISP Theorem Prover starts every proof right from scratch
and does not improve its behavior with the help of previously proved lemmas. This was a
design decision; one of the reasons was:
“Finally, one of the primary aims of this project has been to demonstrate clearly
that it is possible to prove program properties entirely automatically. A total
ban on all built-in information about user defined functions thus removes any
taint of user supplied information.” [Moore, 1973, p. 203]
Moreover, all induction orderings in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover are recombina-
tions of constructor relations, such that all inductions it can do are structural inductions
over combinations of constructors. As a consequence, contrary to later Boyer–Moore
theorem provers, the well-foundedness of the induction orderings does not depend on the
termination of the recursive function definitions.109
105Cf. e.g. the quotation from [Burstall, 1969] in Note 103.
106Cf. e.g. [Bledsoe &al., 1972].
107Cf. [Burstall &al., 1971].
108Here is the actual wording of the timing result found on Page 171f. of [Moore, 1973]:
“Despite theses inefficiencies, the ‘typical’ theorem proved requires only 8 to 10 seconds of
CPU time. For comparison purposes, it should be noted that the time for CONS in 4130
POP–2 is 400 microseconds, and CAR and CDR are about 50 microseconds each. The hardest
theorems solved, such as those involving SORT, require 40 to 50 seconds each.”
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Nevertheless, the soundness of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover depends on the ter-
mination of the recursive function definitions, but only in one aspect: It simplifies and eval-
uates expressions under the assumption of termination. For instance, both (IF110 a d d)
and (CDR (CONS a d)) simplify to d, no matter whether a terminates; and it is admitted
to rewrite with a recursive function definition even if an argument of the function call does
not terminate. Note that such a lazy form of evaluation is sound w.r.t. the given logic
only if each eager call terminates and returns a constructor ground term, simply because
all functions are meant to be defined in terms of constructor variables (cf. § 5.4).111
The termination of the recursively defined functions, however, is not checked by the
Pure LISP Theorem Prover, but comes as a proviso for its soundness.
The logic of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover is an applicative112 subset of the logic
of LISP. The only destructors in this logic are CAR and CDR. They are overspecified on
the only constructors NIL and CONS by the following equations:
(CAR (CONS a d)) = a (CAR NIL) = NIL
(CDR (CONS a d)) = d (CDR NIL) = NIL
As standard in LISP, every term of the form (CONS a d) is taken to be true in the logic of
the Pure LISP Theorem Prover if it occurs at an argument position with Boolean in-
tention. The actual truth values (to be returned by Boolean functions) are NIL (represen-
ting false) and T, which is an abbreviation for (CONS NIL NIL) and represents true.113
Unlike conventional LISPs (both then and now), the natural numbers are represented by
lists of NILs to keep the logic simple; the natural number 0 is represented by NIL and the
successor function s(d) is represented by (CONS NIL d).114
Let us now discuss the behavior of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover by describing the
instances of the stages of the Boyer–Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1) as they are described
in Moore’s PhD thesis.
109Note that the well-foundedness of the constructor relations depends on distinctness of the constructor
ground terms in the models, but this does not really depend on the termination of the recursive functions
because (as discussed in § 5.2) confluence is sufficient here.
110Cf. Note 90.
111There is a work-around for projective functions as indicated in Note 95 and in [Wirth, 2009].
112Cf. Note 82.
113Cf. 2ndparagraph of Page 86 of [Moore, 1973].
114Cf. 2ndparagraph of Page 87 of [Moore, 1973].
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6.2.1 Simplification in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
The first stage of the Boyer–Moore waterfall — “simplification” in Figure 1 — is called
“normalation”115 in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover. It applies the following simpli-
fication procedures to LISP expressions until the result does not change any more:
“evaluation”, “normalization”, and “reduction”.
“Normalization” tries to find sufficient conditions for a given expression to have the
soft type “Boolean” and to normalize logical expressions. Contrary to clausal logic over
equational atoms, LISP admits EQUAL and IF to appear not only at the top level, but in
nested terms. To free later tests and heuristics from checking for their triggers in every
equivalent form, such a normalization w.r.t. propositional logic and equality is part of most
theorem provers today.
“Reduction” is a form of what today is called contextual rewriting. It is based on the fact
that — in the logic of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover— in the conditional expression
(IF c p n)
we can simplify occurrences of c in p to (CONS (CAR c) (CDR c)), and in n to NIL. The
replacement with (CONS (CAR c) (CDR c)) is executed only at positions with Boolean
intention and can be improved in the following two special cases:
1. If we know that c is of soft type “Boolean”, then we rewrite all occurrences of c in p
actually to T.
2. If c is of the form (EQUAL l r), then we can rewrite occurrences of l in p to r (or
vice versa). Note that we have to treat the variables in l and r as constants in this
rewriting. The Pure LISP Theorem Prover rewrites in this case only if either l
or r is a ground term;116 then the other cannot be a ground term because the equation
would otherwise have been simplified to T or NIL in the previously applied “evaluation”.
So replacing the latter term with the ground term everywhere in p must terminate,
and this is all the contextual rewriting with equalities that the Pure LISP Theorem
Prover does in “reduction”.117
115During the oral defense of the dissertation,Moore’s committee abhorred the non-word and instructed
him to choose a word. Some copies of the dissertation call the process “simplification.”
116Actually, this ground term (i.e. a term without variables) here is always a constructor ground term (i.e.
a term built-up exclusively from constructor function symbols) because the previously applied “evaluation”
procedure has reduced any ground term to a constructor ground term, provided that the termination proviso
is satisfied.
117Note, however, that further contextual rewriting with equalities is applied in a later stage of the
Boyer–Moore waterfall, named cross-fertilization.
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“Evaluation” is a procedure that evaluates expressions partly by simplification within
the elementary logic as given by Boolean operations and the equality predicate. Moreover,
“evaluation” executes some rewrite steps with the equations defining the recursive functions.
Thus, “evaluation” can roughly be seen as normalization with the rewrite relation resulting
from the elementary logic and from the recursive function definitions. The rewrite relation
is applied according to the innermost left-to-right rewriting strategy, which is standard in
LISP.
By “evaluation”, ground terms are completely evaluated to their normal forms. Terms
containing (implicitly universally quantified) variables, however, have to be handled in
addition. Surprisingly, the considered rewrite relation is not necessarily terminating on
non-ground terms, although the LISP evaluation of ground terms terminates because of
the assumed termination of recursive function definitions (cf. § 5.5). The reason for this
non-termination is the following: Because of the LISP definition style via unconditional
equations, the positive/negative conditions are actually part of the right-hand sides of the
defining equations, such that the rewrite step can be executed even if the conditions evaluate
neither to false nor to true. For instance, in Example 5.1 of § 5.2, a rewrite step with the
definition of PLUS can always be executed, whereas a rewrite step with (+1′) or (+2′)
requires x= 0 to be definitely true or definitely false. This means that non-termination
may result from the rewriting of cases that do not occur in the evaluation of any ground
instance.118
As the final aim of the stages of the Boyer–Moore waterfall is a formula that provides
concise and sufficiently strong induction hypotheses in the last of these stages, symbolic
evaluation must be prevented from unfolding function definitions unless the context admits
us to expect an effect of simplification.119
Because the main function of “evaluation” — only to be found in this first one of the
Boyer–Moore theorem provers — is to collect data on which base and step cases should
be chosen later by the induction rule, the Pure LISP Theorem Prover applies a unique
procedure to stop the unfolding of recursive function definitions:
A rewrite step with an equation defining a recursive function f is canceled if there is a
CAR or a CDR in an argument to an occurrence of f in the right-hand side of the defining
equation that is encountered during the control flow of “evaluation”, and if this CAR or
CDR is not removed by the “evaluation” of the arguments of this occurrence of f under the
current environment updated by matching the left-hand side of the equation to the redex.
For instance, “evaluation” of (PLUS (CONS NIL X) Y) returns (CONS NIL (PLUS X Y));
whereas “evaluation” of (PLUS X Y) returns (PLUS X Y) and informs the induction rule that
only (CDR X) occurred in the recursive call during the trial to rewrite with the definition of
118It becomes clear in the second paragraph on Page 118 of [Moore, 1973] that the code of both the
positive and the negative case of a conditional will be evaluated, unless one of them can be canceled by the
complete evaluation of the governing condition to true or false. Note that the evaluation of both cases is
necessary indeed and cannot be avoided in practice.
Moreover, note that a stronger termination requirement that guarantees termination independent of the
governing condition is not feasible for recursive function definitions in practice.
Later Boyer–Moore theorem provers also use lemmas for rewriting during symbolic evaluation, which
is another source of possible non-termination.
119In QuodLibet this is achieved by contextual rewriting where evaluation stops when the governing
conditions cannot be established from the context. Cf. [Schmidt-Samoa, 2006b; 2006c].
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PLUS. In general, such occurrences indicate which induction hypotheses should be generated
by the induction rule.120 121
“Evaluation” provides a crucial link between symbolic evaluation and the induction
rule of explicit induction. The question “Which case distinction on which variables should
be used for the induction proof and how should the step cases look?” is reduced to the
quite different question “Where do destructors like CAR and CDR heap up during symbolic
evaluation?”. This reduction helps to understand by which intermediate steps it was possi-
ble to develop the most surprising, sophisticated recursion analysis of later Boyer–Moore
theorem provers.
6.2.2 Destructor Elimination in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
There is no such stage in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover.122
6.2.3 (Cross-) Fertilization in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
Fertilization is just contextual rewriting with an equality, described before for the “reduc-
tion” that is part of the simplification of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover (cf. § 6.2.1),
but now with an equation between two non-ground terms.
The most important case of fertilization is called “cross-fertilization”. It occurs very
often in step cases of induction proofs of equational theorems, and we have seen it already
in Example 4.4 of § 4.8.1.
Neither Boyer nor Moore ever explicitly explained why cross-fertilization is “cross”,
but in [Moore, 1973, p. 142] we read:
“When two equalities are involved and the fertilization was right-side” [of the
induction hypothesis put] “into left-side” [of the induction conclusion,] “or left-
side into right-side, it is called ‘cross-fertilization’.”
“Cross-fertilization” is actually a term from genetics referring to the alignment of haploid
genetic code from male and female to a diploid code in the egg cell. This image may help
to recall that only that side (i.e. left- or right-hand side of the equation) of the induction
conclusion which was activated by a successful simplification is further rewritten during
cross-fertilization, namely everywhere where the same side of the induction hypothesis occurs
as a redex — just like two haploid chromosomes have to start at the same (activated) sides
for successful recombination. In [Moore, 1973, p. 139] we find the reason for this: cross-
fertilization frequently produces a new goal that is easy to prove because its uniform “genre”
in the sense that its subterms uniformly come from just one side of the original equality.
120Actually, “evaluation” also informs which occurrences of CAR or CDR besides the arguments of recursive
occurrences of PLUS were permanently introduced during that trial to rewrite. Such occurrences trigger an
additional case analysis to be generated by the induction rule, mostly as a compensation for the omission
of the stage of “destructor elimination” in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover.
121The mechanism for partially enforcing termination of “evaluation” according to this procedure is vaguely
described in the last paragraph on Page 118 of Moore’s PhD thesis. As this kind of “evaluation” is only
an intermediate solution on the way to more refined control information for the induction rule in later
Boyer–Moore theorem provers, the rough information given here may suffice.
122See, however, Note 120 and the discussion of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover in § 6.3.2.
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Furthermore — for getting a sufficiently powerful new induction hypothesis in a follow-
up induction — it is crucial to delete the equation used for rewriting (i.e. the old induc-
tion hypothesis), which can be remembered by the fact that — in the image — only one
(diploid) genetic code remains.
The only noteworthy difference between cross-fertilization in the Pure LISP Theo-
rem Prover and later Boyer–Moore theorem provers is that the generalization that
consists in the deletion of the used-up equations is done in a halfhearted way: the resulting
formula is equipped with a link to the deleted equation.
6.2.4 Generalization in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
Generalization in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover works as described in § 4.9. The
only difference to our presentation there is the following: Instead of just replacing all
occurrences of a non-variable subterm t with a new variable z, the definition of the top
function symbol of t is used to generate the definition of a new predicate p, such that
p(t) holds. Then the generalization of T [t] becomes T [z] ⇐ p(z) instead of just T [z].
The version of this automated function synthesis actually implemented in the Pure LISP
Theorem Prover is just able to generate simple type properties, such as being a number
or being a Boolean value.123
Note that generalization is essential for the Pure LISP Theorem Prover because it
does not use lemmas, and so it cannot build up a more and more complex theory successively.
It is clear that this limits the complexity of the theorems it can prove, because a proof can
only be successful if the implemented non-backtracking heuristics work out all the way from
the theorem down to the most elementary theory.
6.2.5 Elimination of Irrelevance in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
There is no such stage in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover.
6.2.6 Induction in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
This stage of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover applies the induction rule of explicit
induction as described in § 4.8. Induction is tried only after the goal formula has been
maximally simplified and generalized by repeated trips through the waterfall. The induction
heuristic takes a formula as input and returns a conjunction of base and step cases to
which the input formula reduces. Contrary to later Boyer–Moore theorem provers that
gather the relevant information via induction schemes gleaned by preprocessing recursive
definitions,124 the induction rule of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover is based solely on
the information provided by “evaluation” as described in § 6.2.1.
123See § 3.7 of [Moore, 1973]. As explained on Page 156f. of [Moore, 1973], Boyer and Moore failed
with the trial to improve the implemented version of the function synthesis, so that it could generate a
predicate on a list being ordered from a simple sorting-function.
124Cf. § 5.8.
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Instead of trying to describe the general procedure, let us just put the induction rule
of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover to test with two paradigmatic examples. In these
examples we ignore the here irrelevant fact that the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
actually uses a list representation for the natural numbers. The only effect of this is that
the destructor p takes over the rôle of the destructor CDR.
Example 6.1 (Induction Rule in the Explicit Induction Proof of (ack4))
Let us see how the induction rule of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover proceeds w.r.t.
the proof of (ack4) that we have seen in Example 4.5 of § 4.9. The substitutions ξ1, ξ2
computed as instances for the induction conclusion in Example 5.5 of § 5.8 suggest an overall
case analysis with a base case given by {x 7→ 0}, and two step cases given by ξ1 = {x 7→
s(x′), y 7→ 0} and ξ2 = {x 7→ s(x′), y 7→ s(y′)}. The Pure LISP Theorem Pro-
ver requires the axioms (ack1), (ack2), (ack3) to be in destructor instead of constructor
style:
(ack1′) ack(x, y) = s(y) ⇐ x= 0
(ack2′) ack(x, y) = ack(p(x), s(0)) ⇐ x 6= 0 ∧ y= 0
(ack3′) ack(x, y) = ack(p(x), ack(x, p(y))) ⇐ x 6= 0 ∧ y 6= 0
“Evaluation” does not rewrite the input conjecture with this definition, but writes a “fault
description” for the permanent occurrences of p as arguments of the three occurrences
of ack on the right-hand sides, essentially consisting of the following three “pockets”: (p(x)),
(p(x), p(y)), and (p(y)), respectively. Similarly, the pockets gained from the fault descrip-
tions of rewriting the input conjecture with the definition of lessp essentially consists of the
pocket (p(y), p(ack(x, y))). Similar to the non-applicability of the induction template for
lessp in Example 5.4 of § 5.7, this fault description does not suggest any induction because
one of the arguments of p in one of the pockets is not a variable. As this is not the case
for the previous fault description, it suggests the set of all arguments of p in all pockets as
induction variables. As this is the only suggestion, no merging of suggested inductions is
required here.
So the Pure LISP Theorem Prover picks the right set of induction variables.
Nevertheless, it fails to generate appropriate base and step cases, because the overall case
analysis results in two base cases given by {x 7→ 0} and {y 7→ 0}, and a step case given
by {x 7→ s(x′), y 7→ s(y′)}.125 This turns the first step case of the proof of Example 4.5
into a base case. The Pure LISP Theorem Prover finally fails (contrary to all other
Boyer–Moore theorem provers, see Examples 4.5, 5.5, and 6.11) with the step case it
actually generates:
lessp(s(y′), ack(s(x′), s(y′))) = true ⇐ lessp(y′, ack(x′, y′)) = true.
This step case has only one hypothesis, which is neither of the two we need. 
125We can see this from a similar case on Page 164 and from the explicit description on the bottom of
Page 166 in [Moore, 1973].
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Example 6.2 (Proof of (lessp7) by Explicit Induction with Merging)
Let us write T (x, y, z) for (lessp7) of § 4.4. From the proof of (lessp7) in Exam-
ple 4.3 of § 4.7 we can learn the following: The proof becomes simpler when we take
T (0, s(y′), s(z′)) as base case (besides say T (x, y, 0) and T (x, 0, s(z′))), instead of any of
T (0, y, s(z′)), T (0, s(y′), z), T (0, y, z). The crucial lesson from Example 4.3, however, is
that the step case of explicit induction has to be
T (s(x′), s(y′), s(z′)) ⇐ T (x′, y′, z′).
Note that the Boyer–Moore heuristics for using the induction rule of explicit induction
look only one rewrite step ahead, separately for each occurrence of a recursive function in
the conjecture.
This means that there is no way for their heuristic to apply case distinctions on variables
step by step, most interesting first, until finally we end up with an instance of the induction
hypothesis as in Example 4.3.
Nevertheless, even the Pure LISP Theorem Prover manages the pretty hard task
of suggesting exactly the right step case. It requires all axioms to be in destructor style,
so instead of (lessp1), (lessp2), (lessp3), we have to take:
(lessp1′) lessp(x, y) = false ⇐ y= 0
(lessp2′) lessp(x, y) = true ⇐ y 6= 0 ∧ x= 0
(lessp3′) lessp(x, y) = lessp(p(x), p(y)) ⇐ y 6= 0 ∧ x 6= 0
“Evaluation” does not rewrite any of the occurrences of lessp in the input conjecture with
this definition, but writes one “fault description” for each of these occurrences about the per-
manent occurrences of p as argument of the one occurrence of lessp on the right-hand sides,
resulting in one “pocket” in each fault description, which essentially consist of ((p(z))),
((p(x), p(y))), and ((p(y), p(z))), respectively. The Pure LISP Theorem Prover
merges these three fault descriptions to the single one ((p(x), p(y), p(z))), and so sug-
gests the proper step case indeed, although it suggests the base case T (0, y, z) instead
of T (0, s(y′), s(z′)), which requires some extra work, but does not result in a failure. 
6.2.7 Conclusion on the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
The Pure LISP Theorem Prover establishes the historic breakthrough regarding the
heuristic automation of inductive theorem proving in theories specified by recursive function
definitions.
Moreover, it is the first implementation of a prover for explicit induction going beyond
most simple structural inductions over s and 0.
Furthermore, the Pure LISP Theorem Prover has most of the stages of the Boyer–
Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1), and these stages occur in the final order and with the final
overall behavior of throwing the formulas back to the center pool after a stage was successful
in changing them.
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As we have seen in Example 6.1 of § 6.2.6, the main weakness of the Pure LISP Theo-
rem Prover is the realization of its induction rule, which ignores most of the structure of
the recursive calls in the right-hand sides of recursive function definitions.126 In the Pure
LISP Theorem Prover, all information on this structure that is taken into account by
the induction rule comes from the fault descriptions of previous applications of “evaluation”,
which store only a small part of the information that is actually required for finding the
proper instances for the eager instantiation of induction hypotheses required in explicit
induction.
As a consequence, all induction hypotheses and conclusions of the Pure LISP Theo-
rem Prover are instantiations of the input formula with mere constructor terms. Never-
theless, the Pure LISP Theorem Prover can generate multiple hypotheses for aston-
ishingly complicated step cases, which go far beyond the simple ones typical for structural
induction over s and 0.
Although the induction stage of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover is pretty under-
developed compared to the sophisticated recursion analysis of the later Boyer–Moore
theorem provers, it somehow contains all essential later ideas in a rudimentary form, such
as recursion analysis and the merging of step cases. As we have seen in Example 6.2, the
simple merging procedure of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover is surprisingly successful.
The Pure LISP Theorem Prover cannot succeed, however, in the rare cases where
a step case has to follow a destructor different from CAR and CDR (such as delfirst in § 4.5), or
in the more general case that the arguments of the recursive calls contain recursively defined
functions at the measured positions (such as the Ackermann function in Example 6.1).
The weaknesses and provisional procedures of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
we have documented, help to decompose the leap from nothing to Thm, and so fulfill our
historiographic intention expressed at the beginning of § 6.2.
Especially the crucial link between symbolic evaluation and the induction rule of ex-
plicit induction described at the end of § 6.2.1 may be crucial for the success of the entire
development of recursion analysis and explicit induction.
126There are indications that the induction rule of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover had to be im-
plemented in a hurry. For instance, on top of Page 168 of [Moore, 1973], we read on the Pure LISP
Theorem Prover: “The case for n term induction is much more complicated, and is not handled in its
full generality by the program.”
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6.3 Thm
“Thm” is the name used in this article for a release of the prover described in [Boyer
& Moore, 1979]. Note that the clearness, precision, and detail of the natural-language
descriptions of heuristics in [Boyer & Moore, 1979] is probably unique.127 To the best
of our knowledge, there is no similarly broad treatment of heuristics in theorem proving,
at least not in subsequent publications about Boyer–Moore theorem provers.
Except for ACL2, Boyer and Moore never gave names to their theorem provers.128
The names “Thm” (for “theorem prover”), “Qthm” (“quantified Thm”), and “Nqthm”
(“new quantified Thm”) were actually the directory names under which the different versions
of their theorem provers were developed and maintained.129 Qthm was never released and
its development was discontinued soon after the “quantification” in Nqthm had turned out
to be superior; so the name “Qthm” was never used in public. Until today, it seems that
“Thm” appeared in publication only as a mode in Nqthm,130 which simulates the release
previous to the release of Nqthm (i.e. before “quantification” was introduced) with a logic
that is a further development of the one described in [Boyer & Moore, 1979]. It was
Matt Kaufmann (*1952) who started calling the prover “Nqthm”, in the second half of
the 1980s.131 The name “Nqthm” appeared for the first time in publication in [Boyer &
Moore, 1988b], namely as the name of a mode in Nqthm.
In this section we describe the enormous heuristic improvements documented in [Boyer
& Moore, 1979] as compared to [Moore, 1973] (cf. § 6.2). In case of the minor differences
of the logic described in [Boyer & Moore, 1979] and of the later released version that is
simulated by the THM mode in Nqthm as documented in [Boyer & Moore, 1988b; 1998],
we try to follow the later descriptions, partly because of their elegance, partly because
Nqthm is still an available program. For this reason, we have entitled this section “Thm”
instead of “The standard reference on the Boyer–Moore heuristics [Boyer & Moore,
1979]”.
From 1973 to 1981 Boyer and Moore were researchers at Xerox Palo Alto Research
Center (Moore only) and — just a few miles away — at SRI International in Menlo
Park (CA). From 1981 they were both professors at The University of Texas at Austin or
127In [Boyer & Moore, 1988b, p. xi] and [Boyer & Moore, 1998, p. xv] we can read about the book
[Boyer & Moore, 1979]:
“The main purpose of the book was to describe in detail how the theorem prover worked,
its organization, proof techniques, heuristics, etc. One measure of the success of the book is
that we know of three independent successful efforts to construct the theorem prover from
the book.”
128The only further exception seems to be [Moore, 1975a, p.1], where the Pure LISP Theorem Pro-
ver is called “the Boyer–Moore Pure LISP Theorem Prover”, because Moore wanted to stress that,
though Boyer appears in the references of [Moore, 1975a] only in [Boyer & Moore, 1975], Boyer has
had an equal share in contributing to the Pure LISP Theorem Prover right from the start.
129Cf. [Boyer, 2012].
130For the occurrences of “THM” in publications, and for the exact differences between the THM and NQTHM
modes and logics, see Pages 256–257 and 308 in [Boyer & Moore, 1988b], as well as Pages 303–305, 326,
357, and 386 in the second edition [Boyer & Moore, 1998].
131Cf. [Boyer, 2012].
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scientists at Computational Logic Inc. in Austin (TX). So they could easily meet and work
together. And — just like the Pure LISP Theorem Prover — the provers Thm and
Nqthm were again developed and implemented exclusively by Boyer and Moore.132
In the six years separating Thm from the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, Boyer
and Moore extended the system in four important ways that especially affect inductive
theorem proving. The first major extension is the provision for an arbitrary number of
inductive data types, where the Pure LISP Theorem Prover supported only CONS.
The second is the formal provision of a definition principle with its explicit termination
analysis based on well-founded relations which we discussed in § 5.5. The third major
extension is the expansion of the proof techniques used by the waterfall, notably including
the use of previously proved theorems, most often as rewrite rules via what would come to be
called “contextual rewriting”, and by which the Thm user can “guide” the prover by posing
lemmas that the system cannot discover on its own. The fourth major extension is the
synthesis of induction schemes from definition-time termination analysis and the application
and manipulation of those schemes at proof-time to create “appropriate” inductions for a
given formula, in place of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover’s less structured reliance
on symbolic evaluation. We discuss Thm’s inductive data types, waterfall, and induction
schemes below.
By means of the new shell principle,133 it is now possible to define new data types by
describing the shell, a constructor with at least one argument, each of whose arguments
may have a simple type restriction, and the optional base object, a nullary constructor.134
Each argument of the shell can be accessed135 by its destructor, for which a name and a
default value (for the sake of totality) have to be given in addition. The user also has to
supply a name for the predicate that that recognizes135 the objects of the new data type
(as the logic remains untyped).
NIL lost its elementary status and is now an element of the shell PACK of symbols.136
T and F now abbreviate the nullary function calls (TRUE) and (FALSE), respectively, which
are the only Boolean values. Any argument with Boolean intention besides F is taken
to be T (including NIL).
132In both [Boyer & Moore, 1988b, p. xv] and [Boyer & Moore, 1998, p. xix] we read:
“Notwithstanding the contributions of all our friends and supporters, we would like to make
clear that ours is a very large and complicated system that was written entirely by the two
of us. Not a single line of LISP in our system was written by a third party. Consequently,
every bug in it is ours alone. Soundness is the most important property of a theorem prover,
and we urge any user who finds such a bug to report it to us at once.”
133Cf. [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 37ff.].
134Note that this restriction to at most two constructors, including exactly one with arguments, is pretty
uncomfortable. For instance, it neither admits simple enumeration types (such as the Boolean values),
nor disjoint unions (e.g., as part of the popular record types with variants, say of [Wirth, 1971]). Moreover,
mutually recursive data types are not possible, such as and-or-trees, where each element is a list of or-and-
trees, and vice versa, as given by the following four constructors:
empty-or-tree : or-tree; or : and-tree, or-tree → or-tree;
empty-and-tree : and-tree; and : or-tree, and-tree → and-tree.
135Actually, in the jargon of [Boyer & Moore, 1979; 1988b; 1998], the destructors are called accessor
functions, and the type predicates are called recognizer functions.
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Instead of discussing the shell principle in detail with all its intricacies resulting from
the untyped framework, we just present the first two shells:
1. The shell (ADD1 X1) of the natural numbers, with
• type restriction (NUMBERP X1),
• base object (ZERO), abbreviated by 0,
• destructor135 SUB1 with default value 0, and
• type predicate135 NUMBERP.
2. The shell (CONS X1 X2) of pairs, with
• destructors CAR with default value 0,
CDR with default value 0, and
• type predicate LISTP.
According to the shell principle, these two shell declarations add axioms to the theory,
which are equivalent to the following ones:
# Axioms Generated by Shell ADD1 Axioms Generated by Shell CONS
0.1 (NUMBERP X)= T ∨ (NUMBERP X)= F (LISTP X)= T ∨ (LISTP X)= F
0.2 (NUMBERP (ADD1 X1))= T (LISTP (CONS X1 X2))= T
0.3 (NUMBERP 0)= T
0.4 (NUMBERP T)= F (LISTP T)= F
0.5 (NUMBERP F)= F (LISTP F)= F
0.6 (LISTP X)= F ∨ (NUMBERP X)= F
1 (ADD1 (SUB1 X))= X (CONS (CAR X) (CDR X))= X
⇐ X 6= 0 ∧ (NUMBERP X)= T ⇐ (LISTP X)= T
2 (ADD1 X1) 6= 0
3 (SUB1 (ADD1 X1))= X1 (CAR (CONS X1 X2))= X1
⇐ (NUMBERP X1)= T (CDR (CONS X1 X2))= X2
4 (SUB1 0)= 0
5.1 (SUB1 X)= 0 ⇐ (NUMBERP X)= F (CAR X)= 0 ⇐ (LISTP X)= F
(CDR X)= 0 ⇐ (LISTP X)= F
5.2 (SUB1 (ADD1 X1))= 0
⇐ (NUMBERP X1)= F
L1 137 (ADD1 X)= (ADD1 0)
⇐ (NUMBERP X)= F
L2 138 (NUMBERP (SUB1 X))= T
136There are the following two different declarations for the shell PACK: In [Boyer & Moore, 1979], the
shell CONS is defined after the shell PACK because NIL is the default value for the destructors CAR and CDR;
moreover, NIL is an abbreviation for (NIL), which is the base object of the shell PACK.
In [Boyer & Moore, 1988b; 1998], however, the shell PACK is defined after the shell CONS, we have
(CAR NIL) = 0, the shell PACK has no base object, and NIL just abbreviates
(PACK (CONS 78 (CONS 73 (CONS 76 0)))).
When we discuss the logic of [Boyer & Moore, 1979], we tacitly use the shells CONS and PACK as described
in [Boyer & Moore, 1988b; 1998].
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Note that the two occurrences of “(NUMBERP X1)” in Axioms 3 and 5.2 are exactly
the ones that result from the type restriction of ADD1. Moreover, the occurrence of
“(NUMBERP X)” in Axiom0.6 is allocated at the right-hand side because the shell ADD1
is declared before the shell CONS.
Let us discuss the axioms generated by declaration of the shell ADD1. Roughly speaking,
Axioms 0.1–0.3 are return-type declarations, Axioms 0.4–0.6 are about disjointness of
types, Axiom1 and Lemma L2 imply the axiom (nat1) from § 4.4, Axioms 2 and 3 im-
ply axioms (nat2) and (nat3), respectively. Axioms 4 and 5.1–5.2 overspecify SUB1. Note
that LemmaL1 is equivalent to 5.2 under 0.2–0.3 and 1–3.
Analogous to LemmaL1, every shell forces each argument not satisfying its type restric-
tion into behaving like the default object of the argument’s destructor.
By contrast, the arguments of the shell CONS (just as every shell argument without type
restriction) are not forced like this, and so — a clear advantage of the untyped framework —
even objects of later defined shells (such as PACK) can be properly paired by the shell CONS.
For instance, although NIL belongs to the shell PACK defined after the shell CONS (and so
(CDR NIL) = 0),136 we have (CAR (CONS NIL NIL)) = NIL by Axiom3.
Nevertheless, the shell principle also allows us to declare a shell
(CONSNAT X1 X2)
of the lists of natural numbers only— similar to the ones of § 4.5 — say, with a type predicate
LISTNATP, type restrictions (NUMBERP X1), (LISTNATP X2), base object (NILNAT), and
destructors CARNAT, CDRNAT with default values 0, (NILNAT), respectively.
Let us now come to the admissible definitions of new functions in Thm. In § 5 we have
already discussed the definition principle139 of Thm in detail. The definition of recursive
functions has not changed compared to the Pure LISP Theorem Prover besides that
a function definition is admissible now only after a termination proof, which proceeds as
explained in § 5.5. To this end, Thm can apply its additional axiom of the well-founded-
ness of the irreflexive ordering LESSP on the natural numbers,140 and the theorem of the
well-foundedness of the lexicographic combination of two well-founded orderings.
Just as in § 6.2, we will now again follow the Boyer–Moore waterfall (cf. Figure 1) and
sketch how the stages of the waterfall are realized in Thm in comparison to the Pure LISP
Theorem Prover.
137Proof of LemmaL1 from 0.2, 1–2, 5.2: Under the assumption of (NUMBERP X)= F, we show
(ADD1 X)= (ADD1 (SUB1 (ADD1 X)))= (ADD1 0). The first step is a backward application of the con-
ditional equation 1 via {X 7→ (ADD1 X)}, where the condition is fulfilled because of 2 and 0.2. The second
step is an application of 5.2, where the condition is fulfilled by assumption.
138Proof of Lemma L2 from 0.1–0.3, 1–4, 5.1–5.2 by argumentum ad absurdum:
For a counterexample X, we get (SUB1 X) 6= 0 by 0.3, as well as (NUMBERP (SUB1 X))= F by 0.1. From
the first we get X 6= 0 by 4, and (NUMBERP X)= T by 5.1 and 0.1. Now we get the contradiction
(SUB1 X)= (SUB1 (ADD1 (SUB1 X)))= (SUB1 (ADD1 0))= 0; the first step is a backward application of
the conditional equation 1, the second of L1, and the last of 3 (using 0.3).
139Cf. [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 44f.].
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6.3.1 Simplification in Thm
We discussed simplification in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover in § 6.2.1. Simplification
inThm is covered in ChaptersVI–IX of [Boyer & Moore, 1979], and the reader interested
in the details is strongly encouraged to read these descriptions of heuristic procedures for
simplification.
To compensate for the extra complication of the untyped approach in Thm, which has
a much higher number of interesting soft types than the Pure LISP Theorem Pro-
ver, soft-typing rules are computed for each new function symbol based on types that are
disjunctions (actually: bit-vectors) of the following disjoint types: one for T, one for F, one
for each shell, and one for objects not belonging to any of these.141 These soft-typing rules
are pervasively applied in all stages of the theorem prover, which we cannot discuss here in
detail. Some of these rules can be expressed in the LISP logic language as a theorem and
presented in this form to the human users. Let us see two examples on this.
Example 6.3 (continuing Example 5.1 of § 5.2)
As Thm knows (NUMBERP (FIX X)) and (NUMBERP (ADD1 X)), it produces the theorem
(NUMBERP (PLUS X Y)) immediately after the termination proof for the definition of PLUS
in Example 5.1. Note that this would neither hold in case of non-termination of PLUS, nor
if there were a simple Y instead of (FIX Y) in the definition of PLUS. In the latter case,
Thm would only register that the return-type of PLUS is among NUMBERP and the types of
its second argument Y. 
Example 6.4 As Thm knows that the type of APPEND is among LISTP and the type of its
second argument, it produces the theorem (LISTP (FLATTEN X)) immediately after the
termination proof for the following definition:
(FLATTEN X) = (IF (LISTP X)
(APPEND (FLATTEN (CAR X)) (FLATTEN (CDR X)))
(CONS X NIL)) 
140See Page 52f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for the informal statement of this axiom on well-foundedness
of LESSP.
Because Thm is able to prove (LESSP X (ADD1 X)), well-foundedness of LESSP would imply — together
with Axiom1 and LemmaL2 — that Thm admits only the standard model of the natural numbers, as
explained in Note 43.
Matt Kaufmann, however, was so kind and made clear in a private e-mail communication that non-
standard models are not excluded, because the statement “We assume LESSP to be a well-founded relation.”
of [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 53] is actually to be read as the well-foundedness of the formal definition
of § 4.1 with the additional assumption that the predicate Q must be definable in Thm.
Note that in Pieri’s argument on the exclusion of non-standard models (as described in Note 43), it is
not possible to replace the reflexive and transitive closure of the successor relation s with the Thm-definable
predicate
{
Y (NUMBERP Y)= T ∧ ((LESSP Y X)= T ∨ Y= X) }, because (by the Thm-analog of
axiom (lessp2′) of Example 6.2 in § 6.2.6) this predicate will contain 0 as a minimal element even for a
non-standard natural number X; thus, in non-standard models, LESSP is a proper super-relation of the
reflexive and transitive closure of s.
141See ChapterVI in [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
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The standard representation of a propositional expression has improved from the multi-
farious LISP representation of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover toward today’s stan-
dard of clausal representation. A clause is a disjunctive list of literals. Literals, however,
deviating from the standard of being optionally negated atoms, are just LISP terms here,
because every LISP function can be seen as a predicate.
This means that the “water” of the waterfall now consists of clauses, and the conjunction
of all clauses in the waterfall represents the proof task.
Based on this clausal representation, we find a full-fledged description of contextual
rewriting in Chapter IX of [Boyer & Moore, 1979], and its applications in ChaptersVII–
IX. This description comes some years before the term “contextual rewriting” became pop-
ular in automated theorem proving, and the term does not appear in [Boyer & Moore,
1979]. It is probably the first description of contextual rewriting in the history of logic,
unless one counts the rudimentary contextual rewriting in the “reduction” of the Pure
LISP Theorem Prover as such.142
As indicated before, the essential idea of contextual rewriting is the following: While
focusing on one literal of a clause for simplification, we can assume all other literals — the
context — to be false, simply because the literal in focus is irrelevant otherwise. Especially
useful are literals that are negated equations, because they can be used as a ground term-
rewrite system. A non-equational literal t can always be taken to be the negated equa-
tion (t 6= F). The free universal variables of a clause have to be treated as constants during
contextual rewriting.143
To bring contextual rewriting to full power, all occurrences of the function symbol IF
in the literals of a clause are expelled from the literals as follows. If the condition of an
IF-expression can be simplified to be definitely false F or definitely true (i.e. non-F, e.g.
if F is not set in the bit-vector as a potential type), then the IF-expression is replaced
with its respective case. Otherwise, after the IF-expression could not be removed by those
rewrite rules for IF whose soundness depends on termination,144 it is moved to the top
position (outside-in), by replacing each case with itself in the IF’s context, such that the
literal C[(IF t0 t1 t2)] is intermediately replaced with (IF t0 C[t1] C[t2]), and then this
literal splits its clause in two: one with the two literals (NOT t0) and C[t1] in place of the
old one, and one with t0 and C[t2] instead.
Thm eagerly removes variables in solved form: If the variable X does not occur in the
term t, but the literal (X 6= t) occurs in a clause, then we can remove that literal after
rewriting all occurrences of X in the clause to t. This removal is a logical equivalence trans-
formation, because the single remaining occurrence of X is implicitly universally quantified
and so (X 6= t) must be false because it implies (t 6= t). Alternatively, the removal can be
seen as a resolution step with the axiom of reflexivity.
142Cf. § 6.2.1.
143This has the advantage that we could take any well-founded ordering that is total on ground terms and
run the terminating ground version of a Knuth–Bendix completion procedure [Knuth & Bendix, 1970]
for all literals in a clause representation that have the form li 6= ri, and replace the literals of this form with
the resulting confluent and terminating rewrite system and normalize the other literals of the clause with
it. Note that this transforms a clause into a logically equivalent one. None of the Boyer–Moore theorem
provers does this, however.
144These rewrite rules whose soundness depends on termination are (IF X Y Y) = Y; (IF X X F) = X;
and for Boolean X: (IF X T F) = X; tested for applicability in the given order.
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It now remains to describe the rewriting with function definitions and with lemmas
tagged for rewriting, where the context of the clause is involved again.
Non-recursive function definitions are always unfolded by Thm.
Recursive function definitions are treated in a way very similar to that of the Pure
LISP Theorem Prover. The criteria on the unfolding of a function call of a recursively
defined function f still depend solely on the terms introduced as arguments in the recursive
calls of f in the body of f, which are accessed during the simplification of the body. But
now, instead of rejecting the unfolding in case of the presence of new destructor terms in
the simplified recursive calls, rejections are based on whether the simplified recursive calls
contain subterms not occurring elsewhere in the clause. That is, an unfolding is approved
if all subterms of the simplified recursive calls already occur in the clause. This basic
occurrence heuristic is one of the keys to Thm’s success at induction. As we will see,
instead of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover’s phrasing of inductive arguments with
“constructors in the conclusion”, such as P (s(x))) ⇐ P (x), Thm uses “destructors in
the hypothesis”, such as (P (x) ⇐ P (p(x))) ⇐ x 6=0. Thanks to the occurrence heuristic,
the very presence of a well-chosen induction hypothesis gives the rewriter “permission” to
unfold certain recursive functions in the induction conclusion (which is possible because all
function definitions are in destructor style).
There are also two less important criteria which individually suffice to unblock the
unfolding of recursive function definitions:
1. An increase of the number of arguments of the function to be unfolded that are
constructor ground terms.
2. A decrease of the number of function symbols in the arguments of the function to be
unfolded at the measured positions of an induction template for that function.
So the clause
C[lessp(x, s(y))]
will be expanded by (lessp2′), (lessp3′), and (p1) into the clauses
x 6= 0, C[true]
and
x= 0, C[lessp(p(x), y)]
— even if p(x) is a newly occurring subterm! — because the second argument position
of lessp is such a set of measured positions according to Example 6.8 of § 6.3.7.145
Thm is able to exploit previously proved lemmas. When the user submits a theorem for
proof, the user tags it with tokens indicating how it is to be used in the future if it is proved.
Thm supports four non-exclusive tags and they indicate that the lemma is to be used as
a rewrite rule, as a rule to eliminate destructors, as a rule to restrict generalizations, or as
a rule to suggest inductions. The paradigm of tagging theorems for use by certain proof
techniques focus the user on developing general “tactics” (within a limited framework of
very abstract control), while allowing the user to think mainly about relevant mathematical
truths. This paradigm has been a hallmark of all Boyer–Moore theorem provers since
Thm and partially accounts for their reputation of being “automatic”.
145See Page 118f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for the details of the criteria for unblocking the unfolding
of function definitions.
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Rewriting with lemmas that have been proved and then tagged for rewriting — so-called
rewrite lemmas — differs from rewriting with recursive function definitions mainly in one
aspect: There is no need to block them because the user has tagged them explicitly for
rewriting, and because rewrite lemmas have the form of conditional equations instead of
unconditional ones. Simplification with lemmas tagged for rewriting and the heuristics
behind the process are nicely described in [Schmidt-Samoa, 2006c], where a rewrite lemma
is not just tagged for rewriting, but where the user can also mark the condition literals on
how they should be dealt with. In Thm there is no lazy rewriting with rewrite lemmas,
i.e. no case splits are introduced to be able to apply the lemma.146 This means that all
conditions of the rewrite lemma have to be shown to be fulfilled in the current context.
In partial compensation there is a process of backward chaining, i.e. the conditions can
be shown to be fulfilled by the application of further conditional rewrite lemmas. The
termination of this backward chaining is achieved by avoiding the generation of conditions
into which the previous conditions can be homeomorphically embedded.147 In addition,
rewrite lemmas can introduce IF-expressions, splitting the rewritten clause into cases. There
are provisions to instantiate extra variables of conditions eagerly, which is necessary because
there are no existential variables.148
Some collections of rewrite lemmas can cause Thm’s rewriter not to terminate.149
For permutative rules like commutativity, however, termination is assured by simple term
ordering heuristics.150
6.3.2 Destructor Elimination in Thm
We have already seen constructors such as s (in Thm: ADD1) and cons (CONS) with the
destructors p (SUB1) and car (CAR), cdr (CDR), respectively.
Example 6.5 (From Constructor to Destructor Style and back)
We have presented several function definitions both in constructor and in destructor style.
Let us do careful and generalizable equivalence transformations (reverse step justified in
parentheses) starting with the constructor-style rule (ack3) of § 4.4:
ack(s(x), s(y)) = ack(x, ack(s(x), y)).
Introduce (delete) the solved variables x′ and y′ for the constructor terms s(x) and s(y)
occurring on the left-hand side, respectively, and add (delete) two further conditions by
applying the definition (p1′) (cf. § 4.4) twice.
146Matt Kaufmann and J Strother Moore added support for “forcing” and “case split” annotations
to ACL2 in the mid-1990s.
147See Page 109ff. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for the details.
148See Page 111f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for the details.
149Non-termination of rewriting caused the Boyer–Moore theorem provers to run forever or ex-
haust the LISP stack or heap — except ACL2, which maintains its own user-adjustable stack size
and gives a coherent error on stack overflow without crashing the LISP system. Nqthm introduced
special tools to track down the rewriting process via the rewrite call stack (namely BREAK-REWRITE,
after setting (MAINTAIN-REWRITE-PATH T)) and to count the applications of a rewrite rule (namely
ACCUMULATED-PERSISTENCE), so the problematic rules can easily be detected and the user can disable
them. See § 12 of [Boyer & Moore, 1988b; 1998] for the details.
150See Page 104f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for the details.
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ack(s(x), s(y)) = ack(x, ack(s(x), y)) ⇐
(
x′= s(x) ∧ p(x′)= x
∧ y′= s(y) ∧ p(y′) = y
)
.
Normalize the conclusion with leftmost equations of the condition from right to left (left to
right).
ack(x′, y′) = ack(x, ack(x′, y)) ⇐
(
x′= s(x) ∧ p(x′) =x
∧ y′= s(y) ∧ p(y′) = y
)
.
Normalize the conclusion with rightmost equations of the condition from right to left (left
to right).
ack(x′, y′) = ack(p(x′), ack(x′, p(y′))) ⇐
(
x′= s(x) ∧ p(x′) =x
∧ y′= s(y) ∧ p(y′)= y
)
.
Add (Delete) two conditions by applying axiom (nat2) twice.
ack(x′, y′) = ack(p(x′), ack(x′, p(y′))) ⇐
(
x′= s(x) ∧ p(x′) =x ∧ x′ 6= 0
∧ y′= s(y) ∧ p(y′)= y ∧ y′ 6= 0
)
.
Delete (Introduce) the leftmost equations of the condition by applying lemma (s1′) (cf. § 4.4)
twice, and delete (introduce) the solved variables x and y for the destructor terms p(x′)
and p(y′) occurring in the left-hand side of the equation in the conclusion, respectively.
ack(x′, y′) = ack(p(x′), ack(x′, p(y′))) ⇐ x′ 6= 0 ∧ y′ 6= 0.
Up to renaming of the variables, this is the destructor-style rule (ack3′) of Example 6.1
(cf. § 6.2.6). 
Our data types are defined inductively over constructors.151 Therefore constructors play
the main rôle in our semantics, and practice shows that step cases of simple induction
proofs work out much better with constructors than with the respective destructors, which
are secondary (i.e. defined) operators in our semantics and have a more complicated case
analysis in applications.
For this reason — contrary to the Pure LISP Theorem Prover — Thm applies
destructor elimination to the clauses in the waterfall, but not (as in Example 6.5) to the
defining equations. This application of destructor elimination has actually two further
positive effects:
1. It tends to standardize the representation of a clause in the sense that the numbers
of occurrences of identical subterms tend to be increased.
2. Destructor elimination also brings the subterm property in line with the sub-structure
property; e.g., Y is both a sub-structure of (CONS X Y) and a subterm of it, whereas
(CDR Z) is a sub-structure of Z in case of (LISTP Z), but not a subterm of Z.
Both effects improve the chances that the clause passes the follow-up stages of cross-
fertilization and generalization with good success.152
151Here the term “inductive” means the following: We start with the empty set and take the smallest
fixpoint under application of the constructors, which contains only finite structures, such as natural numbers
and lists. Co-inductively over the destructors we would obtain different data types, because we start with
the universal class and obtain the greatest fixed point under inverse application of the destructors, which
typically contains infinite structures. For instance, for the unrestricted destructors car, cdr of the list of
natural numbers list(nat) of § 4.5, we co-inductively obtain the data type of infinite streams of natural
numbers.
152See Page 114ff. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for a nice example for the advantage of destructor elimi-
nation for cross-fertilization.
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As noted earlier, the Pure LISP Theorem Prover does induction using step cases
with constructors, such as P (s(x)) ⇐ P (x), whereas Thm does induction using step cases
with destructors, such as (
P (x) ⇐ P (p(x)) ) ⇐ x 6= 0.
So destructor elimination was not so urgent in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, simply
because there were fewer destructors around. Indeed, the stage “destructor elimination”
does not exist in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover.
Thm does not do induction with constructors because there are generalized destructors
that do not have a straightforward constructor (see below), and because the induction rule of
explicit induction has to fix in advance whether the step cases are destructor or constructor
style. So with destructor style in all step cases and in all function definitions, explicit
induction and recursion in Thm choose the style that is always applicable. Destructor
elimination then confers the advantages of constructor-style proofs when possible.
Example 6.6 (A Generalized Destructor Without Constructor)
A generalized destructor that does not have a straightforward constructor is the function
delfirst defined in § 4.5. To verify the correctness of a deletion-sort algorithm based on
delfirst, a useful step case for an induction proof is of the form153(
P (l) ⇐ P (delfirst(max(l), l)) ) ⇐ l 6= nil.
A constructor version of this induction scheme would need something like an insertion func-
tion with an additional free variable indicating the position of insertion — a complication
that further removes the proof obligations from the algorithm being verified. 
Proper destructor functions take only one argument. The generalized destructor delfirst
we have seen in Example 6.6 has actually two arguments; the second one is the proper de-
structor argument and the first is a parameter. After the elimination of a set of destructors,
the terms at the parameter positions of the destructors are typically still present, whereas
all the terms at the positions of the proper destructor arguments are removed.
Example 6.7 (Division with Remainder as a pair of Generalized Destructors)
In case of y 6= 0, we can construct each natural number x in the form of (q ∗ y) + r with
lessp(r, y)= true. The related generalized destructors are the quotient div(x, y) of x by y,
and its remainder rem(x, y). Note that in both functions, the first argument is the proper
destructor argument and the second the parameter, which must not be 0. The rôle that the
definition (p1′) and the lemma (s1′) of § 4.4 play in Example 6.5 (and which the definitions
(car1′), (cdr1′) and the lemma (cons1′) of § 4.5 play in the equivalence transformations be-
tween constructor and destructor style for lists) is here taken by the following lemmas on the
generalized destructors div and rem and on the generalized constructor λq, r. ((q ∗ y) + r):
(div1′) div(x, y) = q ⇐ y 6= 0 ∧ (q ∗ y) + r= x ∧ lessp(r, y)= true
(rem1′) rem(x, y) = r ⇐ y 6= 0 ∧ (q ∗ y) + r= x ∧ lessp(r, y)= true
(+9′) (q ∗ y) + r = x ⇐ y 6= 0 ∧ q= div(x, y) ∧ r= rem(x, y)
If we have a clause with the literal y= 0, in which the destructor terms div(x, y) or rem(x, y)
occur, we can — just as in the of Example 6.5 (reverse direction) — introduce the new
literals div(x, y) 6= q and rem(x, y) 6= r for fresh q, r, and apply lemma (+9′) to introduce
the literal x 6= (q ∗ y)+ r. Then we can normalize with the first two literals, and afterwards
with the third. Then all occurrences of div(x, y), rem(x, y), and x are gone.154 
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To enable the form of elimination of generalized destructors described in Example 6.7, Thm
allows the user to tag lemmas of the form (s1′), (cons1′), or (+9′) as elimination lemmas
to perform destructor elimination. In clause representation, this form is in general the
following: The first literal of the clause is of the form (tc= x), where x is a variable which
does not occur in the (generalized) constructor term tc. Moreover, tc contains some distinct
variables y0, . . . , yn, which occur only on the left-hand sides of the first literal and of the
last n+1 literals of the clause, which are of the form (y0 6= td0), . . . , (yn 6= tdn), for distinct
(generalized) destructor terms td0 ,. . . ,t
d
n.
155
The idea of application for destructor elimination in a given clause is, of course, the
following: If, for an instance of the elimination lemma, the literals not mentioned above
(i.e. in the middle of the clause, such as y 6= 0 in (+9′)) occur in the given clause, and if
td0, . . . , t
d
n occur in the given clause as subterms, then rewrite all their occurrences with
(y0 6= td0), . . . , (yn 6= tdn) from right to left and then use the first literal of the elimination
lemma from right to left for further normalization.156
After a clause enters the destructor-elimination stage of Thm, its most simple (actually:
the one defined first) destructor that can be eliminated is eliminated, and destructor elim-
ination is continued until all destructor terms introduced by destructor elimination are
eliminated if possible. Then, before further destructors are eliminated, the resulting clause
is returned to the center pool of the waterfall. So the clause will enter the simplification
stage where the (generalized) constructor introduced by destructor elimination may be re-
placed with a (generalized) destructor. Then the resulting clauses re-enter the destructor-
elimination stage, which may result in infinite looping.
For example, destructor elimination turns the clause
x′= 0, C[lessp(p(x′), x′)], C ′[p(x′), x′]
by the elimination lemma (s1) into the clause
s(x) = 0, C[lessp(x, s(x))], C ′[x, s(x)].
Then, in the simplification stage of the waterfall, lessp(x, s(x)) is unfolded, resulting in
the clause x= 0, C[lessp(p(x), x)], C ′[x, s(x)]
and another one.157
153See Page 143f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
154For a nice, but non-trivial example on why proofs tend to work out much easier after this transformation,
see Page 135ff. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
155Thm adds one more restriction here, namely that the generalized destructor terms have to consist of a
function symbol applied to a list containing exactly the variables of the clause, besides y0, . . . , yn.
Moreover, note that Thm actually does not use our flattened form of the elimination lemmas, but the
one that results from replacing each yi in the clause with tdi , and then removing the literal (yi 6= tdi ). Thus,
Thm would accept only the non-flattened versions of our elimination lemmas, such as (s1) instead of (s1′)
(cf. § 4.4), and such as (cons1) instead of (cons1′) (cf. § 4.5).
156If we add the last literals of the elimination lemma to the given clause, use them for contextual rewriting,
and remove them only if this can be achieved safely via application of the definitions of the destructors
(as we could do in all our examples), then the elimination of destructors is an equivalence transformation.
Destructor elimination in Thm, however, may (over-) generalize the conjecture, because these last literals
are not present in the non-flattened elimination lemma of Thm and its variables yi are actually introduced
in Thm by generalization. Thus, instead of trying to delete the last literals of our deletion lemmas safely,
Thm never adds them.
157The latter step is given in more detail in the context of the second of the two less important criteria of
§ 6.3.1 for unblocking the unfolding of lessp(x, s(y)).
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Looping could result from eliminating the destructor introduced by simplification (such
as it is actually the case for our destructor p in the last clause). To avoid looping, before
returning a clause to the center pool of the waterfall, the variables introduced by destructor
elimination (such as our variable x) are marked. (Generalized) destructor terms containing
marked variables are blocked for further destructor elimination. This marking is removed
only when the clause reaches the induction stage of the waterfall.158
6.3.3 (Cross-) Fertilization in Thm
This stage has already been described in § 6.2.3. There is no noticeable difference between
the Pure LISP Theorem Prover and Thm here, besides some heuristic fine tuning.159
6.3.4 Generalization in Thm
Thm adds only one new rule to the universally applicable heuristic rules for generalization
on a term t mentioned in § 4.9:
“Never generalize on a destructor term t !”
This new rule makes sense in particular after the preceding stage of destructor elimination
in the sense that destructors that outlast their elimination probably carry some relevant
information. Another reason for not generalizing on destructor terms is that the clause will
enter the center pool in case another generalization is possible, and then the destructor
elimination might eliminate the destructor term more carefully than generalization would
do.160
The main improvement of generalization in Thm over the Pure LISP Theorem Pro-
ver, however, is the following: Suppose again that the term t is to be replaced at all its
occurrences in the clause T [t] with the fresh variable z. Recall that the Pure LISP Theo-
rem Prover restricts the fresh variable with a predicate synthesized from the definition
of the top function symbol of the replaced term. Thm instead restricts the new variable in
two ways. Both ways add additional literals to the clause before the term is replaced by
the fresh variable:
1. Assuming all literals of the clause T [t] to be false (i.e. of type F), the bit-vector
describing the soft type of t is computed and if only one bit is set (say the bit expressing
NUMBERP), then, for the respective type predicate, a new literal is added to the clause
(such as (NOT (NUMBERP t))).
2. The user can tag certain lemmas as generalization lemmas; such as
(SORTEDP (SORT X))
for a sorting function SORT; and if (SORT X) matches t, the respective instance of
(NOT (SORTEDP (SORT X))) is added to T [t].161 In general, for the addition of such
a literal (NOT t′), a proper subterm t′ of a generalization lemma must match t.162
158See Page 139 of [Boyer & Moore, 1979]. In general, for more sophisticated details of destructor
elimination in Thm, we have to refer the reader to ChapterX of [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
159See Page 149 of [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
160See Page 156f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
161Cf. Note 123.
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6.3.5 Elimination of Irrelevance in Thm
Thm includes another waterfall stage not in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, the elim-
ination of irrelevant literals. This is the last transformation before we come to “induction”.
Like generalization, this stage may turn a valid clause into an invalid one. The main rea-
son for taking this risk is that the subsequent heuristic procedures for induction assume
all literals to be relevant: irrelevant literals may suggest inappropriate induction schemes
which may result in a failure of the induction proof. Moreover, if all literals seem to be
irrelevant, then the goal is probably invalid and we should not do a costly induction but
just fail immediately.163
Let us call two literals connected if there is a variable that occurs in both of them. Con-
sider the partition of a clause into its equivalence classes w.r.t. the reflexive and transitive
closure of connectedness. If we have more than one equivalence class in a clause, this is an
alarm signal for irrelevance: if the original clause is valid, then a sub-clause consisting only
of the literals of one of these equivalence classes must be valid as well. This is a consequence
of the logical equivalence of ∀x. (A∨B) with A ∨ ∀x. B, provided that x does not occur
in A. Then we should remove one of the irrelevant equivalence classes after the other from
the original clause. To this end, Thm has two heuristic tests for irrelevance.
1. An equivalence class of literals is irrelevant if it does not contain any properly recursive
function symbol. Based on the assumption that the previous stages of the waterfall
are sufficiently powerful to prove clauses composed only of constructor functions
(i.e. shells and base objects) and functions with explicit (i.e. non-recursive) definitions,
the justification for this heuristic test is the following: If the clause of the equivalence
class were valid, then the previous stages of the waterfall should already have estab-
lished the validity of this equivalence class.
2. An equivalence class of literals is irrelevant if it consists of only one literal and if this
literal is the application of a properly recursive function to a list of distinct variables.
Based on the assumption that the soft typing rules are sufficiently powerful and that
the user has not defined a tautological, but tricky predicate,164 the justification for this
heuristic test is the following: The bit-vector of this literal must contain the singleton
type of F (containing only the term F, cf. § 6.3.1); otherwise the validity of the literal
and the clause would have been recognized by the stage “simplification”. This means
that F is most probably a possible value for some combination of arguments.
162Moreover, the literal is actually added to the generalized clause only if the top function symbol of t
does no longer occur in the literal after replacing t with x. This means that, for a generalization lemma
(EQUAL (FLATTEN (GOPHER X)) (FLATTEN X)), the literal
(NOT (EQUAL (FLATTEN (GOPHER t′′)) (FLATTEN t′′)))
is added to T [t] in case of t being of the form (GOPHER t′′), but not in case of t being of the form
(FLATTEN t′′) where the first occurrence of FLATTEN is not removed by the generalization. See Page 156f.
of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for the details.
163See Page 160f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for a typical example of this.
164This assumption is critical because it often occurs that updated program code contains recursive pred-
icates that are actually trivially true, but very tricky. See § 3.2 of [Wirth, 2004] for such an example.
Moreover, users sometimes supply such predicates to suggest a particular induction ordering. For example,
if we want to supply the function sqrtio of § 6.3.9 to Thm, then we have to provide a complete definition,
typically given by setting sqrtio to be T in all other cases. Luckily, such nonsense functions will typically
not occur in any proof.
68
6.3.6 Induction in Thm as compared to the Pure LISP Theorem Prover
As we have seen in § 6.2.6, the recursion analysis in the Pure LISP Theorem Pro-
ver is only rudimentary. Indeed, the whole information on the body of the recursive
function definitions comes out of the poor165 feedback of the “evaluation” procedure of
the simplification stage of the Pure LISP Theorem Prover. Roughly speaking, this
information consists only in the two facts
1. that a destructor symbol occurring as an argument of the recursive function call in
the body is not removed by the “evaluation” procedure in the context of the current
goal and in the local environment, and
2. that it is not possible to derive that this recursive function call is unreachable in this
context and environment.
In Thm, however, the first part of recursion analysis is done at definition time, i.e. at the
time the function is defined, and applied at proof time, i.e. at the time the induction rule
produces the base and step cases. Surprisingly, there is no reachability analysis for the
recursive calls in this second part of the recursion analysis in Thm. While the information
in item1 is thoroughly improved as compared to the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, the
information in item2 is partly weaker because all recursive function calls are assumed to
be reachable during recursion analysis. The overwhelming success of Thm means that the
heuristic decision to abandon reachability analysis in Thm was appropriate.166
6.3.7 Induction Templates generated by Definition-Time Recursion Analysis
The first part of recursion analysis in Thm consists of a termination analysis of every
recursive function at the time of its definition. The system does not only look for one
termination proof that is sufficient for the admissibility of the function definition, but
— to be able to generate a plenitude of sound sets of step formulas later — actually looks
through all termination proofs in a finite search space and gathers from them all information
required for justifying the termination of the recursive function definition. This information
will later be used to guarantee the soundness and improve the feasibility of the step cases
to be generated by the induction rule.
To this end, Thm constructs valid induction templates very similar to our description in
§ 5.5.167 Let us approach the idea of a valid induction template with some typical examples,
which are actually the templates for the constructor-style examples of § 5.5, but now for
the destructor-style definitions of lessp and ack, because only destructor-style definitions
are admissible in Thm.
165See the discussion in § 6.2.7 on Example 6.1 from § 6.2.6.
166Note that in most cases the step formula of the reachable cases works somehow in Thm, as long as
no better step case was canceled because of unreachable step cases, which, of course, are trivial to prove,
simply because their condition is false. Moreover, note that, contrary to descente infinie which can get
along with the first part of recursion analysis alone, the heuristics of explicit induction have to guess the
induction steps eagerly, which is always a fault-prone procedure, to be corrected by additional induction
proofs, as we have seen in Example 4.4 of § 4.8.1.
69
Example 6.8 (Two Induction Templates with different Measured Positions)
For the ordering predicate lessp as defined by (lessp1′–3′) in Example 6.2 of § 6.2.6, we get
two induction templates with the sets of measured positions {1} and {2}, respectively, both
for the well-founded ordering λx, y. (lessp(x, y)= true). The first template has the weight
term (1) and the relational description{ (
lessp(x, y), {lessp(p(x), p(y))}, {x 6= 0} ) }.
The second one has the weight term (2) and the relational description{ (
lessp(x, y), {lessp(p(x), p(y))}, {y 6= 0} ) }. 
Example 6.9 (One Induction Template with Two Measured Positions)
For the Ackermann function ack as defined by (ack1′–3′) in Example 6.1 of § 6.2.6, we get
only one appropriate induction template. The set of its measured positions is {1, 2}, be-
cause of the weight function cons((1), cons((2), nil)) (in Thm actually: (CONS x y)) in the
well-founded lexicographic ordering
λl, k. (lexlimless(l, k, s(s(s(0)))) = true).
The relational description has two elements: For the equation (ack2′) we get(
ack(x, y), {ack(p(x), s(0))}, {x 6= 0} ),
and for the equation (ack3′) we get(
ack(x, y), {ack(x, p(y)), ack(p(x), ack(x, p(y)))}, {x 6= 0, y 6= 0} ). 
To find valid induction templates automatically by exhaustive search, Thm allows the
user to tag certain theorems as “induction lemmas”. An induction lemma consists of the
application of a well-founded relation to two terms with the same top function symbol w,
playing the rôle of the weight term; plus a condition without extra variables, which is used
to generate the case conditions of the induction template. Moreover, the arguments of
the application of w occurring as the second argument of the well-founded relation must
be distinct variables in Thm, mirroring the left-hand side of its function definitions in
destructor style.
Certain induction lemmas are generated with each shell declaration. Such an induction
lemma generated for the shell ADD1, which is roughly
(LESSP (COUNT (SUB1 X)) (COUNT X)) ⇐ (NOT (ZEROP X)),
suffices for generating the two templates of Example 6.8. Note that COUNT, playing the
rôle of w here, is a special function in Thm, which is generically extended by every shell
declaration in an object-oriented style for the elements of the new shell. On the natural
numbers here, COUNT is the identity. On other shells, COUNT is defined similar to our
function count from § 4.5.168
167Those parts of the condition of the equation that contain the new function symbol f must be ignored
in the case conditions of the induction template because the definition of the function f is admitted in
Thm only after it has passed the termination proof.
That Thm ignores the governing conditions that contain the new function symbol f is described in the
2ndparagraph on Page 165 of [Boyer & Moore, 1979]. Moreover, an example for this is the definition of
OCCUR on Page 166 of [Boyer & Moore, 1979].
After one successful termination proof, however, the function can be admitted in Thm, and then these
conditions could actually be admitted in the templates. So the actual reason why Thm ignores these
conditions in the templates is that it generates the templates with the help of previously proved induction
lemmas, which, of course, cannot contain the new function yet.
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6.3.8 Proof-Time Recursion Analysis in Thm
The induction rule uses the information from the induction templates as follows: For each
recursive function occurring in the input formula, all applicable induction templates are
retrieved and turned into induction schemes as described in § 5.8. Any induction scheme
that is subsumed by another one is deleted after adding its hitting ratio to the one of the
other. The remaining schemes are merged into new ones with a higher hitting ratio, and
finally, after the flawed schemes are deleted, the scheme with the highest169 hitting ratio
will be used by the induction rule to generate the base and step cases.
Example 6.10 (Applicable Induction Templates)
Let us consider the conjecture (ack4) from § 4.4. From the three induction templates of
Examples 6.8 and 6.9, only the second one of Example 6.8 is not applicable because the
second position of lessp (which is the only measured position of that template) is changeable,
but filled in (ack4) by the non-variable ack(x, y). 
From the destructor-style definitions (lessp1′–3′) (cf. Example 6.2) and (ack1′–3′) (cf. Ex-
ample 6.1), we have generated two induction templates applicable to
(ack4) lessp(y, ack(x, y)) = true
They yield the two induction schemes of Example 6.11. See also Example 5.5 for the single
induction scheme for the constructor-style definitions (lessp1–3) and (ack1–3).
Example 6.11 (Induction Schemes)
The induction template for lessp of Example 6.8 that is applicable to (ack4) according to
Example 6.10 and whose relational description contains only the triple(
lessp(x, y), {lessp(p(x), p(y))}, {x 6= 0} )
yields the induction scheme with position set {1.1} (i.e. left-hand side of first literal
in (ack4)); the step-case description is
{(
{x,y}↿id, {µ1}, {y 6= 0}
)}
, where µ1 = {x7→x,
y 7→p(y)}; the set of induction variables is {y}; and the hitting ratio is 1
2
.
This can be seen as follows: The substitution called ξ in the discussion of § 5.8 can
be chosen to be the identity substitution {x,y}↿id on {x, y} because the first element of the
triple does not contain any constructors. This is always the case for induction templates for
destructor-style definitions such as (lessp1′–3′). The substitution called σ in § 5.8 (which
has to match the first element of the triple to the term (ack4)/1.1, i.e. the term at the
position 1.1 in (ack4)) is σ = {x7→y, y 7→ack(x, y)}. So the constraints for µ1 (which tries
to match (ack4)/1.1 to the σ-instance of the second element of the triple) are: yµ1= p(y)
for the first (measured) position of lessp; and ack(x, y)µ1= p(ack(x, y)) for the second
(unmeasured) position, which cannot be achieved and is skipped. This results in a hitting
ratio of only 1
2
. The single measured position 1 of the induction template results in the
induction variable (ack4)/1.1.1 = y.
168For more details on the recursion analysis a definition time in Thm, see Page 180ff. of [Boyer &
Moore, 1979].
169This part of the heuristics is made perspicuous in Example 5.5 of § 5.8.
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The template for ack of Example 6.9 yields an induction scheme with the position
set {1.1.2}, and the set of induction variables {x, y}. The triple(
ack(x, y), {ack(p(x), s(0))}, {x 6= 0} )
(generated by the equation (ack2′)) is replaced with
(
{x,y}↿id, {µ′1,1}, {x 6= 0}
)
, where
µ′1,1 = {x7→p(x), y 7→s(0)}. The triple(
ack(x, y), {ack(x, p(y)), ack(p(x), ack(x, p(y)))}, {x 6= 0, y 6= 0} )
(generated by (ack3′)) is replaced with
(
{x,y}↿id, {µ′2,1, µ′2,2}, {x 6= 0, y 6= 0}
)
, where
µ′2,1 = {x7→x, y 7→p(y)}, and µ′2,2 = {x7→p(x), y 7→ack(x, p(y))}.
This can be seen as follows: The substitution called σ in the above discussion is {x,y}↿id in
both cases, and so the constraints for the (measured) positions are xµ′1,1=p(x), yµ
′
1,1=s(0);
xµ′2,1=x, yµ
′
2,1=p(y); xµ
′
2,2=p(x), yµ
′
2,2=ack(x, p(y)).
As all six constraints are satisfied, the hitting ratio is 6
6
= 1. 
An induction scheme that is either subsumed by or merged into another induction scheme
adds its hitting ratio and sets of positions and induction variables to those of the other’s,
respectively, and then it is deleted.
The most important case of subsumption are schemes that are identical except for their
position sets, where — no matter which scheme is deleted — the result is the same. The
more general case of proper subsumption occurs when the subsumer provides the essential
structure of the subsumee, but not vice versa.
Merging and proper subsumption of schemes — seen as binary algebraic operations —
are not commutative, however, because the second argument inherits the well-foundedness
guarantee alone and somehow absorbs the first argument, and so the result for swapped
arguments is often undefined.
More precisely, subsumption is given if the step-case description of the first induction
scheme can be injectively mapped to the step-case description of the second one, such that
(using the notation of § 5.8 and Example 6.11), for each step case (id, { µj | j ∈ J }, C)
mapped to (id, { µ′j | j ∈ J⊎J ′ }, C ′), we have C ⊆ C ′, and the set of substitutions
{ µj | j ∈ J } can be injectively170 mapped to { µ′j | j ∈ J ⊎ J ′ } (w.l.o.g. say µi to µ′i for
i∈ J), such that, for each j ∈ J and x ∈ dom(µj): x∈ dom(µ′j); xµj=x implies xµ′j=x;
and xµj is a subterm of xµ
′
j.
Example 6.12 (Subsumption of Induction Schemes)
In Example 6.11, the induction scheme for lessp is subsumed by the induction scheme for
ack, because we can map the only element of the step-case description of the former to the
second element of the step-case description of latter: the case condition {y 6= 0} is a subset
of the case condition {x 6= 0, y 6= 0}, and we have µ1 = µ′2,1. So the former scheme is
deleted and the scheme for ack is updated to have the position set {1.1, 1.1.2} and the
hitting ratio 3
2
. 
170From a logical viewpoint, it is not clear why this second injectivity requirement is found here, just as
in different (but equivalent) form in [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 191, 1stparagraph]. (The first injectivity
requirement may prevent us from choosing an induction ordering that is too small, cf. § 6.3.9.) An omission
of the second requirement would just admit a term of the subsumer to have multiple subterms of the
subsumee, which seems reasonable. Nevertheless, as pointed out in § 6.3.9, only practical testing of the
heuristics is what matters here. See also Note 171.
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In Example 6.2 of § 6.2.6 we have already seen a rudimentary, but pretty successful kind
of merging of suggested step cases in the Pure LISP Theorem Prover. As Thm
additionally has induction schemes, it applies a more sophisticated merging of induction
schemes instead.
Two substitutions µ1 and µ2 are [non-trivially ] mergeable if xµ1= xµ2 for each x ∈
dom(µ1) ∩ dom(µ2) [and there is a y ∈ dom(µ1) ∩ dom(µ2) with yµ1 6= y].
Two triples (V1↿id, A1, C1) and (V2↿id, A2, C2) of two step-case descriptions of two in-
duction schemes, each with domain Vk = dom(µk) for all µk ∈ Ak (for k ∈ {1, 2}), are
[non-trivially ] mergeable if for each µ1 ∈ A1 there is a µ2 ∈ A2 such that µ1 and µ2 are
[non-trivially] mergeable. The result of their merging is
(
V1∪V2↿id, m(A1, A2), C1∪C2
)
,
where m(A1, A2) is the set containing all substitutions µ1 ∪ µ2 with µ1 ∈ A1 and µ2 ∈ A2
such that µ1 and µ2 are mergeable as well as all substitutions V1\V2↿id ∪ µ2 with µ2 ∈ A2
for which there is no substitution µ1 ∈ A1 such that µ1 and µ2 are mergeable.
Two induction schemes are mergeable if the step-case description of the first induction
scheme can be injectively171 mapped to the step-case description of the second one, such
that each argument and its image are non-trivially mergeable. The step-case description of
the induction scheme that results from merging the first induction scheme into the second
contains the merging of all mergeable triples of the step-case descriptions of first and second
induction scheme, respectively.
Finally, we have to describe what it means that an induction scheme is flawed. This
simply is the case if — after merging is completed — the intersection of its induction
variables with the (common) domain of the substitutions of the step-case description of
another remaining induction scheme is non-empty.
If an induction scheme is flawed by another one that cannot be merged with it, this
indicates that an induction on it will probably result in a permanent clash between the
induction conclusion and the available induction hypotheses at some occurrences of the
induction variables.172
pos. set ind. var.s step-case description hit. ratio
1 {1} {x} {({x,z}↿id, {µ1}, {x 6= 0})} 1
2 {2} {x} {({x,y}↿id, {µ2}, {x 6= 0})} 1
3 {2} {y} {({x,y}↿id, {µ2}, {y 6= 0})} 1
4 {3} {y} {({y,z}↿id, {µ3}, {y 6= 0})} 1
5 {3} {z} {({y,z}↿id, {µ3}, {z 6= 0})} 1
6 {2} {x, y} {({x,y}↿id, {µ2}, {x 6= 0, y 6= 0})} 2
7 {3} {y, z} {({y,z}↿id, {µ3}, {y 6= 0, z 6= 0})} 2
8 {2, 3} {x, y, z} {({x,y,z}↿id, {µ4}, {x 6= 0, y 6= 0, z 6= 0})} 4
9 {1, 2, 3} {x, y, z} {({x,y,z}↿id, {µ4}, {x 6= 0, y 6= 0, z 6= 0})} 5
µ1 = {x7→p(x), z 7→p(z)}, µ2 = {x7→p(x), y 7→p(y)},
µ3 = {y 7→p(y), z 7→p(z)}, and µ4 = {x7→p(x), y 7→p(y), z 7→p(z)}.
pos. = position; ind. var.s = set of induction variables; hit. = hitting.
Figure 3: The induction schemes of Example 6.13
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Example 6.13 (Merging and Flawedness of Induction Schemes)
Let us reconsider merging in the proof of lemma (lessp7) w.r.t. the definition of lessp
via (lessp1′–3′), just as we did in Example 6.2. Let us abbreviate p= true with p, just
as in our very first proof of lemma (lessp7) in Example 4.3, and also following the LISP
style of Thm. Simplification reduces (lessp7) first to the clause
(lessp7′) lessp(x, p(z)), ¬lessp(x, y), ¬lessp(y, z), z= 0
Then the Boyer–Moore waterfall sends this clause through three rounds of reduction
between destructor elimination and simplification as discussed at the end of § 6.3.2, finally
returning again to (lessp7′), but now with all its variables marked as being introduced by
destructor elimination, which prevents looping by blocking further destructor elimination.
Note that the marked variables refer actually to the predecessors of the values of the
original lemma (lessp7′), and that these three rounds of reduction already include all that
is required for the entire induction proof, such that descente infinie would now conclude
the proof with an induction-hypothesis application. This most nicely illustrates the crucial
similarity between recursion and induction, which Boyer and Moore “exploit” . . . “or,
rather, contrived”.173
The proof by explicit induction in Thm, however, now just starts to compute induction
schemes. The two induction templates for lessp found in Example 6.8 are applicable five
times, resulting in the induction schemes 1–5 in Figure 3.
From the domains of the substitutions in the step-case descriptions, it is obvious that
— among schemes 1–5 — only the two pairs of schemes 2 and 3 as well as 4 and 5 are
candidates for subsumption, which is not given here, however, because the case conditions
of these two pairs of schemes are not subsets of each other.
Nevertheless, these pairs of schemes merge, resulting in the schemes 6 and 7, respectively,
which merge again, resulting in scheme 8.
Now only the schemes 1 and 8 remain. As each of them has x as an induction variable,
both schemes would be flawed if they could not be merged.
It does not matter that the scheme 1 is subsumed by scheme 8 simply because the phase
of subsumption is already over; but they are also mergeable, actually with the same result
as subsumption would have, namely the scheme 9, which admits us to prove the generic
step-case formula it describes without further induction, and so Thm achieves the crucial
task of heuristic anticipation of an appropriate induction hypotheses, just as well as the
Pure LISP Theorem Prover.174 
171From a logical viewpoint, it is again not clear why an injectivity requirement is found here, just as
in different (but equivalent) form in [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 193, 1stparagraph]. An omission of the
injectivity requirement would admit to define merging as a commutative associative operation. Nevertheless,
as pointed out in § 6.3.9, only practical testing of the heuristics is what matters here. See also Note 170.
172See Page 194f. of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for a short further discussion and a nice example.
173Cf. [Boyer & Moore, 1979, p. 163, last paragraph].
174The base cases show no improvement to the proof with the Pure LISP Theorem Prover in Exam-
ple 6.2 and a further additional, but also negligible overhead is the preceding reduction from (lessp7) over
(lessp7′) to a version of (lessp7′) with marked variables.
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6.3.9 Conclusion on Thm
Logicians reading on Thm may ask themselves many questions such as: Why is merging
of induction schemes — seen as a binary algebraic operation — not realized to satisfy the
constraint of associativity, so that the result of merging become independent of the order
of the operations? Why does merging not admit the subterm-property in the same way as
subsumption of induction schemes does? Why do some of the injectivity requirements175 of
subsumption and mergeability lack a meaningful justification, and how can it be that they
do not matter?
The answer is trivial, although it is easily overlooked: The part of the automation of
induction we have discussed in this section on Thm, belongs mostly to the field of heuristics
and not in the field of logics. Therefore, the final judgment cannot come from logical and
intellectual adequacy and comprehensibility — which are not much more applicable here
than in the field of neural nets for instance — but must come from complete testing with a
huge and growing corpus of example theorems. A modification of an operation, say merging
of induction schemes, that may have some practical advantages for some examples or admit
humans some insight or understanding, can be accepted only if it admits us to run, as
efficiently as before, all the lemmas that could be automatically proved with the system
before. All in all, logical and formal considerations may help us to find new heuristics, but
they cannot play any rôle in their evaluation.176
Moreover, it is remarkable that the well-founded relation that is expressed by the sub-
suming induction scheme is smaller than that expressed by the subsumed one, and the
relation expressed by a merged scheme is typically smaller than those expressed by the
original ones. This means that the newly generated induction schemes do not represent a
more powerful induction ordering (say, in terms of Noetherian induction), but actually
achieve an improvement w.r.t. the eager instantiation of the induction hypothesis (both for
a direct proof and for generalization), and provide case conditions that further a successful
generalization without further case analysis.
Since the end of the 1970s until today, Thm has set the standard for explicit induction;
moreover, Thm and its successors Nqthm and ACL2 have given many researchers a hard
time trying to demonstrate weaknesses of their explicit-induction heuristics, because exam-
ples carefully devised to fail with certain steps of the construction of induction schemes (or
other stages of the waterfall) tend to end up with alternative proofs not imagined before.
Restricted to the mechanization of the selection of an appropriate induction scheme for
explicit induction, no significant overall progress has been seen beyond Thm and we do not
expect any for the future. A heuristic approach that has to anticipate appropriate induction
steps with a lookahead of one individual rewrite step for each recursive function occurring
175Cf. Notes 170 and 171.
176While Christoph Walther is well aware of the primacy of testing in [Walther, 1992; 1993], this
awareness is not reflected in the sloppy language of the most interesting papers [Stevens, 1988] and
[Bundy &al., 1989]: Heuristics cannot be “bugged” or “have serious flaws”, unless this would mean that
they turn out to be inferior to others w.r.t. a standard corpus. A “rational reconstruction” or a “meta-
theoretic analysis” may help to guess even superior heuristics, but they may not have any epistemological
value per se.
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in the input formula cannot go much further than the carefully developed and exhaustively
tested explicit-induction heuristics of Thm.
Working with Thm (or Nqthm) for the first time will always fascinate informaticians
and mathematicians, simply because it helps to save more time with the standard every-
day inductive proof work than it takes, and the system often comes up with completely
unexpected proofs. Mathematicians, however, should be warned that the less trivial mathe-
matical proofs that require some creativity and would deserve to be explicated in a mathe-
matics lecture, will require some hints, especially if the induction ordering is not a combi-
nation of the termination orderings of the given function definitions. This is already the
case for the simple proofs of the lemma on the irrationality of the square root of two, sim-
ply because the induction orderings of the typical proofs exist only under the assumption
that the lemma is wrong. To make Thm find the standard proof, the user has to define a
function such as the following one:
(sqrtio1) sqrtio(x, y)
= and(sqrtio(y, div(x, s(s(0)))),
and(sqrtio(s(s(0)) ∗ (x− y), (s(s(0)) ∗ y)−x),
sqrtio((s(s(0)) ∗ y)− x, x− y)))
⇐ x ∗x= s(s(0)) ∗ y ∗ y ∧ y 6= 0
Note that the condition of (sqrtio1) cannot be fulfilled. The three different occurrences
of sqrtio on the right-hand side of the positive/negative-conditional equation become im-
mediately clear from Figure 4. Actually, any single one of these occurrences is sufficient
for a proof of the irrationality lemma with Thm, provided that we give the hint that the
induction templates of sqrtio should be used for computing the induction schemes, in spite
of the fact that sqrtio does not occur in the lemma.
x=AE
y=FE =BE =AF
div(x, s(s(0))) =AC =CF
x− y=AB =BD=BG=GF
s(s(0)) ∗ (x− y) =AD
(s(s(0)) ∗ y)−x=AG =GD
.......................................................
A
B
C
F E
D
G
Figure 4: Four possibilities to descend with rational representations of
√
2:
From the triangle with right angle at F to those at C, G, or B.
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6.4 Nqthm
Subsequent theorem provers by Boyer and Moore did not add much to the selection of
an appropriate induction scheme. While both Nqthm and ACL2 have been very influen-
tial in theorem proving, their inductive heuristics are nearly the same as those in Thm and
their waterfalls have quite similar structures. Since we are concerned with the history of
the mechanization of induction, we just sketch developments since 1979.
The one change from Thm to Nqthm that most directly affected the inductions carried
out by the system is the abandonment of fixed lexicographic relations on natural numbers
as the only available well-founded relations. Nqthm introduces a formal representation
of the ordinals up to ε0, i.e. up to ω
ω .
.
.
, and assumes that the “less than” relation on such
ordinals is well-founded. This did not change the induction heuristics themselves, it just
allowed the admission of more complex function definitions and the justification of more
sophisticated induction templates.
After the publication of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] describing Thm, Boyer andMoore
turned to the question of providing limited support for higher-order functions in their first-
order setting. This had two very practical motivations. One was to allow the user to
extend the prover by defining and mechanically verifying new proof procedures in the pure
LISP dialect supported by Thm. The other was to allow the user the convenience of
LISP’s “map functions” and LOOP facility. Both required formally defining the semantics
of the logical language in the logic, i.e. axiomatizing the evaluation function EVAL. Ulti-
mately this resulted in the provision of metafunctions [Boyer & Moore, 1981b] and the
non-constructive “value-and-cost” function V&C$ [Boyer & Moore, 1988a], which were
provided as part of the Nqthm system described in [Boyer & Moore, 1988b; 1998].
The most important side-effect of these additions, however, is under the hood; Boyer
and Moore contrived to make the representation of constructor ground terms in the logic
be identical to their representation as constants in its underlying implementation lan-
guage LISP: integers are represented directly as LISP integers; for instance, s(s(s(0)))
is represented by the machine-oriented internal LISP representation of 3, instead of the
previous (ADD1 (ADD1 (ADD1 (ZERO)))). Symbols and list structures are embedded this
way as well, so that they can can profit from the very efficient representation of these
basic data types in LISP. It thus also became possible to represent symbolic machine
states containing actual assembly code or the parse trees of actual programs in the logic of
Nqthm. Metafunctions were put to good use canonicalizing symbolic state expressions.
The exploration of formal operational semantics with Nqthm blossomed.
In addition, Nqthm adds a rational linear-arithmetic177 decision procedure to the
simplification stage of the waterfall [Boyer & Moore, 1988c], reducing the amount of
user interaction necessary to prove arithmetic theorems. The incompleteness of the proce-
dure when operating on terms beyond the linear fragment is of little practical importance
since induction is available (and often automatic).
With Nqthm it became possible to formalize and verify problems beyond the scope
of Thm, such as the correctness of a netlist implementing the instruction-set architecture
of a microprocessor [Hunt, 1985], Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem,178 the verified
hard- and software stack of Computational Logic, Inc., relating a fabricated microprocessor
design through an assembler, linker, loader, several compilers, and an operating system
to simple verified application programs,179 and the verification of the Berkeley C String
Library.180 Many more examples are listed in [Boyer & Moore, 1998].
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6.5 ACL2
Because of the pervasive change in the representation of constants, the LISP subset sup-
ported by Nqthm is exponentially more efficient than the LISPs supported by Thm and
the Pure LISP Theorem Prover. It is still too inefficient, however: Emerging appli-
cations of Nqthm in the late 1980s included models of commercial microprocessors; users
wished to run their models on industrial test suites. The root cause of the inefficiency was
that ground execution in Nqthm was done by a purpose-built interpreter implemented by
Boyer and Moore. To reach competitive speeds, it would have been necessary to build
a good compiler and full runtime system for the LISP subset axiomatized in Nqthm. In-
stead, in August 1989, less than a year after the publication of [Boyer & Moore, 1988b]
describing Nqthm, Boyer and Moore decided to axiomatize a practical subset of Com-
mon Lisp [Steele, 1990], the then-emerging standard LISP, and to build an Nqthm-like
theorem prover for it. To demonstrate that the subset was a practical programming lan-
guage, they decided to code the theorem prover applicatively in that subset. Thus, ACL2
was born.
Boyer left Computational Logic, Inc., (CLI) and returned to his duties at the The
University of Texas at Austin in 1989, while Moore resigned his tenure and stayed at
CLI. This meant Moore was working full-time on ACL2, whereas Boyer was working
on it only at night. Matt Kaufmann (*1952), who had worked with Boyer andMoore
since the mid-1980s on Nqthm and had joined them at CLI, was invited to join the ACL2
project. By the mid-1990s, Boyer requested that his name be removed as an author of
ACL2 because he no longer knew every line of code.
The only major change to inductive reasoning introduced by ACL2 was the further
refinement of the induction templates computed at definition time. While Nqthm built
the case analysis from the case conditions “governing” the recursive calls, ACL2 uses the
more restrictive notion of the tests “ruling” the recursive calls. Compare the definition of
governors on Page 180 of [Boyer & Moore, 1998] to the definition of rulers on Page 90
of [Kaufmann &al., 2000b].
177Linear arithmetic is traditionally called “Presburger Arithmetic” after Mojżesz Presburger
(actually: “Prezburger”) (1904–1943?); cf. [Presburger, 1930], [Stansifer, 1984], [Zygmunt, 1991].
178Cf. [Shankar, 1994]. In [Shankar, 1994, p. xii] we read on this work with Nqthm:
“This theorem prover is known for its powerful heuristics for constructing proofs by induction
while making clever use of previously proved lemmas. The Boyer–Moore theorem prover
did not discover proofs of the incompleteness theorem but merely checked a detailed but fairly
high-level proof containing over 2000 definitions and lemmas leading to the main theorems.
These definitions and lemmas were constructed through a process of interaction with the
theorem prover which was able to automatically prove a large number of nontrivial lemmas.
By thus proving a well-chosen sequence of lemmas, the theorem prover is actually used as a
proof checker rather than a theorem prover.
If we exclude the time spent thinking, planning, and writing about the proof, the verification
of the incompleteness theorem occupied about eighteen months of effort with the theorem
prover.”
179Cf. [Moore, 1989b; 1989a], [Bevier &al., 1989], [Hunt, 1989], [Young, 1989], [Bevier, 1989].
180Via verification of its gcc-generated Motorola MC68020 machine code [Boyer & Yu, 1996].
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ACL2 represents a major step, however, toward Boyer and Moore’s dream of a
computational logic because it is a theorem prover for a practical programming language.
Because it is so used, scaling its algorithms and heuristics to deal with enormous models and
the formulas they generate has been a major concern, as has been the efficiency of ground
execution. Moreover, it also added many other proof techniques including congruence-
based contextual rewriting, additional decision procedures, disjunctive search (meaning the
waterfall no longer has just one pool but may generate several, one of which must be
“emptied” to succeed), and many features made possible by the fact that the system code
and state is visible to the logic and the user.
Among the landmark applications of ACL2 are the verification of a Motorola digital
signal processor [Brock & Hunt, 1999] and of the floating-point division microcode for the
AMD K5tm microprocessor [Moore &al., 1998], the routine verification of all elementary
floating point arithmetic on the AMD Athlontm [Russinoff, 1998], the certification of
the Rockwell Collins AAMP7Gtm for multi-level secure applications by the US National
Security Agency based on theACL2 proofs [Anon, 2005], and the integration ofACL2 into
the work-flow of Centaur Technology, Inc., a major manufacturer of X86 microprocessors
[Hunt & Swords, 2009]. Some of this work was done several years before the publications
appeared because the early use of formal methods was considered proprietary. For example,
the work for [Brock & Hunt, 1999] was completed in 1994, and that for [Moore &al.,
1998] in 1995.
In most industrial applications of ACL2, induction is not used in every proof. Many of
the proofs involve huge intermediate formulas, some requiring megabytes of storage simply
to represent, let alone simplify. Almost all the proofs, however, depend on lemmas that
require induction to prove.
To be successful, ACL2 must be good at both induction and simplification and integrate
them seamlessly in a well-engineered system, so that the user can state and prove in a single
system all the theorems needed.
ACL2 is most relevant to the historiography of inductive theorem proving because it
demonstrates that the induction heuristics and the waterfall provide such an integration in
ways that can be scaled to industrial-strength applications.
ACL2 and, by extension, inductive theorem proving, have changed the way micro-
processors and low-level critical software are designed. Proof of correctness, or at least
proof of some important system properties, is now a possibility.
Boyer, Moore, and Kaufmann were awarded the 2005 ACM Software Systems
Award for “the Boyer–Moore Theorem Prover”:
“The Boyer–Moore Theorem Prover is a highly engineered and effective
formal-methods tool that pioneered the automation of proofs by induction,
and now provides fully automatic or human-guided verification of critical com-
puting systems. The latest version of the system, ACL2, is the only sim-
ulation/verification system that provides a standard modeling language and
industrial-strength model simulation in a unified framework. This technology is
truly remarkable in that simulation is comparable to C in performance, but runs
inside a theorem prover that verifies properties by mathematical proof. ACL2
is used in industry by AMD, IBM, and Rockwell-Collins, among others.”181
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6.6 Further Historically Important Explicit-Induction Systems
Explicit induction is nowadays applied in many theorem proving systems, such as Isa-
belle/HOL, Coq, PVS, and IsaPlanner, to name just a few. We cannot treat all
of these systems in this article. Thus, in this section, we sketch only those systems that
provided crucial contributions to the history of the automation of mathematical induction.
6.6.1 Rrl
Rrl, the Rewrite Rule Laboratory [Kapur & Zhang, 1989], was initiated in 1982 and
showed its main activity during its first dozen years. Rrl is a system for proving the
viability of many techniques related to term rewriting. Besides other forms of induction,
Rrl includes cover-set induction, which has eager induction-hypothesis generation, but is
restricted to syntactic term orderings.
6.6.2 Inka
The Inka project and the development of the Inka induction systems began at the Uni-
versity of Karlsruhe at the beginning of the 1980s. It became part of the Collaborative
Research Center SFB314 “Artificial Intelligence”, which started in 1985 and was financed
by the German Research Community (DFG) to overcome a backwardness in artificial in-
telligence in Germany of more than a decade compared to the research in Edinburgh and
in the US.
The Inka systems were based on the concepts of Boyer & Moore [1979] and proved
the executability of several new concepts, but they were never competitive with their con-
temporary Boyer–Moore theorem provers,182 and the development of Inka was discon-
tinued in the year 2000.
Three Inka system descriptions were presented at the CADE conference series:
[Biundo &al., 1986], [Hutter & Sengler, 1996], [Autexier &al., 1999].
Besides interfaces to users and other systems, and the integration of logics, specifica-
tions, and results of other theorem provers, the essentially induction-relevant additions of
Inka as compared to the system described in [Boyer & Moore, 1979] are the following:
In [Biundo &al., 1986], there is an existential quantification where the system tries to
find witnesses for the existentially quantified variables by interactive program synthesis.
In [Hutter, 1994], there is synthesis of induction orderings by rippling (cf. § 7.2).
A lot of most interesting work on explicit induction was realized along the line of the
Inka systems: We have to mention here Christoph Walther’s (*1950) elegant treat-
181For the complete text of the citation of Boyer, Moore, and Kaufmann see http://awards.acm.
org/citation.cfm?id=4797627&aw=149.
182Inka 5.0 [Autexier &al., 1999], however, was competitive in speed with Nqthm. This can roughly
be concluded from the results of the inductive theorem proving contest at the 16th Int. Conf. on Automated
Deduction (CADE), Trento (Italy), 1999 (the design of which is described in [Hutter & Bundy, 1999]),
where the following systems competed with each other (in interaction with the following humans): Nqthm
(Laurence Pierre), Inka 5.0 (Dieter Hutter), Oyster/CLaM (Alan Bundy), and a first prototype
of QuodLibet (Ulrich Kühler). Only Oyster/CLaM turned out to be significantly slower than the
other systems, but all participating systems would have been left far behind ACL2 if it had participated.
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ment of automated termination proofs for recursive function definitions [Walther, 1988;
1994b], and his theoretically outstanding work on the generation of step cases with eager
induction-hypothesis generation [Walther, 1992; 1993]. Moreover, there isDieter Hut-
ter’s (*1959) further development of rippling (cf. § 7.2), and Martin Protzen’s (*1962)
profound work on patching of faulty conjectures and on breaking out of the imagined cage
of explicit induction by “lazy induction” [Protzen, 1994; 1995; 1996].
6.6.3 Oyster/CLaM
TheOyster/CLaM system was developed at the University of Edinburgh in the late 1980s183
and the 1990s by a large team led by Alan Bundy.184
Oyster is a reimplementation of Nuprl [Constable &al., 1985], a proof editor for
Martin-Löf constructive type theory with rules for structural induction in the style of
Peano — a logic that is not well-suited for inductive proof search, as discussed in § 4.6.
Oyster is based on tactics with specifications in a meta-level language which provides a
complete representation of the object level, but with a search space much better suited for
inductive proof search.
CLaM is a proof planner (cf. § 7.1) which guides Oyster, based on proof search in the
meta-language, which includes rippling (cf. § 7.2).
Oyster/CLaM is the slowest system explicitly mentioned in this article.182 One reason
for this inefficiency is its constructive object-level logic. Its successor systems, however,
are much faster.185
In its line of development, Oyster/CLaM proved the viability of several most important
new concepts:
• Among the approaches that more or less address theorem proving in general, we have
to mention rippling (cf. § 7.2) and a productive use of failure for the suggestion of
crucial new lemmas.186
• A most interesting approach that addresses the core of the automation of induc-
tive theorem proving and that deserves further development is the extension of
recursion analysis to ripple analysis.187
183The system description [Bundy &al., 1990] ofOyster/CLaM appeared already in summer 1990 at the
CADE conference series (with a submission in winter 1989/1990); so the development must have started
before the 1990s, contrary to what is stated in § 11.4 of [Bundy, 1999].
184For Alan Bundy see also Note 7.
185One of the much faster successor systems of Oyster/CLaM under further development is IsaPlanner,
which is based on Isabelle [Paulson, 1990]. See [Dixon & Fleuriot, 2003] and [Dennis &al., 2005]
for early publications on IsaPlanner.
186Cf. [Ireland & Bundy, 1994]. Moreover, see our discussion on the particular theoretical relevance of
finding new lemmas in mathematical induction in § 4.10. Furthermore, note that the practical relevance
of finding new lemmas addresses the efficiency of theorem proving in general, as described in Notes 72, 73,
and 76 of § 4.10.
187Ripple analysis is sketched already in [Bundy &al., 1989, § 7] and nicely presented in [Bundy, 1999,
§ 7.10].
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7 Alternative Approaches Besides Explicit Induction
In this section we will discuss the approaches to the automation of mathematical induc-
tion that do not strictly follow the method of explicit induction as we have described it.
In general, these approaches are not disjoint from explicit induction. To the contrary, proof
planning and rippling have until now been applied mostly to systems more or less based
on explicit induction, but they are not exclusively related to induction and they are not
following Boyer–Moore’s method of explicit induction in every detail. Even systems
for implicit induction may include many features of explicit induction and some of them
actually do, such as Rrl (cf. § 6.6.1) and QuodLibet (cf. § 7.4).
7.1 Proof Planning
Suggestions on how to overcome an envisioned dead end in automated theorem proving
were summarized in the end of the 1980s under the keyword proof planning. Besides its
human-science aspects,188 the main idea189 of proof planning is to extend a theorem-proving
system — on top of the low-level search space of the logic calculus of a proof checker — with
a higher-level search space, which is typically smaller or better organized w.r.t. searching,
more abstract, and more human-oriented.
The extensive and sophisticated subject of proof planning is not especially related to
induction, but addresses automated theorem proving in general. We cannot cover it here
and have to refer the reader to the standard publications on the subject.190
7.2 Rippling
Rippling is a technique for augmenting rewrite rules with information that helps to find a
way to rewrite one expression (goal) into another (target), more precisely to reduce the
difference between the goal and the target by rewriting the goal.
Although rippling is not restricted to inductive theorem proving, it was first used by
Raymond Aubin191 in the context of the description of heuristics for the automation of
mathematical induction and found most of its applications there. The leading developers
and formalizers of the technique are Alan Bundy, Dieter Hutter, David Basin,
Frank van Harmelen, and Andrew Ireland.
We have already mentioned rippling in § 6.6 several times, but this huge and well-
documented area of research cannot be covered here, and we have to refer the reader to the
monograph [Bundy &al., 2005].192
188Cf. [Bundy, 1989].
189Cf. [Bundy, 1988], [Dennis &al., 2005].
190In addition to [Bundy, 1988; 1989] and [Dennis &al., 2005], see also [Dietrich, 2011], [Melis &al.,
2008], [Jamnik &al., 2003], and the references there.
191The verb “to ripple up” is used in §§ 3.2 and 3.4 of [Aubin, 1976] — not as a technical term, but
just as an informal term for motivating some heuristics. The formalizers of rippling give explicit credit to
Aubin [1976] for their inspiration in [Bundy &al., 2005, § 1.10, p. 21], although Aubin does not mention
the term at any other place in his publications [Aubin, 1976; 1979]. Note, however, that instead of today’s
name “rippling out”, Aubin actually used “rippling up”.
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Let us explain here, however, why rippling can be most helpful in the automation of
simple inductive proofs.
Roughly speaking, the remarkable success in proving simple theorems by induction
automatically, can be explained as follows: If we look upon the task of proving a theorem
as reducing it to a tautology, then we have more heuristic guidance when we know that
we probably have to do it by mathematical induction: Tautologies can have arbitrary
subformulas, but the induction hypothesis we are going to apply can restrict the search
space tremendously.
In a cartoon of Alan Bundy’s, the original theorem is pictured as a zigzagged moun-
tainscape and the reduced theorem after the unfolding of recursive operators according to
recursion analysis (goal) is pictured as the reflection of the mountainscape on the surface of
a lake with ripples. To apply the induction hypothesis (target), instead of the uninformed
search for an arbitrary tautology, we have to get rid of the ripples to be able to apply
an instance of the theorem as induction hypothesis to the mountainscape mirrored by the
calmed surface of the lake.
A crucial advantage of rippling in the area of automated induction is that it can also be
used to suggest missing lemmas as described in [Ireland & Bundy, 1994].
Until today, rippling was applied to the automation of induction only within explicit
induction, whereas it is clearly not limited to explicit induction, and we actually expect it
to be more useful in areas of automated theorem proving with bigger search spaces and,
in particular, in descente infinie.
7.3 Implicit Induction
The further approaches to mechanize mathematical induction not subsumed by explicit
induction, however, are united under the name “implicit induction”.
Triggered193 by the success of Boyer & Moore [1979], publication on these alternative
approaches started already in the year 1980 in purely equational theories.194 A sequence
of papers on technical improvements195 was topped by [Bachmair, 1988], which gave rise
to a hope to develop the method into practical usefulness, although it was still restricted
to purely equational theories. Inspired by this paper, in the late 1980s and the first half
of the 1990s several researchers tried to understand more clearly what implicit induction
means from a theoretical point of view and whether it could be useful in practice.196
192Historically important are also the following publications on rippling: [Hutter, 1990], [Bundy &al.,
1991], [Ireland & Bundy, 1994], [Basin & Walsh, 1996].
193Although it is obvious that in the relatively small community of artificial intelligence and computer
science in the 1970s, the success of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] triggered the publication of papers on
induction in the term rewriting community, we can document the influence of Boyer and Moore’s work
here only with the following facts: [Boyer & Moore, 1975; 1979] are both cited in [Huet & Hullot,
1980]. [Boyer & Moore, 1977b] is cited in [Musser, 1980] as one of the “important sources of inspiration”.
Moreover, Lankford [1980] constitutively refers to a personal communication with Robert S. Boyer in
1979. Finally, Goguen [1980] avoids a direct reference to Boyer and Moore, but cites only the PhD
thesis [Aubin, 1976] of Raymond Aubin, following their work in Edinburgh.
194Cf. [Goguen, 1980], [Huet & Hullot, 1980], [Lankford, 1980], [Musser, 1980].
195Cf. [Göbel, 1985], [Jouannaud & Kounalis, 1986], [Fribourg, 1986], [Küchlin, 1989].
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While it is generally accepted that [Bachmair, 1988] is about implicit induction and
[Boyer & Moore, 1979] is about explicit induction, there are the following three different
viewpoints on what the essential aspect of implicit induction actually is.
Proof by Consistency:197 Systems for proof by consistency run someKnuth–Bendix198
or superposition199 completion procedure. A proof attempt is successful when the
prover has drawn all necessary inferences and stops without having detected any in-
consistency.
Proof by consistency typically produces a huge number of irrelevant inferences under
which the ones relevant for establishing the induction steps can hardly be made ex-
plicit. Proof by consistency has shown to perform far worse than any other known
form of mechanizing mathematical induction; mainly because it requires the genera-
tion of far too many superfluous inferences. Moreover, the runs are typically infinite,
and the admissibility conditions are too restrictive for most applications.
Roughly speaking, the conceptual flaw in proof by consistency is that, instead of find-
ing a sufficient set of reasonable inferences, the research follows the idea of ruling out
as many irrelevant inferences as possible.
Implicit Induction Ordering: In the early implicit-induction systems,200 induction
proceeds over a syntactical term ordering, which typically cannot be made explicit in
the sense that there would be some predicate term in the logical syntax that denotes
this ordering in the intended models of the specification. The semantical orderings of
explicit induction, however, cannot depend on the precise syntactical term structure
of a weight w, but only on the value of w under an evaluation in the intended models.
Contrary to rudimentary inference systems that turned out to be more or less useless
in practice (such as the one of [Bachmair, 1988] for inductive completion in uncon-
ditional equational specifications), more powerful human-oriented inference systems
(such as the one of QuodLibet) are considerably restrained by the constraint to be
sound also for induction orderings that depend on the precise syntactical structure of
terms (beyond their values).201
The early implicit-induction systems needed such sophisticated term orderings,202 be-
cause they started from the induction conclusion and every inference step reduced
the formulas w.r.t. the induction ordering again and again, but an application of an
induction hypothesis was admissible to greater formulas only. This deterioration of
the ordering information with every inference step was overcome by the introduction
of explicit weight terms in [Wirth & Becker, 1995], which obviate the former need
for syntactical term orderings as induction orderings.
196Cf. e.g. [Zhang &al., 1988], [Kapur & Zhang, 1989], [Bevers & Lewi, 1990], [Reddy, 1990],
[Gramlich & Lindner, 1991], [Ganzinger & Stuber, 1992], [Bouhoula & Rusinowitch, 1995],
[Padawitz, 1996].
197The name “proof by consistency” was coined in the title of [Kapur & Musser, 1987], which is the
later published forerunner of its outstanding improved version [Kapur & Musser, 1986].
198See Unicom [Gramlich & Lindner, 1991] for such a system, following [Bachmair, 1988] with several
improvements. See [Knuth & Bendix, 1970] for the Knuth–Bendix completion procedure.
199See [Ganzinger & Stuber, 1992] for such a system.
200See [Gramlich & Lindner, 1991] and [Ganzinger & Stuber, 1992] for such systems.
201This soundness constraint, which was still observed in [Wirth, 1997], was dropped during the further
development of QuodLibet in [Kühler, 2000], because it turned out to be unintuitive and superfluous.
202Cf. e.g. [Bachmair, 1988], [Steinbach, 1988; 1995], [Geser, 1996].
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Descente Infinie (“Lazy Induction”): Contrary to explicit induction, where induction
is introduced into an otherwise merely deductive inference system only by the explicit
application of induction axioms in the induction rule, the cyclic arguments and their
well-foundedness in implicit induction need not be confined to single inference steps.203
The induction rule of explicit induction generates all induction hypotheses in a single
inference step. To the contrary, in implicit induction, the inference system “knows”
what an induction hypothesis is, i.e. it includes inference rules that provide or ap-
ply induction hypotheses, given that certain ordering conditions resulting from these
applications can be met by an induction ordering. Because this aspect of implicit
induction can facilitate the human-oriented induction method described in § 4.6, the
name descente infinie was coined for it (cf. § 4.7). Researchers introduced to this
aspect by [Protzen, 1994] (entitled “Lazy Generation of Induction Hypotheses”)
sometimes speak of “lazy induction” instead of descente infinie.
The entire handbook article [Comon, 2001] (with corrections in [Wirth, 2005a]) is dedi-
cated to the two aspects of proof by consistency and implicit induction orderings. Today,
however, the interest in these two aspects tends to be historical or theoretical, especially
because these aspects can hardly be combined with explicit induction.
To the contrary, descente infinie synergetically combines with explicit induction, as wit-
nessed by the QuodLibet system, which we will discuss in § 7.4.
7.4 QuodLibet
In the last years of the Collaborative Research Center SFB314 “Artificial Intelligence”
(cf. § 6.6.2), after extensive experiments with several inductive theorem proving systems,204
such as the explicit-induction systems Nqthm (cf. § 6.4) and Inka (cf. § 6.6.2), the
implicit-induction system Unicom [Gramlich & Lindner, 1991], and the mixed sys-
tem Rrl (cf. § 6.6.1), Claus-Peter Wirth (*1963) and Ulrich Kühler (*1964) came
to the conclusion that — in spite of the excellent interaction concept of Unicom205 —
descente infinie was actually the only aspect of implicit induction that deserved further
investigation. Moreover, the coding of recursive functions in unconditional equations in
Unicom turned out to be most inadequate for inductive theorem proving in practice, where
positive/negative-conditional equations were in demand for specification, as well as clausal
logic for theorem proving.206
Therefore, a new system had to be created, which was given the name QuodLibet
(Latin for “as you like it”), because it should enable its users to avoid overspecification by
admitting partial function specifications, and to execute proofs whose crucial proof steps
mirror exactly the intended ones.207
203For this reason, the funny name “inductionless induction” was originally coined for implicit induction
in the titles of [Lankford, 1980; 1981] as a short form for “induction without induction rule”. See also the
title of [Goguen, 1980] for a similar phrase.
204Cf. [Kühler, 1991].
205For the assessment of Unicom’s interaction concept see [Kühler, 1991, p. 134ff.].
206See [Kühler, 1991, pp. 134, 138].
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A concept for partial function specification instead of the totality requirement of ex-
plicit induction was easily obtained by elaborating the first part of [Wirth, 1991] into
the framework for positive/negative-conditional rewrite systems of [Wirth & Gramlich,
1994a]. After inventing constructor variables in [Wirth &al., 1993], the monotonicity of
validity w.r.t. consistent extension of the partial specifications was easily achieved [Wirth
& Gramlich, 1994b], so that the induction proofs did not have to be re-done after such
an extension of a partially defined function.
Although the efficiently decidable confluence criterion that defines admissibility of func-
tion definitions inQuodLibet and guarantees their (object-level) consistency (cf. § 5.2) was
very hard to prove and was presented completely and in an appropriate form not before
[Wirth, 2009], the essential admissibility requirements were already clear in 1996.208
The weak admissibility conditions of QuodLibet — mutually recursive functions, pos-
sibly partially defined because of missing cases or non-termination — are of practical impor-
tance. Although humans can code mutually recursive functions into non-mutually recursive
functions,209 they will hardly be able to understand complicated formulas where these en-
codings occur, and so they will have severe problems in assisting the proving system in the
construction of hard proofs. Partiality due to non-termination essentially occurs in inter-
preters with undecidable domains. Partiality due to missing cases of the definition can
often be avoided by overspecification in theory, but not in practice where the unintended
results of overspecification may complicate matters considerably.
For instance, Bernd Löchner (*1967) (a user, not a developer of QuodLibet) con-
cludes in [Löchner, 2006, p. 76]:
“The translation of the different specifications into the input language of the
inductive theorem prover QuodLibet [Avenhaus &al., 2003] was straight-
forward. We later realized that this is difficult or impossible with several other
inductive provers as these have problems with mutual recursive functions and
partiality” . . .
207We cannot claim that QuodLibet is actually able to execute proofs whose crucial proof steps mirror
exactly the ones intended by its human users, simply because this was not scientifically investigated in
terms of cognitive psychology. Users, however, considered it to be more appropriate that other systems
in this aspect, mostly due to the direct support for partial and mutually recursive function specification,
cf. [Löchner, 2006]. Moreover, the four dozen elementary rules of QuodLibet’s inference machine were
designed to mirror the way human’s organize their proofs (cf. [Wirth, 1997], [Kühler, 2000]); so a user
has to deal with one natural inference step where Oyster may have hundreds of intuitionistic steps. The
appropriateness ofQuodLibet’s calculus for interchanging information with humans deteriorated, however,
after adding inference rules for the efficient implementation of Presburger Arithmetic, as we will explain
below. Note that the calculus is only the lowest logic level a user of a theorem-proving system may have to
deal with; from our experience with many such systems we came to the firm conviction, however, that the
automation of proof search will always fail on the lowest logic level from time to time, such that human-
oriented state-of-the-art logic calculi are essential for the acceptance of automated, interactive theorem
provers by their users.
208See [Kühler & Wirth, 1996] for the first publication of the object-level consistency of the
specifications that are admissible and supported with strong induction heuristics in QuodLibet.
In [Kühler & Wirth, 1996], a huge proof from the original 1995 edition of [Wirth, 2005b] guaran-
teed the consistency. Moreover, the most relevant and appropriate one of the seven inductive validities
of [Wirth & Gramlich, 1994b] is chosen for QuodLibet in [Kühler & Wirth, 1996] (no longer the
initial or free models typical for implicit induction!).
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Based on the descente infinie inference system for clausal first-order logic of [Wirth &
Kühler, 1995],210 the system development of QuodLibet in Common Lisp (cf. § 6.5),
mostly by Kühler and Tobias Schmidt-Samoa (*1973), lasted from1995 to 2006. The
system was described and demonstrated at the 19th Int. Conf. on Automated Deduction
(CADE), Miami Beach (FL), 2003 [Avenhaus &al., 2003]. The extension of the descente
infinie inference systems of QuodLibet to the full [modal] higher-order logic of [Wirth,
2004; 2013] has not been implemented yet.
To the best of our knowledge, QuodLibet is the first theorem prover whose proof
state is an and-or-tree (of clauses); actually, a forest of such trees, so that in a mutual
induction proof each conjecture providing induction hypotheses has its own tree [Kühler,
2000]. An extension of the recursion analysis of [Boyer & Moore, 1979] for constructor-
style specifications (cf. § 5.5) was developed by writing and testing tactics in QuodLibet’s
Pascal-like211 meta-language Qml [Kühler, 2000]. To achieve an acceptable run-time
performance (but not competitive with ACL2, of course), Qml tactics are compiled before
execution.
In principle, termination proofs are not required, simply because termination is not an
admissibility requirement in QuodLibet. Instead, definition-time recursion analysis uses
induction lemmas (cf. § 6.3.7) to prove lemmas on function domains by induction.212
At proof time, recursion analysis is used by the standard tactic only to determine the
induction variables from the induction templates: As seen in Example 4.3 of § 4.7 w.r.t.
the strengthened transitivity of lessp (as compared to the explicit-induction proof in Ex-
ample 6.2 of § 6.2.6 and Example 6.13 of § 6.3.8), subsumption and merging of schemes are
not required in descente infinie.213
209See the first paragraph of § 5.7.
210Later improvements of this inference system are found in [Wirth, 1997], [Kühler, 2000], and
[Schmidt-Samoa, 2006b].
211See [Wirth, 1971] for the programming language Pascal. The critical decision for an imperative
instead of a functional tactics language turned out to be most appropriate during the ten years of using
Qml.
212While domain lemmas for totally defined functions are usually found without interaction and total
functions do not provide relevant overhead in QuodLibet, the user often has to help in case of partial
function definitions by providing domain lemmas such as
Def delfirst(x, l), mbp(x, l) 6= true,
for delfirst defined via (delfirst1–2) of § 4.5.
213Although it is not a must and not part of the standard tactic, induction hypotheses may be generated
eagerly in QuodLibet to enhance generalization as in Example 4.5 of § 4.9, in which case subsumption
and merging of induction schemes as described in § 6.3.8 are required. Moreover, the concept of flawed
induction schemes of QuodLibet (taken over from Thm as well, cf. § 6.3.8) depends on the mergeability
of schemes. Furthermore, QuodLibet actually applies some merging techniques to plan case analyses
optimized for induction [Kühler, 2000, § 8.3.3]. The question why QuodLibet adopts the great ideas of
recursion analysis from Thm, but does not follow them precisely, has two answers: First, it was necessary
to extend the heuristics of Thm to deal with constructor-style definitions. The second answer was already
given in § 6.3.9: Testing is the only judge on heuristics.
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A considerable speed-up of QuodLibet and an extension of its automatically provable
theorems was achieved by Schmidt-Samoa during his PhD work with the system in 2004–
2006. He developed a marking concept for the tagging of rewrite lemmas (cf. § 6.3.1),
where the elements of a clause can be marked as Forbidden, Mandatory, Obligatory, and
Generous, to control the recursive relief of conditions in contextual rewriting [Schmidt-
Samoa, 2006b; 2006c]. Moreover, a very simple, but most effective reuse mechanism
analyzes during a proof attempt whether it actually establishes a proof of some sub-clause,
and uses this knowledge to crop conjunctive branches that do not contribute to the actual
goal [Schmidt-Samoa, 2006b]. Finally, an even closer integration of linear arithmetic
(cf. Note 177) with excellent results [Schmidt-Samoa, 2006a; 2006b] questioned one of
the basic principles of QuodLibet, namely the idea that the prover does not try to be
clever, but stops early if there is no progress visible, and presents the human user the proof
state in a nice graphical tree representation: The expanded highly-optimized formulation
of arithmetic by means of special functions for the decidable fragment of Presburger
Arithmetic results in clauses that do not easily admit human inspection anymore. We did
not find means to overcome this, because we did not find a way to fold theses clauses to
achieve a human-oriented higher level of abstraction.
QuodLibet is, of course, able to do all214 descente infinie proofs of our examples
automatically. Moreover, QuodLibet finds all proofs for the irrationality of the square
root of two indicated in Figure 4 (sketched in § 6.3.9) automatically and without explicit
hints on the induction ordering (say, via newly defined nonsensical functions, such as the
one given in (sqrtio1) of § 6.3.9) — provided that the required lemmas are available.
All in all, QuodLibet has proved that descente infinie (“lazy induction”) goes well
together with explicit induction and that we have reason to hope that eager induction-
hypotheses generation can be overcome for theorems with difficult induction proofs, sac-
rificing neither efficiency nor the usefulness of the excellent heuristic knowledge developed
in explicit induction. Why descente infinie and human-orientedness should remain on
the agenda for induction in mathematics assistance systems is explained in the manifesto
[Wirth, 2012c].
214These three descente infinie proofs are presented as Examples 4.2 and 4.3 of § 4.7, and Example 4.5
of § 4.9.
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8 Lessons Learned
What lessons can we draw from the history of the automation of induction?
• Do not be too inclined to follow the current fads. Choose a hard problem, give
thought to the “right” foundations, and then pursue its solution with patience and
perseverance.
• Another piece of oft-repeated advice to the young researcher: start simply.
From the standpoint of formalizing microprocessors, investing in a theorem prover
supporting only NIL and CONS is clearly inadequate. From the standpoint of under-
standing induction and simplification, however, it presents virtually all the problems,
and its successors then gradually refined and elaborated the techniques. The four key
provers discussed here — the Pure LISP Theorem Prover, Thm, Nqthm, and
ACL2 — are clearly “of a kind”. The lessons learned from one tool directly informed
the design of the next.
• If you are interested in building an inductive theorem prover, do not make the mistake
of focusing merely on an induction principle and the heuristics for controlling it. A
successful inductive theorem prover must be able to simplify and generalize. Ideally,
it should be able to invent new concepts to express inductively provably theorems.
• If theorems and proofs are simple and obvious for humans, a good automatic theorem
prover ought not to struggle with them. If it takes a lot of time and machinery to
prove obvious theorems, then truly interesting theorems are out of reach.
• Do not be too eager to add features that break old ones. Instead, truly explore the
extent to which new problems can be formalized within the existing framework so as
to exploit the power of the existing system.
Had Boyer and Moore adopted higher-order logic initially or attempted to solve
the problem solely by exhaustive searching in a general purpose logic calculus, the
discovery of many powerful techniques would have been delayed.
• We strongly recommend collecting all your successful proofs into a regression suite
and re-running your improved provers on this suite regularly. It is remarkably easy
to “improve” a theorem prover such that it discovers a new proof at the cost of failing
to re-discover old ones.
The ACL2 regression suite, which is used as the acceptance test that any suggested
possible improvement has to pass, contains over 90,000 DEFTHM commands, i.e. con-
jectures to be proved. It is an invaluable resource to Kaufmann and Moore when
they explore new heuristics.
• Finally, Boyer and Moore did not give names to their provers before ACL2, and
so they became most commonly known under the name the Boyer–Moore theorem
prover.
So here is some advice to young researchers who want to become well-known: Build
a good system, but do not give it a name, so that people have to attach your name
to it!
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9 Conclusion
“One of the reasons our theorem prover is successful is that we trick the user into
telling us the proof. And the best example of that, that I know, is: If you want
to prove that there exists a prime factorization — that is to say a list of primes
whose product is any given number — then the way you state it is: You define
a function that takes a natural number and delivers a list of primes, and then
you prove that it does that. And, of course, the definition of that function
is everybody else’s proof. The absence of quantifiers and the focus on con-
structive, you know, recursive definitions forces people to do the work. And so
then, when the theorem prover proves it, they say ‘Oh what wonderful theorem
prover!’, without even realizing they sweated bullets to express the theorem in
that impoverished logic.”
said Moore, and Boyer agreed laughingly.215
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